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**The Army
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
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The Army in American Society

The theme of *Military Review's* 1991 writing contest was "The Army in American Society." Numerous entries from Active and Reserve soldiers, retired officers and civilian scholars offered wide-ranging views on the Army and the military in America's society. The first-, second- and third-place winning essays are presented on the following pages. Each article offers several interesting thoughts and proposals on a pertinent topic. Officers' interest in the future of our Army and the quality of their efforts here indicate that they are willing and able to contribute to the tremendous job facing our Army in the days and years ahead.



America, the Army and the Buffalo Soldiers

On Saturday, 25 July, a monument will be dedicated at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, to the "Buffalo Soldiers" of the 9th and 10th Cavalry regiments. The ceremony itself promises to be a big event and will give those attending the ceremony, in spirit as well as in person, a chance to reflect on the sacrifices and the dedication of those who were unknown soldiers in at least one respect but who should be unknown no longer. When the crowd has gone home, the flags put away and the speeches long forgotten, the striking bronze statue of a horse-mounted cavalryman will remain, near the site where the Buffalo Soldiers spent their first hard winter in camp.

It is not hard to imagine that the Buffalo Soldier Monument will become one of the most photographed in the Army, a regional tourist attraction to be visited by elementary school classes, foreign visitors and roving bands of Combined Arms and Services Staff School students. Since it is situated at the intellectual, if not the physical, crossroads of the Army, nearly every serving officer will have the opportunity to visit the site at one time or another. It is clear what the Buffalo Soldier Monument commemorates, and its full meaning for future generations of soldiers can only be supposed. Certainly, a tangible remembrance of the Buffalo Soldiers is long overdue, but such a monument may not have even been possible until recent years. But late will have to do, and now, 1992, is the right time to honor our brothers-in-arms for their service. It is also a good time to reflect on the Army's relationship to the country and to the institutions of the people it serves. Not to be lost or ignored is the painful irony that the dedication of the Buffalo Soldier Monument occurs less than 90 days after Active and National Guard troops were mobilized and deployed into the Los Angeles war zone. Obviously, there is still work to be done, both within the Army and without, to understand and to cultivate the relationships that make America what it is. Perhaps the dedication of the Buffalo Soldier Monument will contribute to that necessary endeavor.

Military Review's 1991 writing contest was crafted to explore these basic relationships between Army, government and people, and we are pleased to offer the three winning articles in this issue. The subject area of the contest, "The Army in American Society," was purposefully broad to allow a range of articles on issues that affect and often confound both the Army and the country at large. We anticipated articles on values, ethics and morality, women in the Army, public support for the military, the volunteer Army, alcohol and drug abuse, AIDS, the military-media relationship, homosexuality and equal opportunity and were not disappointed in the range of articles we received. Every entrant underscored the idea that Army problems reflect society's problems and that the Army's virtues echo those of America. In publishing the winners, we wish to congratulate the authors: Major Rainier H. Spencer, first place for "Blacks, the Army and America"; Captain James B. Brown, second place for "Media Access to the Battlefield"; and Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Maginnis, third place for "The Future of Women in the Army." We also wish to express our appreciation to all authors who took the time to wrestle with these and other pressing issues. Writing about and discussing such issues contribute to an understanding of the Army's place in American society. By honoring the Buffalo Soldiers we also acknowledge the need for much understanding.

All soldiers should take great pride in the dedication of the Buffalo Soldier Monument. Their long ago service is an example to all of us, as well as to the nation as a whole. But the dedication ceremony is only a moment in time during the important work of making the Army, and America, the best that it can be. We are all engaged in that work—understanding the problems of the past, the tasks of the present and the challenges of the future. In that sense, the Buffalo Soldier Monument belongs to all soldiers, to all Americans, to all of us. It cannot, nor should it, be any other way.

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Blacks, the Army and America

Major Rainier H. Spencer, US Army

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The author cautions that the relatively light losses incurred by American ground forces during Operation Desert Storm were atypical of a major war and should not cause us to gloss over a national problem of fundamental moral significance. He offers his views on the disproportionate racial composition of the US Army as a symptom of a larger societal illness that must be treated and cured.

Proportion: A relationship between things or parts of things with respect to comparative magnitude, quantity, or degree. Disproportionate: Out of proportion, as in relative size, shape, or amount.

The American Heritage Dictionary

THE GULF WAR brought to the forefront of national debate a delicate and very difficult question—the issue of black overrepresentation in the Army. Only 50 years ago, the very suggestion of this problem would have been inconceivable. In 1942, blacks made up 5.8 percent of the Army.¹ Most black soldiers were draftees and served primarily in support roles in organizations such as the Quartermaster and Engineer corps. In the days of our segregated Army, black leaders fought to increase black enlistment, raise it to the level of black representation in the population and allow blacks to fight for America, albeit in all-black units. In those days, integration-wary Army leaders claimed that “the military should not be a laboratory for social experimentation.”² As it has turned out, the Army of today stands as the shining result of perhaps the most successful social experiment in

American history. The intervening 50 years have brought with them the end of enlistment discrimination, the end of Army segregation and a fivefold increase in the percentage of black soldiers on active duty. But because civilian America has refused to heed and follow this singular example, the Army’s great social success has become a problem the Army can acknowledge but cannot solve by itself.

Overrepresentation in the Army

Whites make up 84.2 percent of America, yet only 65 percent of the Army, while blacks constitute 12.4 percent of America and an amazing 28.9 percent of the Army.³ For every black person in America, there are 6.7 white persons; but in the Army, for every black soldier, there are only two white soldiers. The consequences for the black community, given across-the-board casualties in a major war (which the Gulf War was not) are of grave concern. In light of these numbers, the argument I want to make is that we should be concerned that blacks find themselves in the position of being prepared to make such a large sacrifice for a country that not only fails to extend equality to them but, through its social and economic practices, tends to steer blacks into armed defense of itself and its institutions—



The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense or any other government office or agency.—Editor

the very institutions that blacks seek to escape through joining the Army. It would appear that the disproportionate number of blacks in the

We should be concerned that blacks find themselves in the position of being prepared to make such a large sacrifice for a country that not only fails to extend equality to them but, through its social and economic practices, tends to steer blacks into armed defense of itself and its institutions—the very institutions that blacks seek to escape through joining the Army.

Army represents a clear-cut indictment of modern American society and, at the same time, sounds a ringing endorsement of today's Army and its equitable, color-blind policies. We should, therefore, regard the racial structure of the Army as the symptom of a larger societal problem and not blame the Army itself for being as attractive to blacks as it is.

We have several ways of viewing the large number of blacks in the Army. One way is to deny that black representation in the Army is in fact disproportionate. This clearly is not a reasonable position; for if to be represented in the Army at a rate that is two and one half times one's percentage of society is not disproportionate, what could possibly count as disproportionate representation? One might attempt to argue that this disproportionality is not a problem, but that is a different issue, one that acknowledges the obvious disparity in representation.

One might take the position that black soldiers are volunteers and that no one forced them to join, a view I will call "voluntarism." The holder of such a view could contend that blacks are guilty of inconsistency—they join the military to take advantage of increased opportunities and benefits and then balk when the possibility of combat arises. Conversely, the proponent of voluntarism might also say that blacks join the

Army out of the same deep feelings of patriotism and service as do their white counterparts. To suggest that they are forced by economics to join or join only for the benefits is to impugn the loyalty of the black soldier.

Still another view holds that American society has not been fair to blacks over the years, but the eve of the Gulf crisis was not the time for dissent. Service in the Gulf War would provide blacks an excellent opportunity to lay a claim to equal rights and treatment in mainstream American society. This view, which I shall call "absolutionism," advises blacks to sacrifice now for later rewards.

The Social Contract

It will be helpful to analyze these two perspectives using the social contract theory of government and obligation. Traditional social contract theory, as propounded by John Locke, holds that the force of government derives from humans agreeing with each other to first form a society and, then, to establish a government based on an agency type of social contract.⁴ This second contract is a conditional agreement between the people and the government. The people, in whom sovereignty resides, may dissolve the government should it not adhere to the conditions of its establishment—one of the foundations of our Constitution. The idea of obligation under the social contract comes about because part of the contract requires that each of us give up certain rights, such as the right to take the law into one's own hands, in exchange for the benefits and conveniences of a regulated society. If we partake of the advantages of society, that is, law and order, social services, protection from foreign invasion, on so on, then we are obligated to repay our society in the form of taxes, conventionally accepted behavior and general adherence to the norms of society. In a social contract scenario, the people agree to equally obey the government, and the government agrees to equally protect the people. We may apply the social contract theory of obligation to each of the views outlined above—the voluntarist and the absolutionist.

Artillerymen of the 1st Cavalry Division swab the tube of a M109A3 after a fire mission into Iraq, February 1991.



The typical white high-school graduate has a wide hallway of many open doors, with military service being one of the possibilities. As a contrast, we can compare this to the experience of the average black high-school graduate who, first of all, has a narrower hallway with fewer doors open, and who, upon squeezing down the constricting corridor, finds that the military door looms wide open and far more attractive than most other possibilities.

The Voluntarist Argument

Probably the easiest argument to make is the argument of the voluntarist. Military service is voluntary. America did not impose a draft during the Gulf buildup; so, clearly, anyone in uniform was in uniform freely, voluntarily. Christopher Jehn, assistant secretary of defense for force management and personnel, typified this attitude when he said of blacks:

"Nobody's making them enlist. They're not victims; they're willing, patriotic Americans."

The voluntarist approach assumes that one party to the social contract (America) has treated and protected the other party (all its citizens) equally and properly. In other words, the voluntarist assumes that America has fully upheld its part of the social contract. The voluntarist must make and defend this claim before the notion of volunteering can have any content insofar as black enlistees are concerned. Before concluding that the issue of a 28.9 percent black army in a nation that is 12.4 percent black is

nonproblematic, we must determine whether this disparity has in fact come about as the function of mere voluntary choice.

According to the *American Heritage Dictionary*, to volunteer is "to enter into or to offer to enter into an undertaking of one's own free will." To illustrate the environment of a potential volunteer, the new high-school graduate, let us use the analogy of a hallway containing doors of opportunity, with high-school graduation representing the entrance to the passageway. The typical white high-school graduate has a wide hallway of many open doors, with military service being one of the possibilities. As a contrast, we can compare this to the experience of the average black high-school graduate who, first of all, has a narrower hallway with fewer doors open, and who, upon squeezing down the constricting corridor, finds that the military door looms wide open and far more attractive than most other possibilities. Should both these graduates opt to volunteer for military service, we

cannot, in good conscience, call both instances volunteering; or if we can, certainly not volunteering to the same degree. This disparity in options appears even more extreme when some

One might take the position that black soldiers are volunteers and that no one forced them to join, a view I will call "voluntarism." The holder of such a view could contend that blacks are guilty of inconsistency—they join the military to take advantage of increased opportunities and benefits and then balk when the possibility of combat arises.

one as high in the military establishment as the commander of Operation Desert Storm, General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, speaking of black soldiers, says:

"I think it's a credit to the military because they come to the military because they understand that that's one place where they are going to be treated truly as equals and they have just as much opportunity to get ahead as anybody else."⁶ Schwarzkopf and other Army leaders such as the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin L. Powell, note that the racial disparity of the Army points to its being an institution that, in general, does not practice racial discrimination. According to Powell, "The Armed Forces have always provided opportunities for blacks, which blacks have found attractive and have gone after, and I see no reason to change that now."⁷

The statements of Powell and Schwarzkopf directly oppose the reasoning of Jehn. If the Army, as extreme and dangerous an occupation as it is, is so profoundly more attractive to blacks than the remainder of opportunities in America, there must be something fundamentally unattractive about black career options and chances for success in civilian America. If this is so, as both Powell and Schwarzkopf agree, then when the average black youth volunteers for Army service, he does so with less freedom than the average

white youth. Imagine a situation where you have the following options in choosing a career:

- The civilian environment, where you face racial discrimination, fewer educational opportunities and generally lower pay than your white counterpart.

- The military environment, which Northwestern University military sociologist, Charles C. Moskos Jr., has called "the only major institution in America with something like a level playing field."⁸

Clearly, in such a scenario, one would tend to favor the military option as the one with the greatest potential for satisfaction and advancement. This is the situation, and these are the options of the average black youth prior to enlisting. The average white youth does not face this dilemma; for him, either option guarantees relatively fair treatment, freedom from discrimination and equitable pay. Thus, we counter the voluntarist by noting that if the relative conditions for volunteering for Army service are not equivalent, then the resultant volunteering is not equivalent.

Going back to the social contract, we can see that, historically, America has a woeful record of fulfilling the contract in regard to its black citizens. It was only 37 years ago that racial segregation in public schools was constitutional. The positive changes that have come about in America over the past 50 years such as desegregation of public schools, integration of the military and the guarantee of voting rights have been the result of militancy and protest by blacks—these changes were not the result of voluntary, justice-based redresses by America. On the social contract model, America has failed to uphold its end of the contract and has created such disparate social conditions that blacks are joining the Army at a rate two and one half times their proportion in society. To say this is not to imply that these black enlistees are unpatriotic—patriotism and a quest for personal social improvement are not incompatible. What is fundamentally unfair and misleading is to ignore the different treatment America affords its black and white citizens and then to say, of both types of enlistees,



It was black congressmen and civic leaders who began to complain about the disproportionate representation of blacks in the Army, not black soldiers. . . . As long as conditions in civilian America continue to make the Army such an overwhelmingly attractive career alternative to blacks, it will remain the sharpest of double-edged swords: one edge—a powerful, efficient tool for social advancement; the other—war, disablement and death.

that each chose to volunteer based on the same wide range of career options.

The Absolutionist Argument

The absolutionist recognizes the inconsistencies inherent in the voluntarist position. The absolutionist accepts that America has yet to make good the "bad check" Martin Luther King Jr. spoke of at the Lincoln Memorial in 1963. In the absolutionist view, blacks are completely justified in their complaints about social conditions in America and the unequal burden they shoulder in its defense. But absolutionists cautioned blacks that instead of demanding justice, equality and recognition of their cause prior to the Gulf War, the best course of action was to serve proudly and without complaining so as to gain a warrant for making a case for racial equality after the war. On its surface, this admonition may seem prudent, but when considered in the context of the past historical sacrifices of blacks for the Army and America and the results these sacrifices have gained them in achieving racial equal-

ity, it seems rather hollow indeed. There was no reason to suppose that after this sacrifice, after this war, America would do what it had not done after all the other wars in which blacks served and died for their country. In fact, the absolutionist position almost seems to imply that blacks must somehow prove their worthiness to make any claim for racial justice. It is incongruous to, on the one hand, tell blacks that their complaints about social inequality are justified and, on the other, to say that they must first prove themselves by fighting in yet another war. This incongruity is made all the more plain for blacks returning from service in the gulf who sense a continuing erosion of the civil rights gains made in the last 50 years. On the social contract model, America, as described above, has failed to uphold its part of the contract insofar as black citizens are concerned. Recognizing this, it is doubly wrong to then require those citizens to again make the ultimate sacrifice before addressing their acknowledged grievances.



Lieutenant General Calvin Waller, deputy commander, CENTCOM, speaking with General Powell during a briefing in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, December 1990.

The Army of today stands as the shining result of perhaps the most successful social experiment in American history. The [past] 50 years have brought with them the end of enlistment discrimination, the end of Army segregation and a fivefold increase in the percentage of black soldiers on active duty. But because civilian America has refused to heed and follow this singular example, the Army's great social success has become a problem the Army can acknowledge but cannot solve by itself.

A Double-Edged Sword

Not only are our black soldiers patriotic, but they are uncomplaining as well. It was black congressmen and civic leaders who began to complain about the disproportionate representation of blacks in the Army, not black soldiers themselves. Herein lies the difficult irony of blacks and the Army. For blacks, the Army represents by far the surest way to achieve fair treatment and merit-based advancement in American society. As President George Bush said during his speech at the United States Military Academy graduation on 1 June 1991:

"Martin Luther King dreamed of an America in which one day our children would—and to quote—'not be judged by the color of their skin, but by the content of their character.' In the Army, just as here at West Point, that 'one day' has arrived."

But we must not allow ourselves to discount the fact that the cost to blacks of partaking of that opportunity and of participating in their nation's

one sure egalitarian institution is the risk of death or serious injury in the event of war. As long as conditions in civilian America continue to make the Army such an overwhelmingly attractive career alternative to blacks, it will remain the sharpest of double-edged swords: one edge—a powerful, efficient tool for social advancement; the other—war, disablement and death.

The problem is easy to state, but the remedy, in terms of what the Army can do, is elusive. To try to make black representation in the Army proportional to that in society, or to merely lower it, would deprive many young blacks of the only sure chance they have of improving their condition in society. On the other hand, to leave levels where they are or to allow them to rise invites cultural disaster in a major war since "unlike white enlistees who tend to be poorer and less educated than their civilian counterparts, most black servicemen and women are high school graduates or better from working- and middle-class families. . . . Black communities who have

already lost great numbers of men to drugs and crime will now lose 'the good ones' to war."¹⁰ In a major ground war with casualties at their traditional levels, black soldiers, who for the most part are widely distributed across the combat, combat support and combat service support arms, would die in numbers far greater than their 12.4 percent representation in society could justify.

The Army has become a cherished institution in America's black community. The irony and tragedy of the Army's dedication to equal rights lie in the gulf that exists between the Army and America as comparative color-blind societies. The Army has done such a manifestly excellent job of creating a progressive, discrimination-free environment that it draws striving, hardworking blacks to it as a magnet attracts iron. The Army cannot solve this problem because the problem lies not with it, but with the nation. Black overrepresentation in the Army can end through only one of two means: quotas limiting the numbers of blacks in the Army, which would surely be an even greater tragedy; or America's becoming as free and open a society as the Army is, so that other career options come to equal the Army in terms of fairness, opportunity and likelihood for advancement. We should want the Army to continue its commitment to equal rights and equal opportunity, and we should likewise demand that America, as a nation, follow the Army's lead and demonstrate its own dedica-

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tion to these cornerstones of our great republic.

There was a time when the US government had to direct the Army to desegregate, integrate and grant equal opportunity. On 26 July 1948, President Harry S. Truman signed Executive Order 9981, which stated that "there shall be equality of treatment and opportunity for all persons in the armed services without regard to race, color, religion, or national origin."¹¹ It took years for the Army to stop its bitter resistance and foot-dragging, but it finally took the policy to heart, and the result is the highly trained, fine-tuned Army we have today. Now, it is the Army that can lead the way for an American society desperately needing an Executive Order 9981 of its own. **MR**

NOTES

1. Martin Binkin and Mark J. Etelberg, with Alvin J. Schnexnider and Marvin M. Smith, *Blacks and the Military* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1982), 42.

2. *Ibid.*, 17-19.

3. These numbers come from two sources, "United States of America," in *Encyclopaedia Britannica: World Data Annual*, 1991 ed., and Isabel Wilkerson, "Blacks Wary of Their Big Role in Military," *The New York Times*, 25 January 1991, A12.

4. The main ideas of John Locke to which I refer are found in chapters 3, 7 and 19 of his *Second Treatise of Government*, 1698.

5. Wilkerson.

6. General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, "Address to United States Military Academy Cadets," 15 May 1991.

7. Wilkerson.

8. *Ibid.*

9. Chuck Eisele, "Chief hails graduates at West Point," *Pointer View* (7 June 1991), 1.

10. Wilkerson.

11. Bernard C. Nalty, *Strength for the Fight: A History of Black Americans in the Military* (New York: The Free Press, 1986), 242.

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Media Access to the Battlefield

Captain James B. Brown, US Army

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The media and the military have almost always been at odds with each other. The author addresses three pertinent questions that arise from this controversy. He explores the media's access to the battlefield from the Vietnam War through the Gulf War. He explains what makes up the Pentagon pool system and how it works. Finally, he offers some ideas on how to improve the media-military relationship.

OVER 2,500 years ago, the ancient Chinese philosopher Sun Tzu wrote:

"All warfare is based on deception. Hence, when able to attack, we must seem unable; when using our forces, we must seem inactive; when we are near, we must make him believe we are far away; when far away, we must make him believe we are near. Hold out baits to entice the enemy. Feign disorder, and crush him. If he is secure at all points, be prepared for him. If he is in superior strength, evade him. If your opponent is of choleric temper, seek to irritate him. Pretend to be weak, that he may grow arrogant. If he is taking his ease, give him no rest. If his forces are united, separate them. Attack him where he is unprepared, appear where you are not expected."

The writings of Sun Tzu in his book known as *The Art of War* are still as relevant to the military operational art today as they were in ancient China. Sun Tzu clearly demonstrates the value that total control of information and the ability to create false information can have in waging war. How, then, does the United States of America, which proclaims that it has a free press and indeed protects the freedom of the press in the Bill of Rights, allow for free media coverage while successfully conducting modern warfare in this "age of information"? During the past generation, the media have witnessed US in-

volvement in five different conflicts: Vietnam, Grenada, the Persian Gulf escort operations, Panama and the Gulf War. It is interesting to note that in each of these conflicts the government has controlled the role of the media differently from the previous conflict. In Vietnam, the media enjoyed relative freedom of access, movement and transmission. There were some restrictions imposed on the media by the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. In Grenada, initially, the media were excluded entirely. The Persian Gulf escort operations saw the use of the media pool system that seemed to show promise of success and the possibility of improved military-media relationships. In Panama, the pool system became a bottleneck for information rather than a conduit. Finally, in the Gulf War, the pool system resulted in what has been called "this nation's best covered war" by some and the "highest level of press restrictions ever allowed on the free media by the Pentagon" by others. The purpose of this article is to look at three pertinent questions that arise from the roles of the media and the military. First, should the media be allowed free access to US combat operations? Second, what is the Pentagon pool system and how does it affect coverage? Finally, how can the military-media relationship be improved for the coverage of future conflicts by the media?

MR

1991 MILITARY REVIEW WRITING CONTEST

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Media Access to the Battlefield

The free and independent media in the United States perform two critical functions in wartime. The first is to inform the public on what policies its government is pursuing and how these policies are being executed. The second purpose is to be present to independently record for history what happened. According to Barry Zorthian, a former State Department press officer who presided over the now infamous Saigon "Five o'clock Follies," in order for the public to be properly informed on the activities of its government, "We need the official version of the war presented by the military, [and] we need the independent observations and accounting of the media as a check on the government."² The true value of the independent media is, although only painfully discerned, most apparent when it serves to inform the public of a policy or conflict that is being carried out by the government to the detriment of the very public it is designed to serve. Two of the most historically relevant cases where the coverage of a free media led to a change in the foreign policy of the government can be found in Great Britain's involvement in the Crimean War and the US involvement in Vietnam.

The role of the press on the battlefield is not just an issue in the post-World War II era. Access of the print media to the battlefield began in 1854 with the arrival of Sir William Howard Russell to chronicle the British involvement in the Crimean War for *The Times* of London. The resulting coverage was surprisingly similar to the coverage by the American media in Vietnam over 100 years later. Russell informed his readers about the misadventures and poorly executed campaign of the British military in this distant war in reports that were "considerably closer [to] the truth than anything the public had previously been permitted to learn, and his influence on the conduct of the Crimean campaign was immense. . . . Once the public had been fully aroused to the state of the army in the Crimea, reaction was rapid. The government, at first worried only in case recruiting might be affected,

soon had to face an angry *Times* demanding that the army's medical services be reformed, a move that eventually took Florence Nightingale, a nurse of professional skill, to the war."³

Just as the unpopularity of the Vietnam War brought about the early end of Lyndon B. Johnson's presidency, Russell's dispatches were cred-

The free and independent media in the United States perform two critical functions in wartime. The first is to inform the public on what policies its government is pursuing and how these policies are being executed. The second purpose is to be present to independently record for history what happened.

ited with turning out the British government.⁴ The reaction of the British government to the impact of Russell's reporting was to establish a tight rein on the future role of British war correspondents.⁵

Over a century later, in what CBS newsman Morley Safer termed "television's first war," the US media found themselves performing the same function in Vietnam as Russell had in the Crimean War.⁶ The media sent home reports to the American people that contrasted sharply with the official government view of the conflict in Vietnam. Retired Colonel Harry Summers describes the impact of this controversy in his book, *On Strategy*:

"In order to smooth our relations with the American people we began to use euphemisms to hide the horror of war. We became the Department of the Army (not the War Department) and our own terminology avoided mention of the battlefield. We did not kill the enemy, we inflicted casualties; we did not destroy things, we neutralized targets. These evasions allowed the notion to grow that we could apply military force in a sanitary and surgical manner. In so doing, we unwittingly prepared the way for the reaction that was to follow.

"We had concealed from the American people the true nature of war at precisely the time that television brought its realities into their living rooms in living color. As a result, to many

Access of the print media to the battlefield began in 1854 with the arrival of Sir William Howard Russell to chronicle the British involvement in the Crimean War for The Times of London. . . . Just as the unpopularity of the Vietnam War brought about the early end of Lyndon B. Johnson's presidency, Russell's dispatches were credited with turning out the British government. The reaction of the British government to the impact of Russell's reporting was to establish a tight rein on the future role of British war correspondents.

Americans, Vietnam became the most destructive, the most horrible, the most terrible war waged in the history of the world. This viewpoint has persisted in the face of all historical evidence to the contrary."⁷

Unfortunately, one of the erroneous legacies of the Vietnam War has been the belief, which is especially prevalent in the military, that it was the media that lost the conflict. While the Western media were certainly the object of much manipulation from Hanoi, the lack of American public support for the conflict was more a reflection of the failure of the US government to have a clearly defined policy with readily attainable objectives in Vietnam and not the negative press coverage that was generated by the conflict.⁸

The reaction of the Pentagon and the Reagan administration to the ingrained belief that it was the media that led to the defeat in Vietnam was to exclude the media from covering the invasion of Grenada. Reporters were not only excluded from the initial invasion but were also left out of the first two days of the operation. The task force commander, Vice Admiral Joseph W. Metcalf

III, justified his exclusion of the press, saying:

"I did not want the press around where I would start second-guessing what I was doing relative to the press. I cannot duck the issue. I had a great deal to do with keeping them out. I think I did the right thing."⁹

This view was, of course, not just limited to the military, as demonstrated by Reagan's secretary of state when he commented: "It seems as though reporters are always against us. . . . They're always seeking to report something that's going to screw things up."¹⁰

Within two years of the invasion of Grenada, two separate panels that were appointed to look into the issue of press access to US combat operations expressed their objection to Metcalf's action. The findings of both panels strongly opposed the exclusion of the press from being able to report freely on the conduct of US military operations. The Sidle Panel, which was appointed by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John W. Vessey Jr., stated in its recommendations:

"The American people must be informed about United States military operations and this information can best be provided through both the news media and the Government. Therefore, the panel believes it is essential that the U.S. news media cover U.S. military operations to the maximum degree possible consistent with mission security and the safety of U.S. forces."¹¹

The other prominent commission that looked into the role of the media in US military operations was the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on the Military and the Media. This task force, which enjoyed far greater cooperation from the media than the Sidle Panel, found that "it is critical, in wartime as well as in peacetime, that our democracy have the freest possible flow of information. Accordingly, the task force believes that the presence of journalists in war zones is not a luxury but a necessity."¹² The conclusions of the Sidle Panel and the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force both called for the implementation of pool systems by the Department of Defense (DOD) in order to provide for initial coverage of any military operations until full

press access can be granted.¹³

The First Amendment to the US Constitution says that "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or the press." In commenting on the role of the media in US military operations with respect to the First Amendment, newsman John Chancellor told a congressional committee on the role of the media in Grenada:

"It is not only the privilege of the American press to be present at moments of historic importance, it is the responsibility of the press to be there. The men who died in the invasion of Grenada were representing values in American life; one of those values is the right of the citizenry to know what their government is doing. That principle, of the press as observer and as critic of the government, was established at the beginning of the United States. It is the responsibility of all citizens to uphold it."¹⁴

The opportunity for US policy to be scrutinized by a free and independent press is one of the enduring strengths of our form of government. Fortunately, the US government and the DOD delved into the issue of press access and, as a result, established a DOD national media pool.

The Pentagon Pool System

The DOD national media pool was formed by order of the secretary of defense in April of 1985. The purpose of the pool was to respond to this recommendation by the Sidle Panel:

"When it becomes apparent during military operational planning that news media pooling provides the only feasible means of furnishing the media with early access to an operation, planning should support the largest possible press pool that is practical and minimize the length of time the pool will be necessary."¹⁵

The design of the pool envisions an initial deployment of approximately 11 reporters, including representatives of all aspects of the public media, such as the wire services, network television, radio, newspaper and magazine correspondents.¹⁶ The concept is that this group of reporters can be secretly called out to join US forces shortly before they become involved in hostili-



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ties abroad. In this way, the secrecy of US operations, which can be vital to the success of the operation and the prevention of unnecessary US casualties, can be protected while the role of the independent media is preserved.

Prior to the US invasion of Panama, the DOD national media pool had been activated 10 separate times for a series of different exercises and several operational deployments such as the Persian Gulf escort operations in April 1987 and the deployment of portions of the 82d Airborne and 7th Infantry divisions to Honduras in March of 1988 in response to Nicaraguan forces' crossing into Honduras. Security of the pool deployment has continued to be a concern as, on a number of occasions, leaks among members of the media

"The American people must be informed about United States military operations and this information can best be provided through both the news media and the Government. Therefore, the panel believes it is essential that the U.S. news media cover U.S. military operations to the maximum degree possible consistent with mission security and the safety of U.S. forces."

General John W. Vessey, 1985

have made it known that the pool had been activated prior to departure.¹⁷ This occurred again on the evening of 19 December 1989 when, shortly after the pool had been called out, two Time magazine staff members at a Christmas party openly discussed who would be going with the pool into Panama.¹⁸ While the security of deploying the pool has been a concern, the pool has demonstrated on other occasions that it can deploy in secrecy. This was the case when the pool deployed to the Persian Gulf in August 1987 and Honduras in March 1988.¹⁹

The Pentagon pool system has been in a period of evolution since its conception in 1985. The nature of this evolution was recently touched on by Charles Lewis, the Washington bureau chief for Hearst newspapers, when he commented: "The relationship between the media and the military is not something that is written in divine script, but instead is worked out by good intentioned human beings trying to achieve an American solution to a difficult and perpetual question."²⁰

In Panama, the pool system failed in two respects. First, the deployment of the pool was compromised by members of the media; second, the pool was not dispatched in time to cover the invasion of Panama. The pool arrived in Panama 5 hours after the fighting began and immediately became "bogged down" for lack of dedicated transport.²¹ Instead of being taken to the fighting, the pool spent its first day in Panama being briefed by a US Embassy official in what one reporter described as a "history lesson," followed by another news conference that evening by the US ambassador.²² In addition to the pool members' not being taken to the action, what reports they could file were severely restricted by

Media Relations in Los Angeles

On 1 May, President George Bush mobilized soldiers from the 7th Infantry Division (ID) and Marines from Camp Pendleton and federalized California National Guardsmen in support of local police forces in Los Angeles. On the same day, Colonel Don Kirchoffner was sent from Army Public Affairs at the Pentagon to set up a Joint Information Bureau for media operations in the area.


Initially, the attitude among the soldiers—and their leaders—was, do not talk to the media. But that attitude soon changed when Major General Marvin Covault, 7th ID commander and Joint Task Force Los Angeles' commander, circulated via the chain of command a commonsense set of ground rules for answering reporters' questions.

The guidance was simple and direct: "The deployment of U.S. forces is a subject of great interest to the U.S. press and the American people. . . . This command fully supports the right of the American people to be informed of the capabilities and performance of their military and the important role played by the press to that end."

Soldiers and leaders were reminded of their responsibility to protect classified information, to not guess or speculate and to not discuss future operations or rules of engagement. Aside from that, Kirchoffner encouraged soldiers to talk to the media and arranged numerous escorts for the media to locations where troops were deployed. Covault made himself accessible to the media and gave numerous interviews. As a result, media relations in Los Angeles were cordial, professional and, according to Kirchoffner, "always positive regarding the military's participation and capabilities."

After redeployment to Washington, Kirchoffner reflected that the chain of command has always held the key to relations with reporters, good or bad. Positive command attitudes and policies regarding the media reflect confidence in the unit and in its ability to perform any given mission. Additionally, "Commanders need to fully understand that they are speaking to their own soldiers and their families as well as to the American public every time they step in front of a TV camera."

Members of the press activated for a test of the DOD national media pool during an exercise in Honduras, 21-25 April 1985.



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the lack of working fax machines or planned transport for film materials. The first video material, which was sent on Thursday, did not arrive in the United States until Saturday.²³ In the wake of the Panama invasion, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs Pete Williams initiated an inquiry, conducted by Fred Hoffman, into the problems of the press pool. Hoffman's findings revealed that although there were dedicated public affairs officers attempting to support the pool, the problems that the pool encountered were primarily caused by a lack of proper planning and execution, as well as "an excessive concern for secrecy."²⁴

Only eight months later, in the US response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990, the DOD national media pool was again called out—this time to cover the deployment of US forces for Operation *Desert Shield*. The Pentagon pool mechanism performed much better than it had in previous instances. Commenting on the initial 12 August deployment, one of the reporters in the pool, *Time* magazine's Jay Peterzell, said:

"The pool did give US journalists a way of getting into Saudi Arabia and seeing at least a part

of what was going on at a time when there was no other way of doing either of those things. Also, in the first two weeks after the wave of TV, newspaper and magazine correspondents flooded into the country, they did not produce any story that was essentially different from what we in the pool had filed."²⁵

During the Persian Gulf military buildup, as well as in the ensuing war, the media pools made marked improvements at ensuring that the media were on site to cover key events in the military campaign. In the wake of the war, Pentagon spokesman Williams declared that "the press gave the American people the best war coverage they ever had."²⁶ In support of his claim, he offered the following evidence:

"Before the air phase of the operation began in January, news organizations were afraid that we wouldn't get the pools out to see anything. But we did. Reporters were on an aircraft carrier in the Red Sea to witness the launching of the first air strikes, aboard a battleship in the Persian Gulf that fired the first cruise missiles ever used in combat, at the air bases where fighter planes and bombers were taking off around the clock,

The two main problems that the Pentagon pool system presented for the media in the Persian Gulf War were: first, failure to grant free access to the media where security was not a concern; and second, the lack of dedicated transport and logistic support for filing pool reports.

and with several ground units in the desert. . . . By the time the ground war began, 132 reporters and photographers were out with the Army and Marines on the ground. Reporters were out with every division, and 27 more were on ships at sea or on air bases.²⁷

Carl Rochelle of CNN was one of those reporters in the initial Pentagon pool in August 1990. He was on board the battleship USS *Wisconsin* to witness the firing of the first Tomahawk missiles in the war. Of his own pool experiences, he commented: "I thought they were doing a hell of a job."²⁸ Rochelle related how the captain of the *Wisconsin* had briefed the pool when the war was to begin and "kept us [the pool] apprised of what was going on at all times."²⁹ He was also pleased with how quickly his video tape was transported from the ship by a helicopter that was passing by. According to Rochelle, the captain of the ship enticed the helicopter to land with the promise of four free baseball caps and a hot meal if the crew would carry the video tape to its destination. "We filmed it [the first launch of a cruise missile] at 1:40 AM and it left at 3 [o'clock] in the afternoon. I thought that was pretty doggone good. I think it was on the air the next day."³⁰ Rochelle's positive experiences with the military pool system, as well as those of many other reporters, are evidence that the Pentagon has come a long way in providing media the access to US combat operations that had been denied the media and the American public in both Grenada and Panama.


Censorship by Access

The two main problems that the Pentagon pool system presented for the media in the Persian Gulf War were: first, failure to grant free ac-

cess to the media where security was not a concern; and second, the lack of dedicated transport and logistic support for filing pool reports. Lewis agreed with Williams' observation that the pool system produced excellent coverage of the war. He commented, "As a result of the pool system, the American public got an unprecedented broad view of the US fighting men and women assigned to the war theater."³¹ However, Lewis sounded a much more sober note when he observed that "the pool system allowed the government to control access to reporting that didn't affect security. The serious and fundamental question in the future involves 'censorship by access.' What the press pools got to see was decided by military officials."³² Frank Aukofer, the Washington bureau chief for *The Milwaukee Journal*, commented that the Pentagon pool system "failed miserably in Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf War" because the military's severe control on reporters' access to the story prevented independent observation by the media.³³ Aukofer claims that, as a result "when the history of this war is written, it probably will have to be written strictly from the military's view."³⁴ Jesse Schulman, a Mutual Broadcasting correspondent, commented in 1987 that the Pentagon pool system and the control of access creates a situation where "we [the media] are becoming accomplices in managed news coverage. It must be reporters and editors who decide whether a particular event is newsworthy, not Pentagon officials."³⁵

While the pool system has been used very successfully to provide coverage of key events that would go uncovered if it were not for the military transporting pools to the appropriate location at the correct time, the control of access in *all areas* creates the impression that the military has something to hide. Worse, it in fact creates the ability to manipulate the story in a way that could prevent the American people from learning what is going on in the military theater of operations.

There are only two ways in which the problem of media access will be solved. One is to allow reporters unilateral coverage—where they have freedom of movement, access and transmission. The other possible solution is for the Joint Infor-



Pool reporters interviewing the captain of the guided missile cruiser USS Fox as it escorts reflagged Kuwaiti tankers in the Persian Gulf, July 1987.

The Pentagon pool system has been in a period of evolution since its conception in 1985. The nature of this evolution was recently touched on by Charles Lewis, the Washington bureau chief for Hearst newspapers, when he commented: "The relationship between the media and the military is not something that is written in divine script, but instead is worked out by good intentional human beings trying to achieve an American solution to a difficult and perpetual question."

mation Bureau to support all requests for stories except in the case where bona fide security of an ongoing or future operation is in question. Summers, who was a member of the Twentieth Century Task Force, believes that allowing reporters free movement on the battlefield is the only dependable way of ensuring that the media is allowed to perform its critical function of acting as the independent link between the people, the army and the government.³⁶ When asked if he thought that this sort of freedom would result in an uncontrollable number of reporters roaming the front and interfering with military operations, Summers replied: "In two wars [Korea and Vietnam] as an infantryman, I never found it crowded up on the front!"³⁷ Zorthian has reported that during a five-year period in Vietnam, where a total of 2,000 reporters had freedom of access, movement and uninhibited transmission, there were only four or five security violations committed in violation of the ground rules.³⁸ Until reporters are able to get access to the stories that they believe are of interest to the public, they will, rightly or wrongly, develop the

suspicion that the military is intentionally hiding something from them.

In the area of transportation of pool reports, a great dichotomy existed among the different forces in the field. Aukofer reported that John Cain of the Associated Press told him, "The Marine pools got reports back in a timely fashion, but the Army pools were never heard from till after the war."³⁹ This observation was certainly borne out by *The Washington Post* during the four-day ground war. Molly Moore, who accompanied Marine units spearheading into Kuwait, had articles on the action published in the first edition of *The Washington Post* following the beginning of the ground war.⁴⁰ After the war, Moore commented:

"The problem was physically getting the information back. And the print media had it a little better than the electronic media, because at least with the Marine Corps [we] had an electronic mail satellite system where we could write our stories on our little Toshiba lap-top computers, take the disc out, walk down to the command tent, stick it in a military computer and have



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it satellited back to a rear base, . . . then faxed to Dhahran for dissemination."⁴¹

Moore's experience with the Marines, compared with that of ABC News' Linda Pattillo, demonstrates the vast difference that occurred within the pools assigned to different units.⁴²

"It was a logistics question I think more than anything for a lot of us out there. I never had any of my copy censored except for security reasons and it would always be something that had been agreed to previously under the guidelines. But it was amazing to us as it became apparent what the plan was for the ground war. Here was the US military, which had just pulled off this incredible movement of men and material in the 'Hail Mary' play, and they were relying on this antiquated Pony Express system of Marines in HMMWVs handing off our tapes to the next HMMWV down the line for a nine-hour drive to Dhahran. And in the end, the only reason we ended up having the first of the US military footage back in Dhahran was because a public affairs officer ran after a medevac chopper and threw our tapes on it, and we didn't know where it was going, it just went and it made its way back to Dhahran in an ABC newsbag."

When asked about the discrepancy between

Marine and Army pool reports, Lieutenant Colonel Joseph L. Allred of the US Army Public Affairs Media Relations Division commented that the Marines have developed their combat training to include planning for the media.⁴³ The need for the military to do a better job of transporting pool reports and using existing technology to support the speedy transmission of those reports has been well documented and acknowledged by Williams as one of the key areas to look at for improvement in the future.⁴⁴

Recommendations for Improvement

The past six years of the Pentagon pool system demonstrate that the presence of the media on future battlefields from day one cannot be assured solely through agreements between the press bureau chiefs in Washington and the Pentagon. It must be anticipated by professional officers and noncommissioned officers at all levels of command and authority within the US military. The only way for this to happen is for our forces to train as they will go to war. The US military has demonstrated that it is the best-trained and most capable military force in the world, yet when the media show up to report on the battle-

Civilian news crews in Saudi Arabia, 23 August 1990.



In the area of transportation of pool reports, a great dichotomy existed among the different forces in the field. . . . The Marines have developed their combat training to include planning for the media. The need for the military to do a better job of transporting pool reports and using existing technology to support the speedy transmission of those reports has been well documented and acknowledged by Williams as one of the key areas to look at for improvement in the future.

field, tactical commanders do not seem to have a common grasp on how to respond to or accommodate their presence. One of the best ways to overcome this shortfall would be to add live media reporting to major military exercises such as those at the US Army's National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, California. There, US mechanized brigades spend a month in the Mojave Desert fighting against a mock Soviet force. As always, the priority task for US units would be finding and defeating the enemy, but adding a media pool at this point in the training would certainly help the units respond to the inevitable presence of reporters in wartime. Likewise, perhaps the media could be convinced to send potential war correspondents to the NTC, where they could be exposed to the rigors of reporting in the field and learn about US military doctrine and capabilities.

The Sidle Panel recommended improving "the media-military understanding and cooperation" through expanded education in the military regarding the media and "through more visits by commanders and line officers to news organizations."⁴⁵ While this seems like a good recommendation on the surface, it runs contrary to the relationship that exists in war. In war, it

is the representative of the media who must go out to meet the military unit in the field and learn about it in order to inform the public—not the reverse. For this reason, it seems prudent to attempt to develop some sort of internship program by which military correspondents can become familiarized, during peacetime, with the capabilities of US military units and the rigors of the military lifestyle. If such a program could be instituted, it seems that all parties concerned would benefit—particularly the American public.

Returning to the teachings and tenets of Sun Tzu, Operation *Desert Storm*'s commander, General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, demonstrated in the execution of his plan to liberate Kuwait that press reporting can be a valuable part of a commander's deception plan. Such was the case with Schwarzkopf's threatened amphibious Marine landing, the training for which had been well covered by the media. The amphibious force turned out to be a feint—thereby pinning down valuable Iraqi military assets on the shoreline as ground forces poured into inland Kuwait and Iraq from unexpected directions.

It was Carl von Clausewitz who wrote that "war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political

intercourse, carried on with other means."⁴⁶ In the United States, all public policy is open to the inspection and criticism of our free and independent media. This is one of the bedrocks of our free society that our military fights to protect. As such, it is incumbent upon the US government and the military to do everything that can be done to ensure that the media have full access to US combat operations. It is interesting to note that it is not the Constitution itself, but rather the First Amendment, along with the Bill of Rights, adopted four years after the US Constitution, that guarantees the freedom of the press. In his *Federalist Papers*, Alexander Hamilton specifically addressed the issue of why the original

Constitution did not have such an amendment. "What is the liberty of the press? Who can give it any definition which would not leave the utmost latitude for evasion? I hold it to be impracticable; and from this I infer that its security, whatever fine declarations may be inserted in any constitution respecting it, must altogether depend on public opinion, and on the general spirit of the people of the government."⁴⁷

In the wake of our euphoria over the allied victory in the Gulf War, it is critical that "the public and the people of the government" rediscover the critical importance of the freedom of the press and work to better ensure it in future conflicts. **MR**

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2. Barry Zorthian, comments made during "The Media & The War: A Retrospective," National Press Forum panel discussion at the National Press Club, 19 March 1991.
3. Phillip Knightley, *The First Casualty* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1975), 5 and 7.
4. *Ibid.*, 14.
5. *Ibid.*, 16.
6. Peter Braestrup, *Battle Lines* (New York: Priority Press Publications 1985), 67.
7. COL Harry G. Summers Jr., *On Strategy* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1984), 63-64.
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9. Braestrup, 93.
10. Peter Hannaford, *Talking Back To The Media* (New York: Facts on File Publications, 1986), 5.
11. Appendix, "The Report of the Sidel Panel," in Braestrup, *Battle Lines*, 161-78.
12. Braestrup, 3-4.
13. The Twentieth Century Fund Task Force endorses the findings of the Sidel Panel, see Braestrup, 5. The conclusions of the Sidel Panel are located on pages 165-78.
14. *Ibid.*, 118.
15. *Ibid.*, 165.
16. LTC James O'Rourke, US Air Force, "The Media Pool: Is It The Solution?" *Military Media Review* (Summer 1989), 11.
17. *Ibid.*
18. *Operation Just Cause: The U.S. Intervention in Panama*, ed. Brian W. Watson and Peter G. Tsouras, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), 149.
19. See George Gameau, "Problems with Pentagon's Persian Gulf Press Pool," *Editor & Publisher*, 7 November 1987, and O'Rourke, "The Media Pool: Is It The Solution?"
20. Charles Lewis, Washington bureau chief, Hearst Newspapers, in opening remarks at "The Media & The War: A Retrospective," National Press Forum panel discussion at the National Press Club, 19 March 1991.
21. *Operation Just Cause: The U.S. Intervention in Panama*, 150.
22. *Ibid.*, 150-51.
23. *Ibid.*, 137.
24. *Ibid.*, 138.
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26. Pete Williams, "Let's Face It, This Was the Best War Coverage We've Ever Had," *Washington Post*, 17 March 1991, D1.
27. *Ibid.*, D4.
28. Carl Rochelle, CNN reporter, introductory comments, "The Media & The War: A Retrospective," National Press Forum panel discussion at National Press Club, 19 March 1991.
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37. Interview between the author and retired COL Harry G. Summers Jr. at Georgetown University, 16 March 1991.
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39. Aukofer.
40. William Claiborne and Molly Moore, "Coalition Battles Iraqis Inside Kuwait," *The Washington Post*, 23 February 1991, 1 and A25.
41. Molly Moore, reporter for *The Washington Post*, comments she made during "Women Covering The War," a panel sponsored by The International Women's Media Foundation at The National Press Club on 26 March 1991.
42. Linda Pattillo of ABC News, comments she made during "Women Covering The War," a panel sponsored by The International Women's Media Foundation at The National Press Club on 26 March 1991.
43. LTC Joseph L. Allred, US Army Public Affairs Media Relations Division, telephone interview with the author on 9 April 1991.
44. Pete Williams, "Let's Face It, This Was the Best War Coverage We've Ever Had," D4.
45. This is the eighth recommendation of the Sidel Panel, see Braestrup, 176.
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The Future of Women in the Army

Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Maginnis, US Army

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The role of women in the US military has long been a controversial issue. In this discussion of gender-related issues, problems and possible remedies, the author addresses the questions of male resistance and limitations on career opportunities for female soldiers. He provides a historical background of current policy on women serving in combat units and offers recommendations to improve force readiness.

MILITARY experts prophesied a gloomy result should the allies launch a ground offensive in the Persian Gulf.¹ Operation Desert Storm proved them wrong.

The same pessimism pervaded the role of American women in combat. The debate about women in combat is really a debate whether women should be in the Army. Desert Storm put that debate to rest. Women performed well. They belong in the Army and can serve in combat.

There were 26,000 female US Army soldiers operating in theater during Desert Storm.² They flew helicopters; commanded air defense batteries and military police battalions; performed intelligence, transportation, ordnance, administrative and medical functions. Women also shared the burden of sacrifice. Twelve women died between 2 August 1990 and the United Nations cease-fire in mid-April 1991 (four of these women died due to hostile action). Twenty-one were wounded in action.³ Two female soldiers spent time as prisoners of war (PWs).⁴

In spite of Army policy limiting risk to women in combat, female soldiers were found through-

Women have participated in armed conflict through the ages. They have been individual warriors, heroines, adventurers, scouts, partisans, terrorists, revolutionaries, nurses and camp followers. Their contributions are a matter of historic record. Their limited combat role in American history is primarily attributed to cultural exclusions imposed on them by a male-dominated society.

out the Kuwaiti Theater of Operation.⁵ They were consistently exposed to combat risk. Women at risk to the perils of combat did not create major sociological problems for the Army and the nation. The nation accepted a significant female role in Desert Storm. The fact that women were being wounded and killed did not stop the war as predicted. The fact that women were taken as PWs did not bring about a national outcry. All women did not return pregnant as feared.⁶ Rather, women earned the well-deserved respect and confidence of their male peers. They earned the right to be equal partners in the Army.

True equality for women in the Army will require the elimination of the combat-

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense or any other government office or agency.—Editor



1991 MILITARY REVIEW WRITING CONTEST

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PRIZE



Female soldiers were found throughout the Kuwaiti Theater of Operation. They were consistently exposed to combat risk. Women at risk to the perils of combat did not create major sociological problems for the Army and the nation. . . . Surveys taken just before the Gulf War . . . found a surprising 47 percent of Americans actually favor women participating in ground fighting.

exclusion policy. This policy is based on the Department of Defense (DOD) risk rule and one congressional statute that intend to limit exposure of women to hostile fire and capture. This

expectation is unrealistic on the modern battlefield. Such an expectation is tantamount to the total exclusion of women from the Army.

Women should be provided equal access to all Army branches.⁷ They have skills essential to the modern Army. Their participation as equal partners should no longer contentiously polarize the Army. Rather, pragmatism must prevail.

The American people have expressed a willingness to support this change. Surveys taken just before the Gulf War found 73 percent of Americans believe it is acceptable to send women into combat.⁸ Another national survey found a surprising 47 percent of Americans actually favor women participating in ground fighting.⁹

Male Resistance

A major obstacle to this forward-looking and long-overdue policy change is the Army's and federal government's male hierarchy. Many men resist female equality within the Army because of longstanding tradition.

Military service has long been a masculine rite of passage. Boys have traditionally grown into men after joining the military. They were likely motivated to enlist by thoughts of patriotism, as well as a host of other less glamorous and pragmatic reasons. Their accession into a predominantly gender-segregated institution has been protected by both law and cultural tradition. The gender segregation of the institution has also been encouraged by male-dominated military associations with subliminal agendas designed to sustain the status quo.

The introduction of women into a masculine environment tends to destroy male intangibles associated with the Army. Men have traditionally sought to idealistically fight for peace, home and family. They want to protect women, not compete with them. The soldier's world has traditionally been a masculine haven. His masculinity is his façade. Women who enter his masculine world threaten his manhood.

This attitude is especially evident within the ranks of the Army's senior personnel. Many of these traditionally minded men have value systems that can only envision women in protected

roles. They see "dependent" women in traditional roles such as mother, sister, wife, daughter, nurse, teacher and secretary. Unfortunately for them, they experience significant cognitive dissonance when faced with women in nontraditional roles. In these situations, senior male personnel sometimes respond by treating these women as daughters, who often welcome the preferential treatment, or as potential mistresses or even worse, as second-class citizens. These men cannot accept women as military equals. The playing field is not level for women in a male-dominated Army.

These masculine, sociological traditionalists too often quote the male pundits and soothsayers who predict the demise of combat readiness at the hands of female service aspirants.¹⁰ These spokesmen often conclude women are a bad buy for the Army. Their argument goes something like this.

Women leave the Army at a higher rate than men. They are more likely to be discharged for homosexuality. They have more medical problems. They have a higher injury rate. They are more likely to be single parents. They have more physical limitations than men. They get pregnant and are, therefore, temporarily useless to their deployable units. The battle of the hormones (testosterone and estrogen) demonstrates that aggressive men are preferred combatants to complacent and maternal women. They argue women have never demonstrated an aptitude for combat. These same antagonists chauvinistically argue that the battlefield is too horrific for women. They prefer to post a sign at the main gate that reads, "Women need not apply" or "We need a few good men."

Several of these arguments have some substance in fact. However, when objectively assessed from a macro perspective, there is no credible reason to support the exclusion of women from any branches of the Army (to include combat arms branches). As long as the Army maintains high accession standards by branch, there is good reason to believe readiness will profit by opening all military occupational specialties (MOSs) to women.¹¹ After all, who



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can confidently argue that the best and brightest future warriors are not women?

Consider the military service record of women, the current policy that restricts female soldier

During the American Revolutionary War, women performed the traditional duties of cooking, sewing and nursing. Some also served as soldiers along with the men. For example, Mad Ann Bailey was a scout, spy, messenger, as well as an expert shot and skilled horsewoman. Sarah Fulton delivered dispatches through enemy lines.

assignments and a summary of the major issues concerning women in the Army. Finally, evaluate for yourself recommendations concerning the future of women in the Army.

Women at War

Women have participated in armed conflict through the ages. They have been individual warriors, heroines, adventurers, scouts, partisans, terrorists, revolutionaries, nurses and camp followers. Their contributions are a matter of historic record. Their limited combat role in American history is primarily attributed to cultural exclusions imposed on them by a male-dominated society. First, consider the military history of women around the world and then the role of American women in the military.

There were the legendary Amazons of ancient Greece, a tribe of female warriors. Their military prowess was reportedly evidenced during the Trojan War. Boudicca, queen of Iceni, fought Nero. Zenobia, queen of the East, tried to bring Syria, Western Asia and Egypt under her command. She wore military garb and accompanied her troops.

Joan of Arc was a simple, illiterate daughter of a French plowman. She played a pivotal military role in ending the Hundred Years' War (1337-1453). Queen Isabella of Spain is credited with the development of artillery, the modern use of infantry and engineers. Kit Welsh, Hannah Snell (alias James Grey) and Trooper Mary were all famous English female fighters.

Women were active in the Russian revolutionary movement. They constituted one-fourth of the revolutionaries. Women were

frontline combatants in Cuba and the Philippines, and the old Mexican armies also employed female combatants.

During World War II, thousands of women actively fought the Germans. Yugoslavian women trained with men and effectively fought the Nazis. By the end of the war, 25,000 had died in battle, and another 40,000 had been wounded. Italian women actively resisted the Germans. French, Hungarian and Czechoslovakian women fought alongside men. They were fierce fighters and no less capable than their male counterparts.

Russian women served in all ground combat positions during World War II. The invasion by Germany created a situation in which men and women of all ages were called upon to help defend their homeland and later to attack the invader. They were drafted and trained. Eventually, they occupied positions that included sharpshooters, machinegunners, automatic riflemen, mortarmen and more. They were engineers, technicians, radio operators, turret gunners, drivers and mechanics. Thousands served in the infantry and in command positions.

Approximately 100,000 British women were drafted during World War II for military or national service duties. Many of these female soldiers were assigned to antiaircraft and searchlight batteries throughout England.

During World War II, thousands of women joined, and sometimes led, units of the French liberation forces and the Free French forces. These women participated in raids and sabotage missions; they also acted as couriers and as spies. They often used weapons. French women also served in noncombatant positions in Vietnam during the French Indochina War.

Israeli women fought to the death during the beginning of Israel's war for independence (1947-1949). Their combat roles were eliminated when it was discovered that the Arabs fought more fiercely to destroy units containing women.¹² Since 1948, women drafted into the Israeli army may serve as regulars. However, they receive separate basic training and defensive combat training only.¹³


Canada recently abolished laws barring women from serving in combat. Canadian women can now serve as infantry soldiers. However, in a recent test only one of the initial 80 women recruited for the infantry successfully completed the training program.¹⁴ Other women were more successful and now serve in artillery and armor units.¹⁵

American women have a limited military service history because of national policies and the fact that there has not been a war on American soil since the Civil War. Though their service opportunities have been limited, their commitment and ability should not be discounted.

During the American Revolutionary War, women performed the traditional duties of cooking, sewing and nursing. Some also served as soldiers along with the men. For example, Mad Ann Bailey was a scout, spy messenger, as well as an expert shot and skilled horsewoman. Sarah Fulton delivered dispatches through enemy lines. Additionally, Deborah Sampson Gannett disguised herself as a man and enlisted as Robert Shurtleff for three years in the Revolutionary Army. When she was wounded, she avoided being discovered by the doctors by removing the shot from her own thigh.

American women served in the War of 1812 and in the Mexican War. Numerous women served in traditional, and some in nontraditional, roles during the American Civil War.¹⁶

In World War I, 21,000 American military nurses saw active duty. Other women filled nonmilitary jobs at munitions factories, as streetcar conductors and more. General John J. Pershing, the commander of the American Expeditionary Force (AEF), sought to employ women in Army clerical and telephone jobs. At his request, 100 civilian contract women were



A 1st Corps Support Command truck driver checks her mirror before heading out, Saudi Arabia, December 1990.

During Desert Storm, the Army deployed female soldiers into high-risk situations. Women were in critical jobs that took them forward to the battlefield. Their high-risk involvement in Desert Storm became inevitable because of the dwindling national male manpower base, the advent of the All-Volunteer Force and the momentum generated by the previous gender-related decisions.

sent to Europe to meet this need.

The War Department at the time opposed legislation to expand the female role in the AEF. A memorandum from the department said:

"The enlistment of women in the military forces of the United States has never been seriously contemplated and such enlistment is considered unwise and highly undesirable. . . . The action provided for in this bill is not only unwise, but exceedingly ill-advised."¹⁷

In late 1939, the General Staff personnel officer conducted a staff study concerning the use of women in the Army.¹⁸ The recommendation was to organize women in a "quasi military female organization." The Women's Army Auxiliary Corps (WAAC) was subsequently founded in May 1942.¹⁹ It provided women to be accountants, cooks, draftswomen, telephone operators, chauffeurs, librarians, postal clerks and more. In July 1943, the organization name was shortened to Women's Army Corps (WAC). Women were trained as noncombatants (no weapons training) and served in all overseas theaters of war.

Approximately 8,000 WAACs served in the European Theater. Nearly 5,500 served in the Southwest Pacific. The WAACs were frequently in hazardous zones overseas. Approximately

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1,500 WACs were assigned to London and exposed to buzz bomb and bomber attacks. Seventeen of these soldiers received the Purple Heart for wartime injuries. WAC communications specialists accompanied Lieutenant General Mark Clark's Fifth Army advance party into Italy.

In the Korean War, more than 100 female Army nurses served in South Korea shortly after the commencement of hostilities. They were later joined by a few WACs who served in-country as stenographers, aides and interpreters.

During the Vietnam War, some 7,500 women served in the war zone. Names of eight of those women are engraved on the Vietnam Veterans' Memorial in Washington, D.C. They were all Army nurses. Up to 700 WACs were consistently stationed at Long Binh, Vietnam, during the war. They were overprotected and locked up at night. They were given no weapons and no training, and many felt they would be easy prey if they were overrun by the enemy in a locked-up camp.²⁰

In 1983, approximately 200 Army women participated in the Grenada relief expedition. During that operation, women were not treated as equal combatants. For example, four military policewomen were mistakenly sent to the island with their unit only to be sent right back to Fort

Bragg, North Carolina, because fighting continued on the island. Women were permitted on the island only after hostilities ceased.

On 20 December, 1989, approximately 803 Army women participated in Operation *Just Cause* in Panama. Army women served in combat service and support roles.

Two Army female helicopter pilots ferried infantrymen via Black Hawk helicopters into Panamanian Defense Force "hot" areas. Captain Linda Bray was noted for her military police unit's actions in Panama, marking the first time a US woman led soldiers in combat.

Recently, over 7 percent of all American forces in *Desert Storm* were women. They were assigned to most units. A few of those units spearheaded the attack into Iraq. Women served in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, with the joint staff and in southern Iraq with forward combat support and combat service support forces. They filled upward of 25 percent of the combat service support jobs, the people who supported General H. Norman Schwarzkopf's "Hail Mary" maneuver.

Former PW Major Rhonda Cornum, an aviation brigade surgeon from Fort Rucker, Alabama, commented on the role of women in *Desert Storm* and the Army. She said, "How stupid it is to talk about women in the military. If you're going to let women be citizens of the United States, then you just have to let them be total citizens."²¹ She endorses complete equality for women in the Army. In the past, women have enjoyed a limited role in the Army because of the interpreted intent of Congress that reflects the perceived will of the American public.

Changing Women's Role

Numerous forces have played a part in shaping the US policy regarding women in the military, especially women in combat. It was not until 1948 that women were given permanent status in the Regular Army.²² The 1967 Public Law 90-130 lifted the 2 percent ceiling on female force content. This law permitted women to attain flag rank and to more fully participate in the military services.²³ However, constraints on full participation of female soldiers in the Army continue today.

WOMEN IN THE ARMY

The secretary of the Army developed policies to exclude women from routine engagement in direct combat. The implied congressional intent behind the Navy and the Air Force statutes (Title 10, U.S.C. 6015 and 8549), as well as the DOD risk rule, is cited by the Army as the basis for its exclusion policy. This policy denies female soldiers assignments with units having direct combat missions.

The secretary has stated women will be assigned in all skills and positions except those that involve the highest probability of direct combat with the enemy. He defined direct combat as:

"Engaging an enemy with individual or crew-served weapons while being exposed to direct enemy fire, a high probability of direct physical contact with the enemy and a substantial risk of capture. Direct combat takes place while closing with the enemy by fire, maneuver, or shock effect in order to destroy or capture, or while repelling assault by fire, close combat, or counterattack."²⁴

Pursuant to this policy, the secretary of the Army developed the Direct Combat Probability Coding (DCPC) system in 1983. Under the DCPC, every position in the Army is evaluated based upon the duties of each MOS or area of concentration, the unit's mission, tactical doctrine and the battlefield location.²⁵ Positions are then coded based upon the probability of engaging in direct combat.²⁶

The DCPC closes many positions to female soldiers.²⁷ However, as found during *Desert Storm*, the probability of exposure to hostile fire on the fluid battlefield was not necessarily dictated by doctrine, mission or geography. For example, Scud missiles indiscriminately killed soldiers in the support bases.²⁸ Medical evacuation helicopters were shot down.²⁹ Transportation drivers were taken captive. Additionally, female soldiers were frequently near the front line supporting the "combatants."³⁰

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advent of the All-Volunteer Force and the momentum generated by the previous gender-related decisions. These changes have been slow in coming but were especially evident over the past two decades. Consider the incremental changes.

During the 1970s, the draft was allowed to lapse and the services began to compete for manpower. This encouraged the reconsideration of an expanded role for women, including their 1976 integration into the US Military Academy at West Point and the senior service schools.³¹ The WAC was disestablished in 1978. During the decade, women were no longer involuntarily released due to pregnancy.³² Married female soldiers received the same family entitlements as

their male counterparts.³³ Female Army officers were integrated into the male officer programs. Women received the same basic training as men,

Opponents often cite West Point and GAO studies that say body composition (both physical and anatomic) favors men. . . . Women experience more difficulty in lifting heavy objects, road marching, carrying loads, running or throwing than do most men. Women generally require more time to perform these tasks. Additionally, they must perform at a higher percentage of their physical abilities, leading to earlier fatigue.

to include, for the first time, weapons training. More specialties were opened to women.³⁴

The decade of the 1970s was also known for the nonratification of the proposed Equal Rights Amendment (1972 to 1982). The amendment's failure confirmed (to DOD) congressional opinion that the majority of the public did not want military women assigned to combat roles. This interpretation influenced the Army's agenda for subsequent women-related actions. It stifled forward progress for women in the Army.

During the 1980s, women were fully integrated into the officer promotion system vis-à-vis the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act. Additionally, their end strength in the Army grew to 11.2 percent of the Active force.³⁵

Any discussion of women in the Army inevitably includes both subjective and objective opposing views. Several views addressing some of the more prominent divisive issues follow.

Physical Limitations

First, the opponents of women in the Army say physical limitations make it impossible for most women to live up to the claim that they can perform as well as or better than men. The notion that technology has alleviated the need for physical strength is almost universally accepted. However, there is no real evidence that technol-

ogy has, in fact, totally eliminated the need for physical strength. This is especially true in rapidly deployable light forces.

Opponents often cite West Point and General Accounting Office (GAO) studies that say body composition (both physical and anatomic) favors men. Specifically, women experience more difficulty in lifting heavy objects, road marching, carrying loads, running or throwing than do most men. Women generally require more time to perform these tasks. Additionally, they must perform at a higher percentage of their physical abilities, leading to earlier fatigue. The specific limiting factors are outlined below.

Men have 50 percent more muscle mass than women. As a result, men and women of the same size do not have the same relative strength.³⁶ This strength difference gives men a speed and power advantage.

Women carry 10 percent more fat than men of the same age. Women tend to accumulate fat on their buttocks, arms and thighs. This fat tends to lower the woman's center of gravity thus presenting more resistance when running.

Women also have less bone mass. Their pelvic structure is wider, which makes running more difficult. The average woman has a lower aerobic capacity when compared to men. This is due to man's larger heart and greater lung capacity. Generally, this translates into an endurance advantage for men.

Advocates of women in the Army present three counters concerning strength and endurance differences. First, the potential physical performance of people entering the military is affected by prior athletic activity.³⁷ For many years in this country, sports and school programs have been offered primarily to boys. Only recently have female sports programs emerged. There is reason to believe the new emphasis on female physical fitness and sports programs will affect the physical fitness (strength and cardiovascular) of future female soldiers.

Second, the issue of strength required for the Army is really how strong must someone be in order to perform the tasks specific to each MOS?³⁸ There may also be a tendency by

branch proponents to overinflate the strength requirements in order to preclude women.

Finally, strength and cardiovascular fitness measurement is something that must be determined on an individual basis.³⁹ Not all men are physically capable and some women are physically capable of performing combat-related activities. This is not a gender issue, but an individual issue. Consider the following report.

A 1982 Department of the Army report of the Women in the Army Policy Review explained the Army's validation of an objective-based, strength-measuring effort by MOS. The Military Enlistment Physical Strength Capacity Test (MEPSCAT) was designed to match the soldier with the job. The test provided scores that predicted the level of physical work capacity by the end of basic training and advanced individual training. The Army expected to reduce turbulence and increase cohesion, thereby improving Army combat readiness as soldiers do better at jobs for which they have the requisite physical capacity.

The MOS proponent described the tasks required for each specialty in terms of actual work performed and also ensured that such work was intrinsic to the task. The policy review group concluded that no MOS was closed to women because of physical requirements, and none were recommended closed as a result of physical demand.⁴⁰ However, the test was not adopted as an official discriminator by the Army.⁴¹

Health Concerns

A second major issue cited by women in the Army opponents is female health. They say women are more prone to injury, mental illness, genitourinary disorders and disease. Many women experience severe premenstrual syndromes. This problem can be potentially dysfunctional for units with many female soldiers. This is especially true if there is an involuntary tendency for women living in close quarters to synchronize their menstrual cycles.⁴²

Pregnancy is a major female health issue and remains the only temporary disability that gives a soldier the option to break a service contract without penalty.⁴³ Pregnancy is also the major

reason for attrition among women in the Army.

During pregnancy, the soldier's duties are often severely curtailed. This curtailment typically includes: no field duty, limited physical training (as prescribed by the doctor), limited standing at attention and no immunizations for predeployment. A pregnant soldier's readiness to perform as a member of a deployable combat-ready unit is nil.

Women in the Army advocates counter by arguing the average woman is pregnant for a very small portion of her productive life.⁴⁴ There are many women who never become pregnant.⁴⁵

The opponents of women in the Army say physical limitations make it impossible for most women to live up to the claim that they can perform as well as or better than men. The notion that technology has alleviated the need for physical strength is almost universally accepted. However, there is no real evidence that technology has, in fact, totally eliminated the need for physical strength. This is especially true in rapidly deployable light forces.



Students at the 101st Airborne Division's Air Assault School

Various areas of the brain are focused differently between the genders. The male brain pattern tends to have more functions organized, thus a man is less easily distracted by superfluous information. . . . The halves of the brain communicate via a network of fibers. Women have more of these communication fibers (links) and thus . . . have the natural ability to communicate, employing the resources of the total brain.

They suggest the critics are making much out of nothing. Additionally, they argue that the data are inconclusive about the pain and discomfort of menstruation.⁴⁶ Rather, women are socialized to be more conscious of health problems than men. This may explain a higher incidence of routine medical visits by women than men.

Psychological Preparedness

The third major issue concerns the alleged differences between the genders concerning psychological preparedness for combat. Much of this is hype and tradition. Men are no better equipped for the psychological trauma of the horrific battlefield than women. This is an issue because many men do not want women to infringe on their dominance in the military. Male ego is involved.

John Stuart Mill said in 1869, "Women are what we have required them to be." Young women in America are often trained to inhibit aggressive behavior. Combat requires aggressive behavior. Physical aggression is primarily identified as a male characteristic in America. Male aggression is promoted by American culture via sports, traditional family roles and mating roles.⁴⁷ Interestingly, studies suggest aggression is more dependent on upbringing than biology. Anthropologist Margaret Mead recorded her studies of a New Guinea tribe in which women were reared as the aggressive sex while men were docile.

Military women have demonstrated aggressive behavior in combat. A former Marine saw women in combat during World War II. He said:

"There was no hesitation on their parts. They were like any animal fighting for its land and brood. When we got prisoners, I practically had to beat them [the women] off the poor Japanese. They really wanted to kill those poor GIs."⁴⁸

Finally, although aggression is desirable among combatants, the degree aggression is evidenced may also compromise good discipline. For example, aggressive behavior was evidenced at My Lai, South Vietnam. It was not disciplined. Possibly controlled aggressive behavior is better than less controlled and hormonally induced behavior.⁴⁹

The issue of psychological preparedness for combat is really a subliminal issue that concerns men accepting the integration of women. Retired Army general and former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John W. Vessey Jr. pointed this issue out when he said, "We have taken a male institution in a very short period of time and turned it into a coed institution and it has been a traumatic exercise for us."⁵⁰ The military has been transformed from the young, bachelor forces of the Vietnam War to an all-volunteer peacetime service where about 55.7 percent of the troops are married, and 11 percent of the force is female.

Lieutenant General Howard D. Graves, the superintendent of the US Military Academy, said in regard to the lifting of the ban on women in combat, women "ought to have every opportunity that they're competent to deal with. . . . But it's not just a question of the capabilities of women; it's the whole issue of the sociology of combat crews."⁵¹ Some opponents suggest that in sexually integrated groups, men may become inhibited and stilted, self-consciously muting the more overt expressions of their camaraderie. They may rebuff the women, or they may compete for their attention. These behaviors could be dysfunctional to a combat unit.

Graves does not blame women for the problem of integration. He said:

"It has a lot to do with the behavior of the men. It may be a question of whether we're sociologically ready for it or not. Maybe we'll need to train our men differently."⁵²

A basic difference between the genders is often ignored. The sexes are different because their brains are constructed differently. This is a biological and not psychological discriminator. The differences are observable in behavior.

Boys generally outperform girls in mathematics, which involves abstract concepts of space, relationships and theory. They can easily imagine in their mind's eye. Girls develop verbal skills sooner. They find it easier to master language skills. This suggests a biological difference between the genders.

Skill aptitude also appears to be linked with the particular area of the brain that is devoted to an activity. Various areas of the brain are focused differently between the genders. The male brain pattern tends to have more functions organized, thus a man is less easily distracted by superfluous information.⁵³

The halves of the brain communicate via a network of fibers. Women have more of these communication fibers (links) and thus expression of emotion and verbal communication tend to be easier for them.⁵⁴

These differences are a matter of biology. Women biologically appear to have the natural ability to communicate, employing the resources of the total brain more so than men. This factor should not be ignored when considering the potential productivity of the individual soldier.⁵⁵

Parenting

A fourth divisive issue is often, and inappropriately, attributed to women. The issue is parenting. It is really a gender-neutral issue, and it impacts on readiness. During *Desert Storm* there were accounts of single military parents whose child care plans failed. Although the actual incidents were few, they do point out a problem that must be addressed.⁵⁶ This leadership issue is best addressed by ensuring family care plans are accurate, frequently reviewed and feasible.

The rise of the pluralistic American family will inevitably affect the future military parent. Single parents will continue to seek employment in the Army because of the steady income and benefits offered. Single female soldiers may decide to have babies and stay in the Army. Addi-

tionally, the Army has many single parents with custody of small children.⁵⁷ Dual-career couples will have families.⁵⁸ Finally, more spouses of military members are employed outside of the home than ever before. This factor must also be considered. These modern realities impact on combat readiness and the military dependent child.

Even though the child's care is the military parent's responsibility, the Army has some implied responsibility to provide the parent with reasonably available child care resources. Unfortunately, Army child care facilities are not available to all soldiers. Current facilities meet only 60 percent of the demand. Only 17 percent of military child care centers are open at night. Finally, after the authorized six weeks of post partum leave, the female soldier often cannot leave her baby at an Army-operated child care facility. She must find alternative care until the baby is six months old. This is a parental problem. It impacts on readiness.

Gender-Neutral Challenges

The final issue involves several institutional concerns that are gender-neutral, although they are often used to argue against the full integration of women. They include soldier relationships, sexual harassment and recruiting and retention.

The Army's policy on soldier relationships has dramatically changed over the years. In the current Army regulation, relationships between soldiers of different rank must not present the appearance of partiality, preferential treatment or the improper use of rank.⁵⁹ This policy will continue to evolve. It is not a female issue. It is an institutional issue because it involves soldiers of both genders and all ranks. It is also a leadership challenge.

Sexual harassment is another gender-neutral issue. The instigator of sexual harassment is usually the individual with leverage (power). Since the male soldier usually has more leverage, it is not surprising that most sexual harassment cases involve male offenders. Additionally, there is a pervasive attitude among many men that women do not belong in the Army. This attitude promotes sexual harassment. Also, many female

soldiers have little confidence in the Army's sexual harassment reporting system. This further exacerbates the institutional problem.

Recruiting and retention of soldiers is another institutional problem. The Army's goal should be to train and retain the best-qualified soldiers as measured by performance and the Army's needs. People are recruited into the Army for a variety of personal reasons. They are attracted by the physical challenge, money for college, travel and a steady income. At the time of accession, they also have preconceived ideas. For example, female recruits tend to show a higher concern than men for duty in a combat zone. They think of the Army first and foremost with regard to dangers of combat and defending the country and, generally, favor allowing women to volunteer for combat assignments.

Recruits of both genders tend to be equally equipped. Specifically, most female recruits have at least a high-school education, as do nine of 10

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men. The mental aptitude scores of the two sexes are now almost identical.

The future stream of high-quality recruits is in jeopardy. Young Americans are being lured away from military service by a multitude of promising civilian career alternatives. This fact is especially critical for the Army because the number of available and qualified young Americans is declining.⁶⁰ The growing competition between government and the private sector will become more intense in the 1990s. This factor supports an increased role for women in the Army.

Retention of trained soldiers is another gender-neutral institutional challenge. A 1990 GAO study of "Women in the Military" indi-

cates the greatest difference in retention rates between the genders occurs after three years of service. Men tend to stay more often than women. This difference decreases after four years of service.⁶¹

A higher rate of attrition by first-term women can partially be attributed to the lack of male acceptance. Too often female soldiers are not accepted as equals by their male supervisors. Men often demonstrate their prejudices toward women by wrongfully assigning their female subordinates. Instead of performing in their assigned MOS, women are too often relegated to "traditional female" jobs such as secretarial duties. This is unfair to the soldier and not supportive of the Army mission.

Finally, women, unlike their male counterparts, do not always see a clear progression of opportunities in the Army. Female career opportunities have too frequently changed over the past few decades. Women cannot realistically see a track of career opportunities that potentially lead to the senior jobs in the Army. This reality understandably discourages many outstanding women who leave the Army for upwardly mobile civilian alternatives.

It is time the Army acknowledged the potential of women to contribute to the overall combat readiness of the force. It can do this by changing its policies and begin to make several institutional changes. Consider the following recommendations.

First, the Army should support the immediate repeal of the combat-exclusion policies vis-à-vis the DOD risk rule. It can do this by seeking Office of the Secretary of Defense support to change the Army's combat-exclusion policy. Elimination of this policy will necessarily mean the demise of the unproductive DCPC and the dysfunctional definition of combat "risk."

Second, the Army should then begin to access people based on standardized physical and mental aptitudes. Each branch must have objectively based entrance requirements that are free of gender bias. Reinstitute MEPSCAT and use the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery could form the culling process.

Third, the Army should favor gender-neutral national registration. Should conscription become necessary, accession should be based on the best available and best-qualified people, using the criteria outlined above.

Fourth, the Army must strictly enforce standards. A top-down enforcement effort must ensure all soldiers are properly assigned and held accountable for performance within their assigned specialty. Audits of the personnel systems must be routine. Nonperformers must be discharged.

Fifth, the Army needs to develop a comprehensive policy and support programs that address parenting issues. Specifically, personal parental responsibilities should not excuse the soldier (male or female) from all reasonable duty requirements. Parents must maintain realistic child care plans, as well as plans for the extended care of their children should the parents die in combat.

Pregnancy should be classified as a temporary medical condition of choice (like elective surgery). Soldiers who choose to become pregnant and subsequently cannot perform their jobs should be held accountable. They must have their tours of duty correspondingly extended as a payback for lost productivity or be given the option to reimburse the government financially much like a payback plan for a tuition assistance loan.⁶² There can be no free ride for female soldiers.

Sixth, the Army should recognize the plurality of the modern Army family. A positive step

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would be to review the current child care system. An ineffective child care system results in the outplacement of too many potentially outstanding soldiers. The Army may have to provide child care as a retention incentive.

Finally, the Army's leaders must sustain a campaign to eliminate perceptions, attitudes and behaviors that hinder the full integration of women. This must include the elimination of dual standards. Women must be expected to perform as equals. That means equal standards for physical fitness tests.⁶³ It also means equal access to all jobs.

In conclusion, the future success of the Army depends on the employment of the best and brightest. Many of these people will be women. To deny them equal opportunity within the modern Army is unwise. The bottom line is combat readiness. Women may hold the key to future battlefield successes. **MR**

NOTES

1. The initial computer-generated estimate of American casualties concerning a ground war in the Gulf topped 40,000 or 10 percent of the force. The prewar and final predictions were less severe, up to 5,000. The estimated duration of the war changed from six weeks to 10 days and actually lasted 100 hours.

2. Women made up 26,000 of the 305,000 soldiers who served Operation Desert Storm.

3. Eight women died in nonhostile incidents and another 16 were injured during the war.

4. The female prisoners of war (PWs) were Major Rhonda Cornum, flight

surgeon for the 2d Battalion, 229th Aviation Regiment, Fort Rucker, Alabama and Specialist Melissa Rathbun-Nealy, a truck driver, with the 233d Transportation Company, Fort Bliss, Texas.

5. The Department of Defense (DOD) risk rule applies only to noncombat positions. The DOD risk rule (as of February 1988) says, "risk of direct combat, exposure to hostile fire/capture are proper criteria for closing positions to women. If the type, degree, and, to a lesser extent, duration of risk are equal to or greater than direct combat units (infantry/armored), then units or positions may be closed to women."

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6 Some women did return pregnant. Many of these women were pregnant prior to deployment. However, there was an anomaly. There were 39 pregnancies among female crew members of the USS Acadia during the ship's wartime deployment. The Army has not reported a similar incident.

7 Enlisted women are authorized to serve in 285 of 331 military occupational specialties (MOSs). Female officers can serve in 205 of 214 specialties; and warrant officers, 69 of 76. Women serve in all but the infantry and armor branches. As of March 1991, there were 77 women officers in field artillery, 182 in air defense artillery, 256 in aviation, and 223 in engineers.

8 Survey by NBC News/Wall Street Journal, 15-18 September 1990.

9 Survey by CBS News, 27-28 January 1991.

10 Former Secretary of the Navy James H. Webb Jr.'s article, "Women Can't Fight," in *The Washingtonian* (November 1979), stirred considerable controversy on the subject of women in combat. Brian Mitchell's book, *Weak Link* makes a case for why women should not be in the military.

11 Women may not serve in the infantry, armor, cannon field artillery, combat engineers, combat (attack and reconnaissance) aviation or low-altitude air defense artillery units of battalion/squadron or smaller size.

12 This idea was argued before *Desert Storm*. However, the Iraqis did not appear to resist, more heroically, units with women. Rather, they indiscriminately surrendered to allied soldiers (male and female).

13 Women are drafted into the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). They do not serve as combatants, although they are trained in self-defense skills. Their role in the IDF is outlined in Reuven Gal's *A Portrait of the Israeli Soldier* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press).

14 In 1987, the Canadian armed forces commenced the Combat Related Employment for Women (CREW) study on the effects of mixed-gender combat forces. They spent \$500,000 trying to recruit 249 women for the field tests, but could only attract 26 women initially. Eventually, 80 women participated in infantry basic combat training, 40 participated in advanced individual training, one graduated.

15 Canada has an all-volunteer force of 82,800 enlisted and officer personnel in all three services. About 10 percent of the force is female. Currently, there is only one female infantry private, but there are 18 female field gunners in two units, and four female crewmen in an English language regiment. There are eight women in an air defense battery, one female field engineer and 49 women in three signal squadrons. This is a total of 31 women in the combat arms and 50 women in the combat support arms.

16 Medical doctor and Civil War veteran Mary Walker is the only female to receive the Medal of Honor. During the Civil War, she could be found near the Union front lines treating the wounded. Initially, her service was performed as a civilian. Eventually, she was appointed as the assistant surgeon for the 52d Ohio Infantry. She was captured by the Confederates and sent to a Richmond prison. After her release, she rejoined the 52d Ohio. After the war, Walker was awarded the Medal of Honor for her services. In 1916, Congress revised the Medal of Honor standards, and, subsequently, an Army board rescinded her medal, citing her ambiguous military status. Sixty years later, the Army restored Walker's Medal of Honor.

17 Mattie E. Treadwell, *The Women's Army Corps* (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1954), 8.

18 In 1920, the War Department appointed a Director of Women's Relations under the office of the G1 (personnel) General Staff. The position was for a civilian adviser. Miss Anita Phipps was appointed. She was influential with women's groups at the time. About the same time, Major (later Major General) Everett S. Hughes conducted a study titled, "Participation of Women in War." He advocated the use of women in war to include training men to understand the problems of the militarization of women. The G1's 1939 staff study mentioned here is titled "Women in the Army (Emergency)."

19 In May 1942 HR 4906 "A Bill to Establish the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps," was passed. The first director of the WAAC, Oveta Culp Hobby, and Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt worked together for the passage of the bill.

20 BG Evelyn Foote, US Army Retired, told about her experience in Vietnam: "When I was in Vietnam in 1967, I was not weapons qualified. In fact, we [women] were not permitted to carry weapons. I was up along the Cambodian border once with a field artillery battalion. The only thing I could do was run around carrying a purse—I called it my M-16 purse. I was wearing a baseball cap, no helmet, no flak jacket, no weapons, nothing. I was a liability to that unit. Women in the Army don't want to be liabilities. They want to be assets, partners in defense with their male counterparts." This citation is found in Tom Kiddoo's *You've Come A Long Way, Soldier*, in *Soldiers* (March 1988), 10.

21 "Proving Their Mettle," *Army Times*, 15 April 1991, 51.

22 The Women's Armed Services Integration Act was passed that year. This act established a 2 percent ceiling for women in the Army and certified the Army Nurse Corps, Medical Specialist Corps and Women's Army Corps (WAC). Until 1967, only one temporary WAC colonel position was authorized, until 1972 all female battalion-level commanders were at the US WAC Center.

23 The law also allowed women to serve in the National Guard and in other than nursing specialties. Of 482 MOSs, 185 were open to women. However, 90 percent of women were still employed in clerical or health care positions.

24 *Women in the Army Policy Review* (Washington, DC: US Department of the Army, ODCSPER, 12 November 1982), 7-8.

25 Ibid.

26 In 1988, the Army reviewed all of its positions to determine validity of coding in light of the recommendations of the 1988 DOD Task Force on "Women in the Military." As a result, an additional 11,138 positions were opened to women. The revalidation of the coding was based on the DOD risk rule.

27 The DCPC system closes a number of noncombat positions and units or manry because of their location in the battlefield area.

28 Three Army women assigned to the 475th Quartermaster Battalion were

killed 25 February 1991, when a Scud missile struck their barracks near Dhahran, Saudi Arabia.

29 Corum was on board a medical evacuation helicopter flying to rescue a downed F-16 pilot when her aircraft was shot down by Iraqi small-arms fire.

30 The support battalion, to which women were assigned, of the lead brigade of the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) ended up six kilometers behind that combat element.

31 The 1975 Stratton Amendment to Title 10 of the US Code provided for the admission of women to the service academies.

32 DOD Policy Guidance Memo, dated 7 June 1974, Subject: Involuntary Separation of Women for Pregnancy and Parenthood, directed the services to discontinue their involuntary discharge policies for pregnancy.

33 In 1973, the Supreme Court ruled in the *Frontiero v. Richardson* case that the spouses of military women could receive the same entitlements as those offered the spouses of military men without the requirement that they prove dependency.

34 During the 1970s, 430 of 467 MOSs were open to women.

35 Of 331 enlisted specialties, 285 were open to women in the 1980s. Women were authorized in 69 of 76 (91 percent) of warrant officer specialties and 205 of 214 (96 percent) of officer specialties.

36 Women tend to be 80 percent as strong as the same size men.

37 K. H. M. Knudson, "Scientific Knowledge Applicable to Decisions Regarding Women in the Military," in *A Report to the Secretary General, NATO: under the Auspices of the Committee on Women in the NATO Forces*, undated, 20.

38 Judith Hicks Stehlm, *Arms and the Enlisted Woman* (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1989), 219.

39 MAJ Jeffrey A. McNally, "Women in the United States Military: A Contemporary Perspective," unpublished thesis, Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, 1985, 49.

40 *Women in the Army Policy Review*, 2-37.

41 MEPSCAT was adopted for counseling purposes only in January 1984. The test was discontinued in November 1990.

42 Martin Binkin and Shirley J. Bach, *Women in the Military* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1977), 88.

43 This option is available only to enlisted women.

44 Mady W. Segal, "The Argument for Female Combatants," in *Female Soldiers—Combatants or Noncombatants?* ed. N. L. Goldman, (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982), 272.

45 Eight to 10 percent of Army women are pregnant at any given time.

46 Binkin and Bach, 86.

47 Androgynous behavior is often disassociated with a demonstration of emotion. For example, American boys have been programmed not to cry. Society tells them crying is for girls. This cultural taboo is changing. General H. Norman Schwarzkopf became teary eyed during an interview with Barbara Walters on "20/20." Such a demonstration of emotion is becoming more acceptable for men (and is not necessarily a sign of weakness).

48 J. David Truby, *Women at War: A Deadly Species* (Colorado: Paladin Press, 1977), 61.

49 The hormone testosterone is linked with male aggressive behavior. During basic training, the act of calling recruits "ladies" or "girls" is a derogatory admonishment for male recruits to improve their performance, be more aggressive. This social bias is evident throughout the Army.

50 Molly Moore, "Open Doors Don't Yield Equality," *The Washington Post*, 24 September 1989, 1.

51 "American Amazons?" *Washington Times*, 2 May 1991, G-2.

52 Ibid.

53 Anne Moir and David Jessel, "Sex and Cerebellum," *The Washington Post*, 5 May 1991, K3.

54 Ibid.

55 Ibid.

56 As of 5 March 1991, there were 31,850 male and 13,800 female active duty single parents in the Army. Of this number, 12,379 male and 3,725 female single parents were deployed to Southwest Asia.

57 While most single parents in the male-dominated Army are men, a far higher percentage of women are active duty single parents.

58 Dual-service Army couples constitute approximately 5 percent of the total force. As of 5 March 1991, there were 29,128 enlisted soldiers and 5,884 officers enrolled in the Married Army Couples Program (MACPI). There were 9,000 members of married Army couples deployed to Southwest Asia. There were 2,462 Army couples deployed, of which 1,343 had dependents.

59 US Department of the Army Regulation 600-20, *Army Command Policy*, "Relationships between soldiers of different ranks," March 1988, para. 4-14.

60 Americans are having 1.7 children and then too often visit the doctor for sterilization. As a result of this dynamic, America is falling short of the 2.2 zero population replacement rate.

61 First term women tended to reenlist at higher rates than men in 1988: 54% women and 48% men. Third termers: 81% women and 86.5% men.

This is cited from the study, *Women in the Military*, GAO/NSIAD-90-87BR, Washington, DC, July 1990.

62 The US Coast Guard has a policy that gives the prospective mother a one-year leave of absence without pay to have a baby. This type policy offers an alternative to the proposed tour extension or payback recommendations.

63 Senior women should be "grandmothered" for the purpose of this recommendation. It is unrealistic to expect senior Army women to instantly meet significantly increased physical standards. Additionally, the current Army Physical Fitness Test (APFT) may not be a true measure of sex-generic physical readiness. See CPT Joseph Knapik's analysis of the utility of the current test, "The Army Physical Fitness Test (APFT): A Review of the Literature," in *Military Medicine* (June 1989), 326-29. His analysis points out some shortfalls in the test.



The OMG in the Defense

Bogdan Swita

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For almost a decade before the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO was very concerned with the impact of the possible Soviet use of the operational maneuver group (OMG). The OMG concept threatened to unhinge NATO's doctrine of forward defense and flexible response. Although it was never employed against NATO, operational maneuver remains a viable concept with defensive, as well as offensive, applications in future conflicts. The author is a former officer in the Polish Naval Infantry. He commanded a battalion prior to his attendance at the Soviet Frunze Military Academy. Editorial comment on the article has been included and highlighted with bold type.

POLITICAL and military international relations have changed drastically with the collapse of the communist system in Europe. The majority of issues that concerned the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) and its military doctrine ceased to exist when all the states (except the Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS]) left the communist system. Now, even the CIS has abandoned its communist ideology. But the orientation of the WTO's military doctrine, which determined the defense to be the primary type of combat in the initial period of war, remains. A variety of plans were drafted for employing divisions, regiments and battalions in the defense from the onset of an enemy invasion. Since the defense had now become a primary

form of combat, theorists of tactics and operational art searched for ways that would allow the defender to avoid passivity and seize the initiative. Counterattacks, counterstrokes and counteroffensives, designed to destroy an invader, are a basic part of the defense framework. [The author believes that the Warsaw Pact's "defensive" doctrine was really defensive, although V. N. Lobov, the former chief of staff of the Warsaw Pact and later chief of staff of the Soviet General Staff, stated that it was only politically defensive and never militarily so.]

Furthermore, the conduct of tactical raids in the enemy rear are planned for immediate implementation following the initiation of hostilities. During the initial period of future war, there will

Changes in the views of operational art and strategy regarding the relationship between the offense and defense, created by the proclamation of defensive doctrine, did not substantively change the tactical missions of divisions, regiments and battalions. The main problem in the defense remains how to stall an enemy offensive and seize the initiative while avoiding defensive measures that may limit the commander's ability to make a rapid transition to the operational offensive.

probably not be a continuous front line with units all tied in at the flanks. This expected deployment does not contradict the essence of defensive military doctrine; rather, it makes it possible to add dynamism to the defense.

According to operational theory taught at the Frunze Military Academy, the operational maneuver group (OMG) was to be committed only under specific circumstances and only during the offensive. While at the academy, I postulated maintaining a high degree of maneuver during the army's first defensive operation of the initial period of war by using an OMG. My theory has had many opponents and many defenders. When working on this theory, I proceeded from the principles of military art, which are always changing, flexible and fresh. Strategy, operational art and tactics undergo continual development, and changes in one can affect the others. However, changes in the views of operational art and strategy regarding the relationship between the offense and defense, created by the proclamation of defensive doctrine, did not substantively change the tactical missions of divisions, regiments and battalions. The main prob-

lem in the defense remains how to stall an enemy offensive and seize the initiative while avoiding defensive measures that may limit the commander's ability to make a rapid transition to the operational offensive.

My theory postulated the use of an OMG to execute maneuver missions in the enemy rear during the first defensive operation of an army and *front*. I concluded that one division from the defending army should be employed as an OMG to thwart the enemy's offensive and to create tactical and operational conditions that would permit army front forces to transition to the counter-offensive.

Many questions arose during my work. The five most important were:

- How is the OMG introduced into the enemy rear if the enemy is conducting offensive actions and has seized the initiative?
- Which defending division should become the OMG?
- How does the commander provide fire support during the entire maneuver?
- How does the commander synchronize all elements at each stage of committing the OMG?
- How does the OMG conduct combat?

Some readers may say that the theory is impossible to implement in a real war, but I remind them that the contents of tactics and operational art, including their principles, change as new methods and means for conducting armed struggle appear. There is no room for stereotyping or templating tactics and operational art. New principles are now being recognized. But the main principle is that of the asymmetrical threat by which a commander attempts to create conditions that will require enemy countermeasures that are very costly in terms of time, forces and equipment. I present, for professional discussion by all officers, my theory for committing an OMG into the enemy rear during the first defensive operation of an army and *front*.

Development of the Raid

Success in modern combined arms battle depends, to a great extent, on the effective simulta-

neous application of fire and forces to the entire depth of the enemy combat formation. The rapid defeat of enemy groupings is impossible today without decisive, flexible and broad maneuver, including that of OMGs and raiding detachments operating in the enemy rear.

During World War II, the duration of a raid did not exceed 24 hours (for battalions and regiments operating independently). Their depth of maneuver reached 50 to 60 kilometers, and their separation from the main force was up to 30 kilometers and sometimes even more. As a rule, regiments and battalions were sent out on a raid during combat to breach the tactical zone of defense. After penetrating its main zone, they rushed into the depth, destroying artillery, command posts (CPs), communications sites, ammunition and fuel depots, airfields and other objectives. Successful execution of missions was achieved by: skillful exploitation of weak spots and gaps in the defensive formation; dynamic reconnaissance both in front of, and on the flanks of, the raiding detachment; swift development of the raid to arrive rapidly at the designated objective; wide use of maneuver by fire and forces; and protection from enemy ground and air attack.

Divisions, regiments and battalions still conduct raids in contemporary combat. A modern division's maneuver units plus supporting air and artillery assets are much more powerful than their World War II ancestors and can extend their combat power over a much greater area than before. Raids into the enemy rear have become an important and indispensable part of modern battle as demonstrated by the raid of a small group of Israeli tanks into the rear of the Third Egyptian Field Army in October 1973. This raid unhinged and threatened to defeat the entire Third Army.

While raids have their place in every war, 90 percent of these actions have occurred in the offense. Nevertheless, raids can be not only part of the defense but are essential in a maneuver defense. Defending commanders with sufficient forces should plan raids in support of their defense. A defender's raid can force the attacker to

take countermeasures that could detract from or thwart his attack. The optimum time for employing defensive raids is during the initial period of a war, when there has not been time or opportunity to establish a continuous front.

[Soviet operational graphics are designed to accommodate maneuver warfare. In order to understand the author's figures, the following guide is furnished.]

Army Boundary	Division Boundary	International Boundary		
(Note the author uses the Western corps and division boundary symbols for Blue.)				
Army Group HQ	Corps HQ	Army HQ	Army Rear HQ	Division HQ
			TD	MCD
Brigade HQ	Regiment HQ	Battalion HQ	Tank Division	Motorized Rifle Division
(An arrow shows that the element is moving and the direction of movement.)				
Air Defense Site	Helicopter Unit	Division Artillery Group	Army Artillery Group	
Army Multiple Rocket Launcher Group	Regimental Artillery Group	Airhead	Antitank Reserve	
Planned Antitank Position	Defensive Position	Planned Attack/Counterattack	Airfield	
FASCAM	ICM Strike	Air Strike	Airborne Landing	Surrounded Element
OMR	Tank	Multiple Rocket Launcher	Helicopter Strike	
Day of Operation	Artillery Concentration	Electronic Jamming		

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Disposition of Forces

Under modern conditions, when reconnaissance assets have attained extreme effectiveness, a surprise attack by a large force against another territory has become practically impossible. Therefore, in future war a commander will be able to determine the probable enemy plan for the first two or three days of battle. [Apparently, the author dismisses an attack against garrisons by improved conventional munitions (ICM) at the start of the war and expects adequate warning time.] Initially, the most important task for all staffs and commanders is to determine the probable nature of enemy actions, taking into consideration his main attacks or his regions of concentration of main forces in the defense.

Based on the international situation and an understanding of enemy doctrine, "Red" forces will occupy assigned defensive regions for the purpose of protecting the state border. Force composition and the supplies on hand will depend on assigned zones of defense and the missions to be carried out during the first two to

three days of combat actions. [In Soviet war games "Red" forces have always been the "good" forces, and "Blue" forces, the "bad" forces—a tradition that precedes the communist revolution.]

The probable structure of the defense for the Red army will take the following form: two divisions in the first echelon, one division in the second echelon (almost always a tank division) and one division concentrated in rear assembly areas as a reserve. Each of the first-echelon divisions will constitute a security zone jointly with border troops. The Red army has great maneuver capabilities, is fully capable of executing defensive missions during the first days of the war and, subsequently, can create conditions for main front forces to go over to the counter-offensive.

The Blue enemy will be forced to concentrate its corps on axes that are favorable for an attack. He will certainly assess the Red defense, taking into consideration its weak points and, subsequently, determine the axis of the main strike and the concentration of his main forces. The Blue army will not be able to attack on all necessary axes either because of terrain limitations or an insufficient quantity of forces and means. Therefore, in many sectors, Blue will go over to the defense for the purpose of covering several regions in the vicinity of the state border and for securing its flanks. A corps may allocate up to a mechanized division, together with border detachments, to execute these defensive missions. The defending Blue division normally deploys with two to three brigades in the first echelon and one brigade in second echelon. In the depth of the defense, there will be up to one tank battalion serving as a combined arms reserve.

Since the attacker must defend in certain sectors, one can conclude that under some conditions, offensive actions on the part of the defender (Red forces) can begin well in advance of a planned army and front counteroffensive. Before the onset of hostilities, Red army and front commanders, after assessing the situation, would be able to contemplate use of one of their divisions as an OMG. Planning for the commitment of an




Figure 1

OMG will determine those missions that would place the bulk of the OMG in the rear of the enemy's main thrust to destroy or suppress the critical rear objectives and reserves. This can thwart the full execution of the Blue offensive plan. In addition, several battalions from the OMG could maneuver as small raiding units in coordination with airmobile and airborne assaults to capture and hold important regions that would assist the follow-on counteroffensive operation of the Red army and *front*. The OMG would be committed after the second or third day of the war, in order to allow time for the situation to develop.

Figure 1 shows the probable disposition of troops before the beginning of hostilities. The northern second-echelon tank division (in the

assembly area, not the tank division deployed in defensive positions) is the most logical candidate for the OMG mission during the 1st Army's defensive operation.

[Figure 1 shows a conventional Soviet *front* defense with two complete armies (3d and 1st) forward and 2d Army about 100 kilometers deep in the third defensive belt. A piece of a defending army is portrayed to the north of 3d Army and the south of 1st Army. The 3d Army consists of two motorized rifle divisions and two tank divisions—the reserve tank division in the northwest is the candidate OMG division. The 1st Army consists of three motorized rifle divisions and a tank division. The Red IPB (intelligence preparation of the

Since the attacker must defend in certain sectors, one can conclude that under some conditions, offensive actions on the part of the defender (Red forces) can begin well in advance of a planned army and *front* counter-offensive. Before the onset of hostilities, Red army and *front* commanders, after assessing the situation, would be able to contemplate use of one of their divisions as an OMG.

battlefield) process projects that the Blue main attack will come through the 1st Army sector. The 2d Army consists of three motorized rifle divisions. Red has constituted a security zone with a motorized rifle or tank regiment forward of each division in the main defensive belt.

Although the author talks about gaps and the incomplete nature of defenses in the initial period of war, this schematic portrays an established linear defense that has had some time to prepare its positions. Furthermore, Red has pushed its forces well forward and is not going to trade space for time. The scenario is somewhat reminiscent of the opening days of Operation *Barbarossa*—the German invasion of the Soviet Union.

The Blue army group is attacking with four corps. One corps is attacking to the north of 3d Army; two corps plus an additional armor division are attacking 1st Army; and one corps is attacking immediately south of 1st Army. A single mechanized division is defending opposite 3d Army and will launch spoiling attacks to assist the main attack and hold 3d Army in

its place. Initial Blue defense of the border areas opposite 1st Army are by border guard battalions. Blue will launch a series of air assault or airborne landings in the 1st Army area to assist its attack.])

Commitment of an OMG

As depicted in figure 2, Blue launched an attack against the 1st Army defensive sector, and by the end of the second day, the offensive was able to overcome the security zone, partially break through the primary line of the Red defense and prepare for committal of its operational reserves. Exploiting success, Blue landed airborne assaults in the enemy rear for the purpose of destroying Red army CPs, attacking its second echelon, drawing it into battle and capturing important regions that could influence further offensive actions. Some Blue regiments and battalions were compelled to go over to the defense to protect their flanks.

Red lost the security zone in the 1st Army defensive sector after stubborn battles during the two days of war; subsequently, making use of well-prepared primary and intermediate defensive lines, it was able to achieve its goals and prevent penetration of the main defensive zone, thereby stopping the enemy offensive grouping from reaching the flanks and rear of the army.

Summing up the situation, Blue did not lose the offensive initiative, although it did not achieve its main goals; that is, to break completely through the Red defense, partially encircle its forces and, subsequently, position its main force to continue the attack. The fact that some Blue elements went over to flank defense and that Blue employed airborne assaults demonstrates that Blue will attempt to concentrate its offensive efforts on specific axes in order to seize the strategic-operational initiative and create conditions for committing follow-on divisions into battle.

The Blue division defending opposite 3d Army remains in its original defensive positions except where it launched supporting attacks on its flanks in support of the army group offensive.



Thus, on the second day of the war, based on direction of the *front* commander, 3d Army commander announced his decision (see fig. 2):

a result of the attack by part of the army forces through the Blue defense sector.

"Missions for the army plan include the following:

Operational-Tactical. Move two tank regiments from positions in the second defensive belt through the security zone; attack, in conjunction with security zone forces, to break through the primary enemy defense zone; rapidly penetrate to his flanks; and subsequently, in cooperation with airmobile assaults and OMG forward detachments, create conditions to support the commitment of the OMG.

"Continue to support the flanks and retain occupied defensive lines in order to prevent a flank penetration by the enemy. The tank division defending in the army second echelon (third

"Airborne CPs are the primary form of troop control when committing an OMG, ensuring that all radio nets are compatible and that adequate frequencies are assigned to support the maneuver."

"Logistic support is critical to OMG success, yet ammunition and fuel resupply to the OMG will prove difficult. The army will provide support to the OMG until the moment of its commitment, so that it does not use up its ammunition and fuel supplies, and ensure that the OMG is not engaged in combat prior to commitment."

defensive belt) will dispatch one tank regiment to occupy new defensive positions along our flank with 1st Army.

"Organize and support the movement of the OMG division to ensure its initial commitment through enemy lines without becoming embroiled in combat."

Reconnaissance. "Conduct an evaluation of the enemy over a wide zone and in great depth. Analyze and forecast possible changes in his deployment, paying particular attention to any possible developing countermeasures to the commitment of the OMG."

"Maintain constant surveillance on objectives to be captured and destroyed and be continually aware of each objective's current location and disposition." [Soviet objectives are normally troop units, not key terrain.]

Rocket-Artillery. Commitment of the OMG is the responsibility of the army; therefore, one of the two army-level artillery groups will directly support the commitment of the OMG. This will be the Army artillery group (AAG). [An army usually has at least two artillery groups—one composed of guns and the

other of multiple rocket launchers.] "In addition, all battalion and regimental artillery of units and subunits located in contact with the enemy and the two regimental artillery groups (RAGs) from the breakthrough tank regiments will support the commitment of the OMG."

"The overall quantity of breakthrough is:

- Four artillery battalions from the AAG.
- Three RAGs—nine artillery battalions.
- Three mortar batteries.

These forces should fully support the commitment of the OMG, in order to avoid using artillery that is part of the OMG during its commitment. Subsequently, support OMG maneuver by delivering rocket strikes with ICMs against the forward enemy defenses, CPs and reserves. Strikes will be delivered by rocket battalions that are subordinate to the army commander and by rocket battalions subordinate to our divisions."

Antitank. "The antitank reserves of 1st, 2d and 3d armies are all committed to the main defensive battle. Regiments in contact with the enemy will release their antitank assets to form a new army antitank reserve. Its mission is to support the commitment of the two breakthrough tank regiments by direct fire; subsequently, redeploy along the flanks and on possible counterattack axes to continue the support of the shock group's offensive and to cooperate with adjacent tanks."

Air forces. "Fixed-wing aviation will support the commitment of the OMG in three phases:

- During the regrouping, movement and attack of the tank regiments and artillery groups designated for the breakthrough attack, aviation will provide air support for the movement of the attack force and deliver strikes against enemy forward positions, positions in depth, CPs and reserves.

- During the movement of the OMG from the assembly area to the line of commitment, provide air support as in the first phase.

- During the commitment of the OMG and its advance into the enemy tactical and operational depths, provide air strikes against en-

emy CPs, artillery and reserves, and subsequent close air support to the OMG. Fifty percent of aviation sorties are committed to this phase.

"Helicopters will support the commitment of the OMG in three phases:

- During the breakthrough attack by the tank regiments, accompany the regiments to destroy enemy antitank assets and tanks to the regiments' immediate front and flanks.

- During the completion and development of the breakthrough, continue to accompany and support the attack and be prepared to repel counterattacks.

- During the commitment of the OMG and landing of airmobile forces, provide flank security to advancing forces and, while cooperating with airmobile assaults, keep the enemy out of the gap through which the OMG is being introduced."

Air defense. "Air defense forces will continuously support the OMG commitment, initially concentrating on coverage during movement and regrouping, and subsequently concentrating efforts on covering the actual commitment of the OMG, since the funnelling of the OMG through a narrow breach will create a prime target for enemy aviation. Army air defense assets plus those of the divisions will support the movement and commitment of the OMG."

Protection against weapons of mass destruction. "Prepare personnel and equipment for prolonged exposure to radioactive and chemical contamination. Before the battle, check the OMG regiments' and battalions' inventories and serviceability of individual and collective protective gear and radiation and chemical detection instruments. Prepare TOE [table of organization and equipment] decontamination equipment."

Communications. "Ensure uninterrupted communications and troop control during two phases:

- Movement and regrouping of the OMG to its line of commitment.

- Commitment of the OMG and its arrival in the enemy rear.




Figure 3

"Airborne CPs are the primary form of troop control when committing an OMG, ensuring that all radio nets are compatible and that adequate frequencies are assigned to support the maneuver." (Figure 3 shows the use of airborne CPs during commitment of the OMG.)

[The author shows an airborne CP coordinating the actions of two forward airheads (that hold the flanks of the OMG), the OMG itself, the two breakthrough regiments (that are shown providing flank security) and the AAG. In addition, the airborne CP is in contact with the army forward CP. The army airborne CP is operating on four nets.]

Rear services. "Logistic support is critical to OMG success, yet ammunition and fuel resupply to the OMG will prove difficult. The army will provide support to the OMG until the moment of its commitment, so that it does not use up its ammunition and fuel supplies, and ensure that the OMG is not engaged in combat prior to commitment. Refueling points established by the units in contact will provide forward fueling so that the OMG is committed with full fuel tanks. Resupply of the OMG in the depth of the enemy position will be accomplished to the maximum degree possible."

Airmobile and airborne operations. "During commitment of the OMG, in order to seize forward positions that will secure the flanks, the OMG will conduct actions in the depth of the enemy defense to seize specific objectives or capture important regions that will facilitate the development of the OMG thrust.




Figure 4

Ammunition and fuel resupply points for the OMG will be established in secured airheads.

"The attack by, and actions of, the OMG in the enemy rear will make it possible for 2d Army to mount a counteroffensive, rout Blue and achieve victory in the first border engagement."

[The author's figure 2 shows a great regard for flank security. The flanks of the OMG are covered first by the breakthrough regiments, then by two company-size airheads and then a battalion-size and company-size airhead. All airheads establish blocking positions. The 2d Army's counteroffensive shows the same concern for flank security. First, the army flanks are secured with FASCAM (family of scatterable mines) strikes on advancing brigades and air strikes on division headquarters. Next, ICM strikes on a corps headquarters and an attack helicopter unit are employed, while flank security is provided by encircled Red units from the security zone, which have gone to

ground to provide indigestible "lumps" in the penetrated area. Air strikes on an attack helicopter unit, a corps forward CP and an armored division in march column supplement flank protection. Near the international boundary, further flank security is provided to 2d Army by a FASCAM strike, air strikes and three company-size airheads (two heliborne and one parachute). Finally, the line for committing 2d Army's second-echelon division is secured by air strikes and up to three regimental-size airdrops.

The OMG scheme of maneuver is intriguing and has many similarities to the actions of the Soviet 1st Guards Mechanized Corps in December 1942 in the Middle Don operation. Instead of going deep, the OMG conducts a turning movement back into and following the main enemy attack and, eventually, into the path of 2d Army's counteroffensive. Control, fratricide and traffic management are key is-

sues that the author does not address. Furthermore, the strength of the OMG is dissipated somewhat by the use of dispersed battalion and regimental raids. There appears to be no plan to reassemble the OMG or to provide it with fire support or supplies once it has been committed against the flank of the Blue offensive.]

Commitment of the OMG

As shown in figure 4, during the morning hours of the third day of the defensive operation, the two breakthrough tank regiments, supported by aviation, combat helicopters, the AAG and units in contact with the enemy, rupture the Blue defense along the axis for commitment of the Red 1st Army OMG. At this time, the front attacks all advancing enemy reserves, as well as other enemy objectives.

The OMG advances behind its own forward detachments. After moving and regrouping at the line of commitment, the OMG, exploiting the attack of the two tank regiments, aviation, combat helicopters, artillery and its forward detachments that had penetrated into the Blue grouping, swiftly arrives at the line for commitment. Avoiding combat and cooperating with airmobile assaults, the OMG advances into the enemy rear and carries out its missions.

[The OMG advances to commitment on two routes—each spearheaded by a forward detachment structured around a tank battalion. Pre-planned artillery strikes, air strikes and helicopter strikes are employed extensively to attack targets on the flanks. On-call FASCAM and air strikes are employed to support the airheads and commitment of the OMG.

The electronic warfare plan is ambitious. Blue CPs and transmitters are jammed on both flanks of the breakthrough while artillery, air space, air defense, ground maneuver and movement of the OMG are coordinated and controlled by an airborne CP. Soviet jamming was normally directed at deeper, operational targets and seldom on the frontline trace.]

Summary

The committal of an OMG during the first defensive operation of an army and front is one operational-tactical variant that may be incorporated in a new theory of tactics and operational art. All possible paths that can lead us to new knowledge in military affairs need to be explored instead of being summarily dismissed as impossible. Ultimately, war and war alone will demonstrate what is possible and what is impossible and which maneuvers will create success.

[Throughout the article, there is a lot of "mirror-imaging" of Blue tactics. Blue helicopter tactics are a mirror of Red—not a reflection of Western helicopter employment. Blue use of ICM and fixed-wing aviation in the article does not approximate Western practice. Apparently, the process of Western tactics was not fully appreciated in the Frunze Military Academy, since the essence of AirLand Battle and follow-on forces attack is missing. Although the Western reader may take exception to the survivability of forward-deployed forces as depicted, the author drives home the point that passivity in the defense surrenders initiative while defensive maneuver can create the conditions for success.] *MR*

Bogdan Suita was a serving officer in the Polish Naval Infantry, who commanded a battalion prior to being selected to attend the prestigious, three-year course of the Soviet Frunze Military Academy. He graduated with high marks in 1988. While enrolled at Frunze, he was assigned a special project on tactical raids and operational maneuver. He worked closely on this project with a faculty member for over 400 hours and wrote several articles for the academy on the subject. His "master work" for the project was on the actions of an OMG during the mutual army-level offensive. This was critiqued by three Soviet general officers and a colonel and received special recognition upon its completion.

The Elusive SOVIET PEACE DIVIDEND

Major Marcus A. Kuiper,
US Army

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The Cold War is over; the Soviet Union has been dissolved; and Mikhail Gorbachev is no longer in power. The author looks at the former Soviet Union as it faces the problems of demobilizing its military might. The author discusses the Soviet defense budget and how it has evolved over the years. He also reviews the defense budget cuts and the cost associated with the disarmament. Finally, he looks at the Soviet economy in the wake of the August 1991 coup attempt and how it has created a severe budget squeeze.

IN 1987, Mikhail Gorbachev publicly accused the United States of harboring an "immoral intention to bleed the Soviet Union white economically . . . by dragging us ever deeper into the quagmire of the arms race."¹ His tone seemed to indicate a degree of sympathy with the arguments of a number of civilian defense analysts who contended that the Soviet Union's excessive preoccupation with military power and ideological confrontation during the Brezhnev years had debilitated the economy and had produced diminishing returns in the political arena as well.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense or any other government office or agency. Editor

They warned that failure to reorder budget priorities would further weaken the economy and cause the Soviet Union to fall even farther behind the West economically, technologically and militarily.²

Gorbachev heeded these warnings and launched a comprehensive program to cut defense spending. In December 1988, he boldly announced deep unilateral troop reductions in the Soviet armed forces.³ In 1989, he further clarified his intent by announcing that reductions in military spending would provide "resources for carrying out social programs" and that his ultimate goal was to "sharply reduce—by 33 percent to 50 percent—the share of our national income that goes to defense spending."⁴

At the time, it seemed logical to assume that Gorbachev's unilateral troop reductions and defense spending cuts would produce rather substantial savings and that this would provide almost immediate budgetary relief. However, the experience of the past three years has shown the promise of significant savings to be illusory. Simply put, there was no peace dividend. The Gorbachev era is over now, having officially ended with his resignation on 25 December 1991, and his effort to carve a meaningful peace dividend out of the bloated Soviet defense budget failed. This failure is worth examining, as the new Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) has inherited the same set of economic, social and political problems that Gorbachev faced and it also must try to find practical and effective solutions to resolve them.

There are a number of reasons why Gorbachev was not successful in this endeavor. First, the severe distortions in Soviet cost accounting procedures made it very difficult to ascertain precisely how much money was being saved and exactly where it was going. Second, the defense budget proved fairly resilient in resisting deep cuts and in compensating for those that were implemented. Third, the aggregate cost of compliance with a series of arms reduction and troop withdrawal agreements far exceeded original expectations. Fourth, the ongoing military reform process greatly exacerbated existing social problems within the armed forces, creating a need for significantly higher outlays for the social protection of servicemen. And finally, the collapse of central authority in the wake of the abortive coup attempt in August 1991 left the levers of real power in the hands of the newly independent republics, who seem determined to create their own defense establishments.

Understanding the Defense Budget

Traditionally, the portion of the state budget allocated for defense spending was grossly understated. In 1988, the official figure proffered as representing the year's total military expenditures was 20.2 billion rubles. This figure repre-

sented an extremely modest annual growth rate of .14 percent compared to the official 1970 figure of 19.7 billion rubles.⁵ However, in May 1989, Gorbachev revealed that the "real figure"

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for Soviet defense spending in that year was 77.3 billion rubles. He also indicated that this figure represented 9 percent of the Soviet gross national product and that the defense budget had been frozen since 1987.⁶ These claims were met with considerable skepticism both in the Soviet Union and abroad.⁷ A substantial majority of Western intelligence services and defense economics experts feel that these figures are still significantly understated.⁸

The 1990 defense budget was officially 70.9 billion rubles, a reduction of 8.28 percent from 1989, or a savings of 6.4 billion rubles. However, the 1991 state budget approved by the Supreme Soviet called for an annual outlay of 96.5 billion rubles for defense.⁹ Not surprisingly, a number of civilian commentators had a hard time reconciling these figures with the government's claim that this represented a significant reduction in defense spending.¹⁰ In an effort to quell the criticism, the late Marshal Sergey Akhromeyev, Gorbachev's former adviser on defense matters, offered the explanation that the 96.5 billion ruble figure was based on a revised system of calculating prices. He maintained that the new figure was equivalent to approximately 65 billion rubles in 1990 prices and that this represented a

reduction of approximately 8.5 percent in real spending.¹¹ The key to understanding this question lies in the issue of price formation or, more accurately, in the issue of price deformation.

The unit price of an individual item of military equipment has traditionally been determined by

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bureaucratic fiat and bears little relation to the sum total of labor or material resources required to produce the item. In addition, defense plants have been heavily subsidized for years, so the true cost of producing modern weaponry has remained hidden and, until recently, largely irrelevant. However, as more and more factories shift over to self-cost accounting, these hidden distortions have become clearly evident. For instance, the plant manager of the Saratov aircraft factory has complained that the Ministry of Civil Aviation purchases the Yak-42 aircraft that his plant produces "at a price which is barely half its production cost."¹²

It is apparent that creative accounting techniques have been used to understate costs for so long that the figures being used as a computational basis today have lost all relevance. A major overhaul of the existing pricing system for the labor, supplies and services that go into the manufacture and maintenance of Soviet military hardware is needed in order to gauge the success or failure of specific budget-cutting measures and to reliably determine the amount of defense rubles being saved. The 96.5 billion ruble figure for 1991 demonstrates that the Ministry of Defense is cognizant of this fact. The former chief

of the Soviet General Staff, Army General Mikhail Moiseyev, has revealed that as a result of economic reform, the unit price for many items of military equipment has increased "two to three times and more."¹³ Apparently, however, this rather remarkable jump in prices was insufficient because former Minister of Defense Marshal Dmitri Yazov announced that in 1991 "the wholesale cost of a modern tank will increase 1.5 times, combat aircraft 1.6 to 1.7 times and artillery 1.4 times."¹⁴ Even so, it remains to be seen whether this programmed inflation will bring prices more in line with actual production costs and if the 1991 figure of 96.5 billion rubles can be meaningfully compared to the 1990 figure of 70.9 billion rubles.

At present, the 1992 defense budget is a subject of hot debate and a number of prominent economists and political commentators are urging the government to make a clean break with the past by revealing the true scope of hidden Soviet military expenditures. They believe that it is now possible to publish a "real defense budget," with prices for military hardware determined by market conditions and all budgetary authority for weapons procurement and research and development transferred from the various industrial ministries to the Ministry of Defense.¹⁵

Cutting the Defense Budget

According to official Soviet data, the 1990 defense budget was reduced by 6.4 billion rubles, a modest but fairly significant sum. Unfortunately, this money was not reallocated to the civilian sector. The Ministry of Defense requested that it be allowed to use the savings to implement the state conversion program and 4 billion rubles was reallocated for this purpose.¹⁶ The end result of this sleight-of-hand budgeting was something less than efficacious, however, as the loss of 6.4 billion rubles had a significant negative impact on a number of defense enterprises, while the 4 billion ruble rebate was insufficient to jump start the conversion program.

In 1991, the budget axe fell again, presenting the political and military leadership with an array of hard choices that sparked a fierce inter-



Excess Soviet tanks transferred to the East German government and now awaiting disposition after the unification of Germany.

The portion of the state budget allocated for defense spending was grossly understated. In 1988, the official figure proffered as representing the year's total military expenditures was 20.2 billion rubles . . . in May 1989, Gorbachev revealed that the "real figure" for Soviet defense spending in that year was 77.3 billion rubles. He also indicated that this figure represented 9 percent of the Soviet gross national product and that the defense budget had been frozen since 1987. These claims were met with considerable skepticism both in the Soviet Union and abroad.

nal debate about fiscal priorities. Moiseyev confirmed the fact that in 1989–1990, the volume of arms production "was reduced by almost one-fifth." He also explained why the General Staff felt that spending for weapons procurement had to be stabilized in 1991 at the expense of research and development funding:

"You must understand that it is impossible and undesirable for a number of reasons to quickly reduce military hardware production several times over, as is often suggested. That would mean cutting back the most complex production lines, disrupting a well oiled production process, and forsaking people's interests. Unfortunately, such a situation is taking its toll right now in some sectors of the defense industry, particularly in tank building."¹⁷

However, the decision to shift the bulk of the budget cuts to the research and development ac-

count also entailed significant risks and consequences. During 1990, some 40,000 employees at defense sector scientific research institutes quit their jobs. It is estimated that another 90,000 left in 1991. Moreover, many of those departing are highly skilled specialists who cannot be easily replaced. Clearly, the Ministry of Defense can ill afford a brain drain of this magnitude. Therefore, it is not surprising that Gorbachev allegedly eliminated the planned 1991 cuts in defense-related research and development and restored funding to 1990 levels.¹⁸

It seems fairly clear that the central leadership has encountered serious difficulties in its efforts to reduce military expenditures. Defense cuts inflict real social and economic pain on the bloated work force of the massive military-industrial complex.¹⁹ Moreover, in the absence of any comprehensive review of the state's genuine

national security needs, projected cuts have not always been well conceived. As a result, the requisite funding must be restored or transferred

The cuts that have been implemented in arms production and procurement so far have been largely driven by a lack of funding and not by any overarching plan to draw down the military in a rational and coherent manner. In actual practice, it has proved extremely difficult to reconcile the goal of achieving deep cuts in defense spending with the goal of reorganizing the Soviet armed forces, based on qualitative rather than quantitative parameters.

from other accounts. Meanwhile, inflation has seriously eroded the meager savings achieved.


The end result has been that the government is mortgaging the endeavor by maintaining a relatively constant flow of defense rubles into the modernization effort while simultaneously reducing troop strength. This approach may be the result of political compromise. However, it is also possible that it is the result of rational analysis. The defense procurement cycle is characterized by long lead times and institutional inertia. The average amount of time required for a given weapon system to progress from the research and development stage to serial production is usually 10 to 15 years. Ongoing Soviet weapon projects represent an enormous sunk cost. National security considerations aside, a decision to terminate these programs would probably not result in meaningful savings and could prove economically counterproductive because of the concomitant rise in unemployment. Gorbachev did not reveal an inclination to terminate these programs, and so far, Boris Yeltsin has not either. Rather, the evidence suggests that he remains committed to a strong investment policy. The preferred solution seems to be to scale back the production of developed weapons, particularly those of older vintage, while maintaining the pace of research and development of follow-on

weapon systems.²⁰ However, a severe budget crisis is affecting the implementation of this policy. The cuts that have been implemented in arms production and procurement so far have been largely driven by a lack of funding and not by any overarching plan to draw down the military in a rational and coherent manner. In actual practice, it has proved extremely difficult to reconcile the goal of achieving deep cuts in defense spending with the goal of reorganizing the Soviet armed forces, based on qualitative rather than quantitative parameters.²¹

Disarmament Costs

Next, there are the hidden costs of disarmament to consider. Unit deactivation costs money. Transportation charges for rail and sea movement of tanks and other tracked vehicles require off-budget funding. Similarly, monies must be allocated to cover the fuel and maintenance costs of road-marching columns of wheeled vehicles hundreds of kilometers across Eastern Europe. Once the equipment is back in the former Soviet Union, it must be transhipped to collection points and prepared for destruction, reorganization or conversion for use in the civilian sector.

The scale of the ongoing Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe is impressive. In addition to the four tank divisions that were withdrawn from the territory of the former German Democratic Republic during 1989 and 1990 under the unilateral reductions, the Soviet Union met its treaty obligations by withdrawing all of its forces (nine divisions) from Hungary and Czechoslovakia by 30 June 1991. Over the next three years, the 15 divisions and five air armies remaining on German territory must also be withdrawn—a force consisting of over 370,000 service members with 184,200 family members, over 5,000 tanks, 9,500 armored fighting vehicles, 4,400 field artillery pieces, 1,700 surface-to-air missile systems, 620 combat aircraft and 790 helicopters. In addition, there are more than 1,660,000 tons of ammunition and supplies to be moved. In comparison, when the United States began its drawdown, there were 18 active divi-



A factory manufacturing MiG-29 Fulcrum air-superiority fighters.

The unit price of an individual item of military equipment has traditionally been determined by bureaucratic fiat and bears little relation to the sum total of labor or material resources required to produce the item. In addition, defense plants have been heavily subsidized for years, so the true cost of producing modern weaponry has remained hidden and, until recently, largely irrelevant. . . . For instance, the plant manager of the Saratov aircraft factory has complained that the Ministry of Civil Aviation purchases the Yak-42 aircraft . . . "at a price which is barely half its production cost."

sions in the entire US Army. Five of these were light infantry divisions, and one third of them contained a "roundout" Reserve Component or National Guard brigade.

As if this were not enough, in December an agreement was concluded providing for the phased withdrawal of the approximately 45,000 Soviet troops stationed on Polish territory by the end of 1994. Negotiations are also underway to set the terms and a timetable for the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops from the three newly independent Baltic States. Clearly, the Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe is a massive undertaking entailing considerable expense. The German government has appropriated 1 billion Deutsche marks (DM) (approximately \$600 million) to help defray the costs of the withdrawal. However, a significant portion of this sum will be expended merely meeting transportation costs within Germany itself.²² Current estimates for

the total cost of road and rail transit through Poland are in the neighborhood of \$2 billion to \$3 billion.²³ Yazov has confirmed the fact that so far this effort "has not been supported by corresponding finances from the state budget."²⁴

In addition to the ongoing expense incurred by transporting and collecting large quantities of military equipment from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, there are the much greater costs associated with equipment disposition, which must be considered. For instance, what will be done with the thousands of tanks, armored vehicles and artillery that exceed the limits specified in the treaty on conventional force reductions in Europe?²⁵ The destruction procedures specified in the treaty protocols are manpower- and capital-intensive. One study estimates that it will cost between \$4,000 and \$12,000 to decommission each combat vehicle covered by the treaty, depending on the vehicle's size and

The 15 divisions and five air armies remaining on German territory must also be withdrawn—a force consisting of over 370,000 service members with 184,200 family members, over 5,000 tanks, 9,500 armored fighting vehicles, 4,400 field artillery pieces, 1,700 surface-to-air missile systems, 620 combat aircraft and 790 helicopters . . . [and] 1,660,000 tons of ammunition and supplies. . . . In comparison, when the United States began its drawdown, there were 18 active divisions in the entire US Army.

type.²⁶ Further, implementation of the verification regime will entail considerable costs.

Soviet sources indicate that their expenditures incurred by implementation of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty amounted to approximately \$50 million annually. This figure is probably significantly understated, as US implementation costs were closer to \$200 million a year.²⁷ Moiseyev has acknowledged the fact that "in the initial stage of the reduction of armaments and combat equipment, we will have to bear considerable costs." He further admits, "There is no denying it—disarmament costs a lot of money, and this fact must be considered." His successor, Army General Vladimir Lobov, has echoed this. "It is naive to think that once a treaty has been signed, weapons can immediately go under the knife. The material costs are enormous, and the elimination process drags on for months and even years."²⁸


Social Costs

Then there is the human dimension. The Soviet media frequently feature stories about discharged service members who are not receiving the benefits to which they are entitled by law. In addition, those officers and warrant officers who remain on active duty are facing a severe housing shortage that is exacerbated by the ongoing withdrawal from Eastern Europe. At present, virtually all of the Ministry of Defense's available

construction capacity is engaged in erecting new housing; nevertheless, during 1990 the number of families of servicemen without accommodations increased to 173,600. This trend continued in 1991 as the withdrawals from Czechoslovakia and Hungary were completed, and four more divisions were removed from German territory, bringing the total to over 192,000. Minister of Defense Marshal of Aviation Gyeveniy Shaposhnikov has stated that the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops from Germany, Poland and the Baltics will add another 87,600 families to this number. From all this, it is readily apparent that the current rate of new housing construction is insufficient to house the annual flow of returning servicemen and their families, let alone make significant progress toward retiring the backlog.²⁹

In the near term, any serious attempt at resolving the housing shortage will require additional funding and resources which the Ministry of Defense does not presently have. In 1990, the Soviet Council of Ministers appropriated an additional 70 million rubles for this purpose.³⁰ However, this was a drop in the ocean given the sheer magnitude of the problem. Additional funding will have to come from somewhere.

In general, the central government of the former Soviet Union seemed unwilling or unable to appropriate additional monies for this purpose. Unfortunately, Yeltsin's financial position is no better. The preferred approach appears to be a negotiated withdrawal settlement with the Germans that involves substantial remuneration in cash, credits and new construction. Germany has already agreed to provide the former Soviet Union with 7.8 billion Deutsche marks during the period 1991–1994 for the construction of residential housing and infrastructure. The Soviets estimate that this sum will provide for the construction of approximately 36,000 apartments.³¹ However, this level of new construction represents less than half of the housing requirement generated by the withdrawal of the Western Group of Forces from German territory and does nothing to address the growing shortage of military housing resulting from the simul-



Research and development efforts had traditionally been a high priority of the former Soviet Union, and received a large share of scarce resources.

Defense cuts inflict real social and economic pain on the bloated work force of the massive military-industrial complex. Moreover, in the absence of any comprehensive review of the state's genuine national security needs, projected cuts have not always been well conceived . . . the requisite funding must [then] be restored or transferred from other accounts. Meanwhile, inflation has seriously eroded the meager savings achieved.

taneous withdrawal of Soviet forces from other former allies. Moreover, from an economic perspective, it is a daunting thought to consider that 7.8 billion Deutsche marks are required to retire only one-fifth of the current housing backlog. Given the sheer magnitude of the problem, it is clear that even a more generous final agreement with the Germans will provide only palliative budgetary relief, and the bulk of the housing crisis will remain.³²

A Whole New Ball Game

Finally, the abortive coup attempt of August 1991 has served as a catalyst, radically altering the political landscape of the former Soviet Union by unleashing hidden social pressures and accelerating the dynamics of change. In particular, the virtual collapse of central authority has imparted an unstructured nature to the reform process that has broad and pervasive implications for a wide range of defense issues.

In 1991, military expenditures became a key issue in the power struggle between the center and the periphery. A number of republics started to withhold tax revenues from the central gov-

ernment, as well as the delivery of raw materials and intermediate goods to central industries that produce weaponry and military equipment. As a result, the projected annual budget deficit for 1991 of 16.7 billion rubles was exceeded by the end of March. It is estimated that the total deficit for 1991 was in excess of 204 billion rubles.³³

Not surprisingly, this has created a severe budget squeeze for the military-industrial ministries, and a number of shipbuilding and aircraft production programs have reportedly been suspended. Colonel General Aleksandr Galkin, chief of the Ministry of Defense Main Armor Administration, has revealed that the impact on the production of armored vehicles has been dramatic. He states that appropriations for tank production in 1991 were cut in half and that appropriations for the production of infantry fighting vehicles were slashed by more than 80 percent as well. This budgetary stringency has forced the armored vehicle production lines at the huge tank plants in Kharkov and Nizhni Tagil to shut down completely.³⁴

The newly independent republics' refusal to provide revenue and resources to the union has

precipitated an acute cash crisis. The nation's gold and oil reserves have already been tapped into repeatedly, and the government is unable to service its estimated foreign debt of \$70.2 billion. Making matters worse is the government's apparent inability to control the money supply. The central bank has continued to simply print more money to cover expenditures, triggering the onset of hyperinflation.³⁵

What this means is that good intentions notwithstanding, the former Soviet Union will no longer be able to comply with the various arms control agreements that it has entered into due to a lack of funds. For instance, the joint Soviet-American agreement on the disposal and non-production of chemical weapons requires both sides to initiate destruction procedures no later

The former Soviet Union will no longer be able to comply with the various arms control agreements . . . due to a lack of funds. For instance, the . . . agreement on the disposal and nonproduction of chemical weapons requires . . . [initiation of] destruction procedures no later than . . . 1992. Unfortunately, however, the Soviets do not have any destruction facilities and lack both the requisite technology and funding to build them.

than 31 December 1992. Unfortunately, however, the Soviets do not have any destruction facilities and lack both the requisite technology and funding to build them.³⁶ If the former Soviet Union is to fulfill its treaty obligations in an ecologically safe manner, someone else will probably have to foot the bill. An analogous situation exists regarding implementation of the Conventional Forces in Europe and the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks agreements.

But the rebellious republics are doing far more than merely withholding resources and tax revenues. The three newly independent Baltic States, Georgia and Moldavia have demanded the complete withdrawal of all Soviet troops sta-

tioned on their territory, and 12 of 15 former republics have taken concrete steps toward forming their own defense establishments. These developments are of more than academic interest because several republics have begun to form their own national armies. On 23 October 1991, the Ukrainian parliament approved the creation of an army, air force and navy, totaling 420,000 troops and a national guard with a planned strength of 30,000. Even more ominous is the fact that there are significant numbers of nuclear weapons deployed on the territory of Belorussia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan. The declaratory policy of various Ukrainian officials has been particularly confused and inconsistent regarding their plans in this area. On 30 December 1991, an agreement was reached providing for the eventual destruction of all nuclear weapons on Belorussian and Ukrainian territory, but in the post-Soviet Union environment, such agreements have an alarming tendency to unravel prior to implementation.³⁸

At present, the newly independent republics do not have the money to implement their defense agenda, but three of them (Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Georgia) have announced plans to nationalize the Soviet weapons and military equipment on their territory.³⁹ It is likely that this process will go forward because the center lacks both the means and the will to prevent it. The first test case was over the separatist Autonomous Republic of Checheno-Ingush, where Yeltsin's decree establishing emergency rule was overturned by the Russian parliament.⁴⁰ This was followed by the secession of the ethnically Russian "Dniester Moldavian Republic" from Moldavia, where elements of the 14th Army have placed themselves under the self-proclaimed republic's jurisdiction.⁴¹ If the central government is unable to impose its will on tiny enclaves such as these, it seems highly unlikely that it will be able to control the actions of the larger and more powerful former union republics.

Meanwhile, the political, economic and social turmoil assailing the former Soviet Union has rendered the armed forces themselves virtually

combat ineffective. The loss of former allies and former republics has ripped gaping holes in Moscow's strategic defense system, and local commanders no longer have time for training and readiness because the more pressing concerns of feeding and housing the troops take precedence. And now the numerous interrepublican disputes over ownership and control of military assets threaten to split the armed forces along ethnic and regional lines.

Making matters worse is the unimaginative and hidebound approach of the senior military leadership toward solving these problems. Shaposhnikov seems to think that it is still possible to retain some form of all-union defense structure. From August through December 1991, he and Lobov railed against any attempt to undermine the concept of maintaining unified armed forces.⁴² At the January All-Officer Conference in Moscow, Shaposhnikov demonstrated that he is cognizant of the political and economic realities of the military's predicament, but he did not show any inclination toward brokering a compromise with the breakaway republics. A more realistic viewpoint is espoused by the deputy chairman of the Russian State Committee for Defense Questions, Vladimir Lopatin. "To set your hopes on the continued preservation of unified armed forces is simply political deafness and blindness, which will lead to the further disintegration of the army."⁴³ So it seems that just as the old Soviet high command clung to the idea of retaining Eastern Europe as a Soviet sphere of influence long after the formal dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the current high command is still trying to hold together an entity that has already expired.

From an economic standpoint, it is readily apparent that after more than three years of implementation, Gorbachev's strategy of cutting the defense budget did not yield the kind of savings

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that were originally anticipated. The results achieved were meager at best, and the combined financial impact of his foreign policy, domestic policy and military reform program was to create large new sources of revenue consumption. At present, the situation has not improved. It seems rather problematic that a defense budget, requiring a massive infusion of capital to finance the fulfillment of various treaty obligations, the relocation of hundreds of thousands of service members and all their equipment from Eastern Europe and the maintenance of an inefficient and overextended military-industrial complex, can be used as a source for obtaining a substantial amount of unobligated funds.

In the postcoup environment, the likelihood of achieving these goals seems more remote than ever. The newly independent republics are currently ascendant and will probably accrue even more power and autonomy in the near term. This will eventually force Russia to absorb whatever central governmental apparatus remains and to transform the armed forces from a union structure to a Russian one. As a result, the Soviet peace dividend will continue to prove an elusive chimera, and those who have pinned their hopes on it to solve the country's economic problems are likely to be sorely disappointed. **MR**

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2. Vitali Zhurkin, Sergei Karaganov and Andrei Kortunov, "Vyzovy bezopasnosti—starye i novye," *Kommunist*, no. 1, (1988):42–50; A. Izyumov and A. Kortunov, "Sovetskiy Soyuz v menyayushchetsy mire," *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn*, no. 7, (July 1988):53–64; and A. Kislov "Novoe politicheskoe myshlenie i regionalnye konflikt," *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn*, no. 8, (August 1988):39–47.
3. "Vystuplenie M. S. Gorbacheva v Organizatsii Obedinyonnykh Natsii," *Pravda* and *Izvestiya*, 8 December 1988, 1.
4. "Vystuplenie M. S. Gorbacheva," *Pravda* and *Izvestiya*, 31 May 1989, 1; and "Obshche-Evropeyskiy protsess idyot vperyod," *Pravda*, 7 July 1989, 1.
5. For a vigorous defense of these figures, see Colonel Ivan Yudin, "Defense Spendings and Economics of Disarmament," *Soviet Military Review* (June 1989):28–30.
6. "Vystuplenie M. S. Gorbacheva," *Pravda* and *Izvestiya*, 31 May 1989, 1.
7. For instance, see "Skolko tratit na oborony," *Ogonek* (May 1989):6–7; and Soviet television *Vzglyad*, 6 June and 8 October 1989. Shortly after Gorbachev's speech, the former chief of the USSR General Staff, Army General Mikhail Moiseyev tried to blunt the criticism by explaining the figures in greater detail. See "Oborona byudzheta SSSR," *Pravda*, 11 June 1989, 5.
8. "Double Their Money," *The Economist* (15 December 1990):20. For a detailed discussion of Soviet defense spending, see Dmitri Steinberg, "Trends in Soviet Military Expenditure," *Soviet Studies*, vol. 42, no. 4, (October 1990):675–99.
9. I. Demchenko, "Gosbyudzheta SSSR: poteri budut rasti, a kompensatsii ne predviditsya," *Izvestiya*, 10 January 1991, 2; and "O soyuoznom byudzhete na 1991 god," *Izvestiya*, 15 January 1991, 4.
10. S. Bobrovsky, "Tanki byut po nashim karmanam," *Komsomolskaya pravda*, 11 December 1990, 1; and I. Sichka, "Narod i armiya edinye?" *Komsomolskaya pravda*, 9 January 1991, 1.
11. Interview with V. Litovkin, "Skolko stoit oborona," *Izvestiya*, 12 January 1991, 2.
12. Soviet television *Vremya*, 13 September 1989. The issue of price deformation is examined in detail in M. Barabanov, "Strukturny knsis sovetsoi ekonomiki: puti pereodeleniya," *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya*, no. 3, (1991):41–50. For a general discussion of the problems inherent in the Soviet price formation system, see "When the Price is Wrong," *The Economist* (2 February 1991):27.
13. "Argumenty generalnogo shtaba," *Izvestiya*, 23 February 1990, 3.
14. *Pravatelstvennyy vestnik*, no. 48, (November 1990):5–10.
15. Lieutenant Colonel V. Makarenko, "Voenny byudzheta: ot chernovo yashchika k beloi knige," *Armia*, no. 17, (September 1991):19–22; and Soviet television *Serving the Fatherland*, 31 August 1991.
16. Major General V. A. Ryaboshapko and Colonel V. A. Vtorushin, "O probleme konversii oboronnnykh otraslei promyshlennosti v SSSR," *Voenennaya mysl*, no. 9, (1990):41–46. According to radical military reformer Vladimir Lopatin, "... the leaders of the military-industrial complex requested 60 billion rubles from the state budget" for this purpose. See V. Lopatin, "Poyasnite: naya zapiska k proektu kontseptsii voennoi reformy," *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya*, no. 9, (1990):122–24.
17. *Krasnaya zvezda* [Red Star, hereafter cited as KZ], 6 November 1990:3; and 12 June 1991, 1–2. More insight is provided by Colonel General V. A. Achakov, former commander of Airborne Forces, who complained that "this year like last, the Ministry of Defense industry has failed to supply us with a large quantity of equipment and armaments." See "V svyazke s minoboronpro-mom," KZ, 11 November 1990, 1. A significant shortfall in the amount of combat equipment delivered to the airborne elite gives one cause to wonder about the status of deliveries throughout the armed forces.
18. Soviet television *Resonance*, 6 August 1991 and "Voenny byudzheta: Kakim emu byt?" KZ, 13 December 1990, 1.
19. The Soviet military-industrial complex may employ as many as 12 million to 13 million people, of which some 500,000 have already left their jobs seeking other work. In contrast, there are approximately 2 million people engaged in arms production in the United States. See Michael Checinski, "The Conversion of the Soviet Arms Industry: Plans, Reality and Prospects," *Osteuropa-Wirtschaft* (36 Jhg., January 1991). Also see KZ, 17 October 1991, 1; and Soviet television *Vesti*, 19 November 1991.
20. In August 1989, the late Marshal Sergey Akhromeyev testified before a joint session of the US Congress that Soviet tank production had been cut in half to an annual rate of 1,700. Several months later, former Defense Minister Dmitri Yazov clarified this statement by revealing that older models such as the T-70, T-54 and T-55 were being phased out in favor of continued development and increased production of newer models such as the T-72 and T-80. See Soviet television *Topical Interview*, 22 February 1990. For more information on Soviet weapons development, see "The Soviet Weapons Industry: An Overview," DI-8610016 (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, September 1986); and Stephen M. Meyer, "The Near Term Impact of SDI on Soviet Strategic Programs: An Institutional Perspective," in *On the Defensive? The Future of SDI*, ed. J. S. Nye and J. A. Sneer, (Boston, MA: University Press of America, 1988):55–86.
21. Gorbachev outlined the overall goals of his military reform program in August 1990 during a speech to a group of officers in the Odessa Military District. See "Dostoino priti perva: v istorii strany," KZ, 20 August 1990, 1. So far, the emphasis on equipping the armed forces with the most modern arms and equipment has not changed in the post-coup environment. See the Ministry

of Defense Marshal Evgeni Shaposhnikov's comments at the All-Army Officer Congress in KZ, 21 January 1992, 1–3.

22. The Soviets estimate their total requirement to move the Western Group of Forces in its entirety at 11,000 trains and 3,000 road convoys. Assuming an average of 30 freight cars per train and using the current German transport charge of 360 DM per rail axle, I calculate that rail transport costs in Germany alone will exceed 237 million DM. In addition, road movement costs and charges for sea shipment must be included in the total bill. See Major S. Popov and Lieutenant Colonel V. Khabarov, "Vyyvod voisk... s prepyatstviyami," KZ, 5 February 1991, 1; and Douglas L. Clarke, "Poland and the Soviet Troops in Germany," *Radio Liberty Report on Eastern Europe*, 25 January 1991, 40–44.

23. Soviet television *Vremya*, 13 February 1991.

24. See the Ministry of Defense draft concept of military reform in *Pravitelstvennyy vestnik*, no. 48, November 1990, 5–10.

25. Apparently part of the answer is to move vast quantities of combat equipment east of the Urals. Economic, as well as military, considerations may have been involved in this decision to violate the spirit of the accords. The issue of some 20,000 "missing" tanks has sparked some controversy. See Aleksandr Ignatov, "Chto za ostavkoi Shevardnadze?" *Komsomolskaya pravda*, 3 January 1991, 1; and the rebuttal by H. Belan, "Legenda o propavshikh tankakh," *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, 5 January 1991, 5.

26. V. Faltsman, "Konversia i ekonomicheskaya reforma," *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya*, no. 11, (1990):40. More recently, German officials have provided an estimate of \$19,000 per tank. See German television *Tageschau*, 19 December 1991.

27. Gavril Khromov, "Skolko stoyat vzryvy. Dogovor po RSMD—v deistviye," KZ, 20 October 1989, 4; V. Nazarenko, "Vooruzhennyye sily obnovlennoyo soyuza," KZ, 16 October 1991, 5; and Brigadier General Roland Lapoe, "The On-Site Inspection Agency Earns Its Stripes," *Defense* 89 (January–February 1989):18–23.

28. Soviet television *International Panorama*, 24 November 1990; and *Pravda*, 17 October 1991, 5.

29. Army General Mikhail Moiseyev "Vyyvody posle vyyvoda," *Pravitelstvennyy vestnik*, no. 35, August 1990, 8; and interview with Marshal Evgeni Shaposhnikov in KZ, 26 September 1991, 2. Several sources have challenged the official figure of 192,000 as too low. For instance, see "Gde zhe vykhod iz kvartirnykh tupikov?" KZ, 13 November 1991, 2. In 1990, the overall shortfall in housing throughout the Soviet Union was more than 14 million apartments. See the 1990 year-end report of the Soviet Union State Committee for Statistics in *Ekonomika i zhizn*, no. 5, January 1991, 9–13.

30. *Ibid*.

31. V. Litovkin, "7.8 miliarda marok vydalo pravitelstvo FRG v svyazi s vyyvodom sovetsoi voisk," *Izvestiya*, 26 September 1990, 2; N. Medvedev, "Valyutnye doma dlya sovetsoi voennykh," *Izvestiya*, 2 January 1991, 2; and Ye. Piskunov "Kto polychit 7.8 miliarda marok?" *Izvestiya*, 30 January 1991, 4.

32. On a number of occasions, the Soviet High Command has threatened to slow down or suspend the withdrawal of its troops from Germany. These extortion tactics have met with some success, however, as the Germans have agreed to reduce transportation charges and to provide 200 million DM for the vocational retraining of withdrawing servicemen. See *Trud*, 5 March 1991, 1; and *Izvestiya*, 9 July 1991, 3.

33. Interview with V. Kucherenko, chairman of the Supreme Soviet Committee on Budget, Planning and Finance in KZ, 16 April 1991, 1. Also see the statistical reports in *Izvestiya*, 6 April 1991, 2; 22 April 1991, 2; and 13 November 1991, 2. For a brief overview of how the republics are taking national economic policy into their own hands, see *The Economist* (6 July 1991):70–72; and (13 July 1991):21–23.

34. "Bronya i lyudi," KZ, 18 April 1991, 1; and Soviet television *Television News Service*, 22 November 1991.

35. See the interview with Gngon Yavlinski on Soviet television *Vzglyad*, 27 September 1991, and the figures provided in *Izvestiya*, 3 September 1991, 3; and 27 September 1991, 1.

36. It is estimated that implementation costs will exceed 5.4 billion rubles. See the interview with Colonel General Stanislav Petrov, chief of Chemical Troops in *Izvestiya*, 22 October 1991, 4.

37. Kathleen Mihalisko, "Laying the Foundation for the Armed Forces of Ukraine," *RFE RL Report on the USSR*, vol. 3, no. 45, (8 November 1991):19–22.

38. Colonel P. Chernenko, "Soglasenia podpisany, voprosy ostayutsya," KZ, 1 January 1992, 1.

39. It is interesting to note that the majority of housing being built by the Germans for departing Soviet service members and their families is located on the territory of the three Baltic States, Belorussia and the Ukraine (18,610 out of 36,000 apartments in the Ukraine alone). It seems logical to assume that these assets will be nationalized as well. See "Voiska vyyvodyatsya. Zhilya poka ne stroitsya," KZ, 9 July 1991, 1.

40. Soviet television *Vremya*, 11 November 1991. In addition to the 15 former union republics, there are 20 so-called autonomous republics within Russia that were created for ethnic minorities. Checheno-Ingush is a small muslim enclave of 1.3 million people with a long history of opposition to Russian rule.

41. See KZ, 20 November 1991, 5; and Soviet television *Television News Service*, 10 January 1992.

42. See *Izvestiya*, 14 September 1991, 1; KZ, 20 September 1991, 1; and the interviews with Marshal Shaposhnikov and General Lobov in *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 3 September 1991, 2–3; *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, 20 September 1991, 1–2; and *Pravda*, 25 September 1991, 1 and 3.

43. "Vsearmeiskoe ofiterskoe sobranie," KZ, 21 January 1992, 1–3; and interview with Vladimir Lopatin in *Moskovsky Novosti*, 29 December 1991, 9.

Avoiding Not So Friendly Fire

Colonel Dwight B. Dickson Jr., US Army,
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Death as a result of friendly fire is not new to the battlefield. The authors review what was done during Operation Desert Storm to reduce the possibility of fratricide incidents. They also discuss the ongoing process to field a standardized combat vehicle marking system.

Fratricide is the employment of friendly weapons and munitions with the intent to kill the enemy or destroy his equipment or facilities that results in unforeseen and unintentional death or injury to friendly personnel.

General Officer Steering Committee, 17 December 1991

FROM the burial mound at Marathon to the Vietnam Veterans' Memorial in Washington, nations have erected monuments to honor their fallen soldiers. These expressions of collective grief pay tribute to soldiers who have made the ultimate sacrifice at the hands of their enemies. Accepting these losses is understandably difficult for families and comrades-in-arms alike. However, when the cause of our grief for the death of a soldier has been because of a mistake, an error, a mishap—an incidence of "fratricide"—the sense of loss is amplified. With the technological advances in the range and lethality of weapons and the faster pace and

tempo of modern combat, the possibilities for fratricide have increased.

Fratricide is not a new problem. All of the wars of the 20th century have experienced incidents of friendly fire causing casualties among our own troops. While not all cases have been documented in the historical records, enough have been recorded to allow certain patterns to emerge. Lieutenant Colonel Charles R. Schrader, in his research survey, *Amicide: The Problem of Friendly Fire in Modern War*, examined friendly fire incidents in World War I, World War II, Korea and Vietnam. He found that while the percentage of casualties attributed to friendly fire in these wars was low, about 2 percent, the advance of technology might cause an increase in friendly fire casualties. He concluded:

"Indeed, there is every reason to suspect that the advance to military technology has increased rather than reduced the problem of



A Bradley destroyed by Hellfire missiles.

Soldier of Fortune

amicicide. As the use of technologically sophisticated weapons systems has increased, the limits of human ability to control such destructive forces have been approached. With respect to the problem of amicide, it may be suggested

TRADOC [was tasked] to establish a task force together with AMC, to improve identification in combat. . . . An accelerated Concept-Based Requirements System process was used to provide an established process and a framework for identifying battle-field needs in all functional areas related to combat identification.

that the optimum point of matching the capabilities of men and machines may already have been passed and that the gap between the capabilities of machines and the human ability to control them adequately is increasing. The implications of this gap for amicide in future war are clear: amicide may be a greater problem on the future battlefield than ever before, both in terms of frequency and the number of casualties produced thereby."¹ Lethality and range increases, resulting from improved technology, will continue to stress human capability until augmented by improved identification and situational awareness technology and techniques.

Our experiences in Operation *Desert Storm* seem to verify Schrader's predictions. Although the specific circumstances of fratricide incidents during the Southwest Asia war may have been a result of a specific set of conditions, there can be no doubt that our most recent combat experience has underscored the historical problem of fratricide and has set into motion a series of actions to consider the issue of fratricide across the total spectrum of Army doctrine, training, leader development, organization and materiel systems. The purpose of this article is to report the actions of the Combat Identification Task Force, to describe some of the solutions that have been developed to minimize the chance of fratricide

in future conflicts and to lay down the training challenge facing the Army.

Many actions to minimize fratricide actually had their beginning before and during operations *Desert Shield* and *Desert Storm*. In January 1989, the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), at Fort Leavenworth, disseminated lessons learned on fratricide gathered at the combat training centers (CTCs) and previous operations. Army doctrine and training methods describe techniques for fratricide prevention. Examples of such techniques employed during *Desert Storm* include strict controls on ground to air fires, restrictive fire-control measures for indirect fires and quick-reaction training materials. Anyone who participated in the ground war or watched the television accounts saw the ubiquitous fluorescent VS-17 panels on the tops of tanks, Bradleys and other vehicles, and the upside-down "V" that was painted on every coalition vehicle.

These were the two most visible elements of the fratricide prevention effort, but they were not the only techniques used. Less visible, but widely acclaimed by users as contributing to fratricide reduction, was a variety of devices employing Global Positioning System technology. The US Army Materiel Command (AMC) had several technological innovations in various stages of research and development. Two that made their way to the war zone were the BUDD light and the DARPA light. The BUDD light is a simple device that attached to a common 9-volt battery. While it did not solve every problem, most notably identification through thermal sights, it did provide an additional means of identifying friendly vehicles at night. The DARPA light was a more sophisticated technological solution designed primarily to help aircraft identify friendly vehicles. The design, fabrication and fielding of this device was accomplished in a remarkably short period of time; however, no unit received them before the cease-fire.

Toward Solutions

However successful efforts to reduce fratricide incidents may have been, they were not able to prevent the 35 deaths and 72 wounded



A B-17 Flying Fortress loses part of its tail when it drops back into the falling bombs of another plane over central Berlin, circa 1944.

While not all [friendly fire] cases have been documented in the historical records, enough have been recorded to allow certain patterns to emerge. . . . "There is every reason to suspect that the advance to military technology has increased rather than reduced the problem of amicide. As the use of technologically sophisticated weapons systems has increased, the limits of human ability to control such destructive forces have been approached."

US forces that were attributed to friendly fire.² This high proportion of casualties, as compared to other battle casualties, brought the issue of fratricide into sharp focus. Consequently, the vice chief of staff of the Army tasked the commander of the US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) to establish a task force together with AMC, to improve identification in combat. He stated the Army "cannot accept casualties that can be prevented by our own actions to improve combat identification." The initial objectives that were set down were: address near- and long-term requirements and solutions; detail necessary cooperation with other services and allies; use an integrated approach to address doctrine, training, leader development, organization,

materiel; and identify advanced technology contributions. A draft concept for combat identification and a 1989 Fratricide Action Plan, provided starting points for the project. In May 1991, the Combat Identification Task Force was formed to provide the leadership for the combat identification initiative. The task force membership included representatives from the Army Staff, the Army Secretariat, TRADOC, AMC, the US Air Force Tactical Air Command and the US Marine Corps Combat Developments Command.³

An accelerated Concept-Based Requirements System process was used to provide an established process and a framework for identifying battlefield needs in all functional areas related to combat identification. By September 1991, the

(Right) A DARPA light mounted on a Bradley.
(Inset) Close up of a BUDD light and DARPA light.



Lethality and range increases, resulting from improved technology, will continue to stress human capability until augmented by improved identification and situational awareness technology and techniques. . . . Two [devices] that made their way to the war zone were the BUDD light and the DARPA light. The BUDD light is a simple device that attached to a common 9-volt battery [assists in] identifying friendly vehicles at night. The DARPA light was a more sophisticated technological solution designed primarily to help aircraft identify friendly vehicles.

task force had developed a prioritized list of needs and proposed solutions.⁴ Additionally, the Combat Identification Task Force determined that the inability to maintain situational awareness in combat and the lack of positive target identification capability are the major contributors to fratricide. To guide the Army's efforts, the combat identification concept was refined and included these elements as critical to reduction of fratricide.

Following approval of the Combat Identification Task Force's action plan, the Combined Arms Command at Fort Leavenworth established the Fratricide Prevention Task Force (FPTF) as a complementary component of the Combat Identification Task Force to assess actions within TRADOC and to determine steps needed to integrate fratricide prevention measures. The FPTF's mission was to assign tasks, determine milestones, examine and track implementation of solutions. This was done through the Fratricide Prevention Action Plan, which is based on the solutions developed by the Combat Identification Task Force and has responsibilities

and milestones coordinated and assigned. It provides the means to track all approved actions through development and fielding. As a "living" document, it is also the means by which new initiatives are incorporated into the overall effort.

The solutions identified by the task force in the Fratricide Prevention Action Plan fall within the areas of doctrine, organization, materiel, training and leader development.

Doctrine and Organization

In the area of doctrine, significant recognition of the risks of fratricide and measures to prevent it are already present in our most important writings. These include doctrinal manuals at all levels. One example, US Army Field Manual (FM) 71-2, *The Tank and Mechanized Infantry Battalion Task Force*, contains fratricide prevention guidance and is highlighted in a discussion on the control of battalion task force fires. However, tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP)—the application of doctrine to specific circumstances—are being examined to ensure clarity and standardization of fratricide prevention mea-

Thermal infrared beacons on a Bradley and in close-up.



The Army is examining items available now known as Quick Fix near-term items; those available within one and a half to three years, called Quick Fix Plus; and also investigating mid- and long-term approaches. Quick Fix items—BUDD lights, DARPA lights, thermal tape—and one Quick Fix Plus item, a thermal identification device, have been evaluated at TRADOC schools and the NTC, to determine their contribution to improved combat identification.

sures. Some TTP may require expansion to fully address fratricide prevention. For example, the steps in the command estimate process may need to be revised to expand the risk assessment to include an evaluation of potential fratricide risks. If risks are high, additional fratricide prevention measures can be taken by a unit. The discussion of liaison duties in FM 101-5, *Staff Organization and Operations*, is being expanded largely based on information learned from the Army's use of coalition liaison teams in *Desert Storm*. The US Army Field Artillery School, Fort Sill, Oklahoma, has prepared a White Paper to examine the doctrine for clearing indirect fire and evaluate the need for change. Doctrine for air space management and control measures for direct and indirect fires in the offense is also being reviewed.⁵

As already mentioned, organizational changes to minimize fratricide were begun during *Desert Storm* by employment of mobile liaison teams to improve communications and coordination among units. In the future, we will institutionalize liaison structures.⁶

Materiel

The Army is examining items available now known as Quick Fix near-term items; those available within one and a half to three years, called Quick Fix Plus; and also investigating mid- and long-term approaches. Quick Fix items—BUDD lights, DARPA lights, thermal tape—and one Quick Fix Plus item, a thermal identification device, have been evaluated at TRADOC schools and the National Training Center (NTC), Fort Irwin, California, to determine their contribution to improved combat identification. Further experience with these devices will be gained by their employment at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), Fort Chaffee and Little Rock Air Force Base, Arkansas, and the Combined Maneuver Training Center (CMTC), Hohenfels, Germany. Additional Quick Fix Plus items—laser warning devices and position location devices—will be demonstrated, along with prototypes of six near-term identification devices to determine the most viable technology for further development. Several situational awareness, pos-nav devices

will also be demonstrated. Near-term devices will apply laser detection and warning technologies and employ various approaches to alert firing

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platforms that targets are friendly. The development, testing and fielding of proposed materiel solutions are being spearheaded by LABCOM's Combat Identification Systems Project Office at Fort Meade, Maryland. TRADOC assists in the management of combat identification initiatives through its Fratricide Prevention Action Plan. Twice a year, the Combat Identification Task Force will meet to review status of actions and provide guidance for future actions.⁷

Much remains to be done. In-depth evaluations of solutions are needed to determine whether they are valid and make a significant contribution to combat identification. Quick Fix materiel solutions need further evaluation to determine proper tactics, techniques and procedures. The Army will implement these solutions only if they complement combat effectiveness.⁸

Training and Leader Development

Review of our doctrine and the development of materiel solutions are important pieces of the ultimate solution. However, most of the technological solutions are not yet in the field. Even when they become available, soldiers, units and leaders must be trained in their proper use. In fact, training is the one action that can be taken by everyone, now and in the future. The keys to

reducing the incidence of fratricide are sound doctrine and a vigorous, comprehensive training program integrating fratricide prevention at all levels and among all soldiers supported by innovative technological developments.

A number of actions to enhance fratricide prevention are already underway in our training programs. Training actions include introduction of lost and flank unit friendly vehicles into unit sectors at the NTC, fratricide data collection at the CTCs and greater emphasis on fratricide during after-action reviews. A proposed regulation that provides a standard combat vehicle marking system has been written and is out for final staffing prior to its publication.

The US Army Armor School, Fort Knox, Kentucky, has produced a training videotape called *Fratricide Awareness and Prevention*, which highlights thermal characteristics of friendly and enemy combat vehicles and provides insights into training solutions immediately available in the field. The video was distributed in March. Its primary target audience is leaders and trainers within the battalion task force, but it is applicable to the individual soldier through senior leaders. The videotape's modular design has natural breakpoints to facilitate specific tailoring to the desired target audience.

One major contributing factor to fratricide identified by the Combat Identification Task Force that the videotape reinforces as a training point is situational awareness. Situational awareness is the distributed knowledge of friendly and enemy locations in the context of METT-T (mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available). Knowing where friendly elements are keeps us from targeting them. The importance of situational awareness cannot be overlooked, given that the range at which one can acquire, hit and kill targets exceeds the range at which one has the ability to gain positive identification. This demands that leaders train how to use situational awareness information in order to enhance their skills in maintaining their battlefield orientation. This sensing for where friendly units are on the battlefield, coupled with the proper use of fire control measures, will help

An Abrams tank struck by a depleted uranium round is roped off with yellow tape and a radiation contamination marking.



Soldier of Fortune

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minimize the occurrence of fratricide. Training the control and coordination of fires is critical to making this happen. Training helps develop discipline in fire control, as well as techniques that enable application of decisive, overwhelming power at the right time and place with minimum casualties. As a result of our training, we must be able to move quickly and shoot first. Operational success usually results from this type of bold, aggressive action and cannot be sacrificed to timidity or a hesitancy to shoot.

The US Army Infantry School's Training Circular (TC) 90-1, *Military Operations in Urbanized Terrain (MOUT)*, incorporates the use of non-combatants in its exercises with specific rules of engagement. The JRTC conducts this type of training and will continue doing so when it moves to Fort Polk, Louisiana. The JRTC briefs player units on fratricide prevention techniques as a key topic during the preexercise visits, and many potential fratricide situations are presented during training. These situations include the use of direct fire, indirect fire, mines and booby traps. This realistic training challenges both leaders and unit members by presenting them with complex situations that require proper decision making and coordination to avoid incidents of simulated fratricide.

In another effort to make training more realistic, the Field Artillery School has developed training aids for the dual-purpose improved

conventional munitions and for the family of scatterable mines. These training aids include mock-ups of the remote antiarmor mine system and the area denial artillery munitions. During *Desert Storm*, soldiers went into areas that contained unexploded ordnance and simply did not recognize it or the inherent danger present. These mock-ups will greatly improve leader and soldier training in the area of unexploded ordnance recognition.

In its December 1991 interim report, the task force stated that "Other fixes to training, in leader development, are also underway. Fratricide prevention measures are currently part of battalion and brigade pre-command course programs. Other leader development courses are being reviewed and fratricide prevention included as appropriate."⁹

CALL published a fratricide prevention and risk assessment newsletter in March 1992. The newsletter contains an operational risk assessment matrix and appendixes that list fratricide contributing factors and prevention measures. CALL is soliciting comments from the field on the operational risk assessment matrix and is currently gathering data at the CTCs to further examine the factors that contribute to fratricide. Feedback from the field and the CTCs will be used to make an operational risk assessment card. The newsletter is to be used in leader development courses, as well as throughout the Army.

The Future

In summary, there is reason to suspect that the advance of military technology has increased rather than reduced the risk of fratricide. In recent years, the Army has developed the capability to acquire and kill targets at ranges that exceed its ability to discriminate between them. Mobility of its forces may also be outstripping capability to maintain combat orientation, establish effective fire control measures and provide responsive command and control. If the Army fails to increase its capability in these areas, fratricide may be a greater problem on the future battlefield in terms of frequency of incidents and the number of casualties produced. While materiel solutions offer great promise, many of the technological approaches will not be available to the field for some time. However, the training and leader development solutions can, and should, begin now. The Army will continue its progress in fratricide prevention through the implementation of the Fratricide Prevention Action Plan. Fratricide prevention must become a part of all training from the planning stage, through execution, to the after-action review. Fratricide is the ultimate safety issue and thus demands the same emphasis as peacetime safety concerns have enjoyed among leaders and soldiers alike. When technological improvements reach the field, we must

The keys to reducing the incidence of fratricide are sound doctrine and a vigorous, comprehensive training program integrating fratricide prevention at all levels and among all soldiers supported by innovative technological developments. . . . Training actions include introduction of lost and flank unit friendly vehicles into unit sectors at the NTC, fratricide data collection at the CTCs and greater emphasis on fratricide during after-action reviews.

blend them into our training programs so that we will be prepared for combat without unnecessary safety risks to our own troops. Finally, Army leadership recognizes that it will never be able to completely eliminate incidents of fratricide. Fratricide will always be one of the risks of battle, but we are committed to minimizing those risks by positive actions as described in this article. **MR**

In April 1992, CALL published Handbook, 92-3, *Fratricide Risk Assessment for Company Leadership*. The handbook should be available through distribution to most Army units, and local reproduction of the publication is highly encouraged. For further information, call DSN 552-2132 or (913) 684-2132.

NOTES

1 LTC Charles R. Schrader, *Amicide: The Problem of Friendly Fire in Modern War*, Research Survey No. 1 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, Combat Studies Institute, December 1982), 109.

2 Office of the Chief of Public Affairs, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C.

3 MG Wesley K. Clark, *Combat Identification Program Interim Report*, US Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia, 12 December 1991.

4 Ibid. 2.

5 Ibid. 4.

6 Ibid.

7 Ibid. 4 and 5.

8 Ibid. 5.

9 Ibid. 4.

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Buffalo Soldiers

1866 Through 1890

Major George E. Knapp, US Army

The 9th and 10th Cavalry regiments served the nation with distinction during the post-Civil War years. The author discusses the history of the Buffalo Soldiers from their beginning in 1866 until the 1890s. He recounts the hardships these soldiers had to endure during the early years in order to serve a nation trying to heal itself after the Civil War. He also points out that the black soldier has always served his nation when called upon and has earned the right to be a part of the American dream.

THE BUFFALO SOLDIER Monument will be dedicated on 25 July 1992 at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, as a memorial to the soldiers who served in the 9th and 10th Cavalry regiments. This is a noble and long-delayed recognition of black soldiers, and it comes at an opportune time for several reasons.

First and foremost, there remain few veteran Buffalo Soldiers from the pre-1952 segregated Army. The country seems to be in the mood to accept military memorials now. This has not always been the case. Finally, production and showing of movies such as *Glory* and the attendant interest in military history have aroused a willingness to accept realistic appraisals of the

role played by blacks in the military history of the United States.

The Buffalo Soldier Monument reaffirms the equality of blacks, their contributions to American history and their claim to an equal share of the American dream. This article briefly recounts the beginnings of the Buffalo Soldiers and several of their earliest campaigns.

Beginnings

On 28 July 1866, the Congress of the United States acted to increase the Army's cavalry by four regiments: the 7th, 8th, 9th and 10th. Congress authorized the Army to recruit black volunteers to fill the 9th and 10th regiments. The

congressional act also specified that two-thirds of the officers were to be selected from the already existing Volunteer cavalry, and the remaining one-third, from the Regular Army. Further, the act restricted eligibility to veterans

[The] screening identified high-quality officers based on war record, qualifications and leadership. By the summer of 1867, the selection board approved 37 officers. Enlisted men and noncommissioned officers could be recruited from the existing black Volunteer regiments that had served in the war.

of at least two years of field service in the Civil War. Officers were to be white, but many white officers preferred not to serve in the new black regiments. For example, George Armstrong Custer refused a lieutenant colonel assignment in the 9th Cavalry.

The Army established a board of cavalry officers to screen applicants who were willing to serve in the black units. This screening identified high-quality officers based on war record, qualifications and leadership. By the summer of 1867, the selection board approved 37 officers. Enlisted men and noncommissioned officers could be recruited from the existing black Volunteer regiments that had served in the war.

All enlisted men and noncommissioned officers were black. The 9th Cavalry formed in General Philip H. Sheridan's Division of the Gulf and contained men recruited exclusively from within the limits of that command—primarily from the New Orleans area. Sheridan appointed Colonel Edward Hatch as regimental commander and Lieutenant Colonel Wesley Merritt as second in command. Hatch served as a cavalry commander in the western theater during the Civil War, and Merritt finished the war second in command to Sheridan in the Army of the Potomac's cavalry corps.

By September 1866, the recruits assembled in

New Orleans and occupied their first camp, an abandoned cotton press. The camp moved twice that fall and winter because of poor living conditions and threat of disease. The regiment moved to San Antonio in the spring of 1867 and into western Texas later that summer.

The 10th Cavalry formed in General William T. Sherman's Division of the Missouri. Sherman specified Fort Leavenworth as the headquarters for the 10th and appointed Colonel Benjamin H. Grierson as commander. Grierson commanded one of the greatest cavalry raids in the Civil War during the Vicksburg Campaign. He commanded the 10th until 1890—22 years in command of the same regiment. Strangely, recruiters initially found it difficult to enlist troopers into the 10th. Perhaps the social concepts of segregation made it difficult for white officers to contact and recruit blacks. By the end of 1866, only 64 soldiers had enlisted in the 10th Cavalry. Grierson directed Lieutenant Colonel Charles C. Walcutt, executive officer, to recruit as far east as Philadelphia, and by August 1867, the regiment fielded eight troops and nearly 700 troopers.

The regiment suffered serious problems at Fort Leavenworth due to Brevet Major General William Hoffman, who commanded the post from 1866 to 1868. Hoffman quartered the 10th on the worst piece of ground available and refused to cooperate with Grierson to improve soldiers' living conditions.¹ Soldiers suffered from pneumonia and cholera, resulting in 23 deaths in July 1867 alone. Conditions did not improve until the 10th left Fort Leavenworth early in August.²

First Campaigns

The 9th Cavalry moved into western and southwestern Texas in June 1867 to assist in opening the area from Fort Clark to El Paso and from the Rio Grande to Fort Concho. Hatch located his headquarters and four companies at Fort Stockton.³ He placed Merritt at Fort Davis with six companies. Two companies remained at Brownsville. The 9th's missions were to open and protect the mail and stage routes from San Antonio to El Paso; to establish law and order in

Cavalrymen working in the stable area of Fort Leavenworth prior to the departure of the 10th Cavalry in 1867.



The 10th Cavalry formed in General William T. Sherman's Division of the Missouri. Sherman specified Fort Leavenworth as the headquarters for the 10th and appointed Colonel Benjamin H. Grierson as commander. . . . [Fort Leavenworth's commanding officer] quartered the 10th on the worst piece of ground available and refused to cooperate with Grierson to improve soldiers' living conditions. Soldiers suffered from pneumonia and cholera, resulting in 23 deaths in July 1867 alone. Conditions did not improve until the 10th left Fort Leavenworth early in August.

the country along the Rio Grande; and to keep Indians from roving from their reservations.⁴ For the individual soldiers, duties were generally dull and repetitious, spiced with the occasional skirmish. The regiment remained in Texas for eight years, spending the majority of that time patrolling the prairie, skirmishing with Indians and enforcing the laws among settlers.

In late 1876, the regiment transferred to New Mexico with headquarters at Santa Fe and its companies dispersed throughout the territory. Missions, duties and accommodations were nearly identical to those in Texas, and the regiment, now veteran, focused on capturing and returning Apaches to their reservations. The 9th spent five years in this posting and, during that time, campaigned against innumerable small groups of roving Indians, including those led by Nana and Victorio. The regiment moved to Kansas and Indian Territory (Oklahoma) in the summer of 1881 for garrison duty. It remained

there until 1885 when it moved to the Department of the Platte. There, in 1890–1891, the 9th participated in quelling the Sioux uprising. The regiment moved from its garrisons into the field in November 1890 and spent that winter under canvas. This was a major advantage that the Army had over the Indians, who were not well prepared for winter campaigning.

After its unpleasant stay at Fort Leavenworth, the 10th moved its regimental headquarters during the summer of 1867 to Fort Riley, Kansas. Three companies moved to Indian Territory and the remainder billeted along the Kansas Pacific Railroad. The regiment's strength at this time was 25 officers and 702 enlisted men. First contact with hostile Indians came on 2 August 1867 about 40 miles from Fort Hays, Kansas. Three hundred Cheyennes attacked Company F as it patrolled the railroad with two officers and 34 men. During the 6-hour fight, the Indians wounded Captain George Armes and killed

A member of Fort Huachuca's color guard during a ceremony marking the fort's part in the Geronimo Campaign.



In September 1868, Indians attacked a party of white scouts led by Lieutenant Colonel George Forsyth [and soon] had Forsyth's group besieged on an island in the Republican River. Two of the scouts escaped and brought word to Fort Wallace. . . . [rescuers] found Forsyth's command out of food and all officers either dead or wounded. . . . Two weeks later, [Captain Carpenter] took two troops of the 10th Cavalry on a mission escorting wagons to Beaver Creek. Along the way, several hundred Indians attacked his small force. Carpenter proceeded to a suitable defensive position where he . . . fought his command on foot [and] drove off the attackers.

Sergeant William Christy—the first Buffalo Soldier killed in combat. Later that same month, Armes led his company and about 90 other troopers in a fight with several hundred Indians northeast of Fort Hays in which a second Buffalo Soldier died. The headquarters stayed at Fort Riley until April 1868, with the companies evenly divided between Kansas and the Indian Territory. Then, it moved to Fort Gibson in Indian Territory. The Indians were not restricted to reservations within the territory. Indian groups were assigned to agencies, which issued them supplies. Sheridan decided to restrict the Indians to reservations. This brought about the winter campaign of 1867–1868, primarily against Black Kettle's band of Cheyennes. The 10th Cavalry did much hard marching and fighting including two famous fights—the Battle of the Republican River and the Battle of Beaver Creek.

In September 1868, Indians attacked a party of white scouts led by Lieutenant Colonel George Forsyth of the 10th Cavalry. Soon, the Indians had Forsyth's group besieged on an island in the Republican River. Two of the scouts escaped and brought word to Fort Wallace, from which a relief column made up of soldiers from 5th Infantry, 2d Cavalry and 10th Cavalry moved to the rescue. Captain L. H. Carpenter was first at the scene with Company H of the 10th. They found Forsyth's command out of food and all officers either dead or wounded. Carpenter evacuated the wounded to Fort Wallace. Two weeks later, he took two troops of the 10th Cavalry on a mission escorting wagons to Beaver Creek. Along the way, several hundred Indians attacked his small force. Carpenter proceeded to a suitable defensive position where he dismounted and fought his command on foot. The cavalymen drove off the attackers and completed their mission with no further incident. Sheridan thanked the command for their gallantry in a general field order, and he breveted Carpenter to colonel.⁵

The 10th Cavalry moved its regimental headquarters to Camp Wichita, Indian Territory, in March 1869. This was the site of an old Indian village, and Sheridan selected it as the location

for a military post. The 10th got the mission to build the post. Later, the fort got its new name—Fort Sill. While headquartered at Fort Sill, the 10th conducted what later became described as pacification operations. The mission was to hold the country and keep the Indians within their boundaries. They did so by scouting, patrolling and often fighting. The most significant battle the 10th fought during this period was the Battle of Wichita Agency in August 1869. Four companies of the 10th, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel John W. Davidson, defended Wichita Agency against attacks by as many as 500 Indians.⁶ Both sides used innovative tactics in this fight. The Indians tried to destroy the agency and rout the soldiers by setting fire to the prairie at different points. The soldiers fought the fires, and at one point, Carpenter's company conducted a mounted charge. The 10th had four men wounded. Indian losses were heavy, but exact numbers are unknown. During the three years that the regiment headquartered at Fort Sill, its monthly desertion rate dropped from seven to three—among the lowest in the Army despite poor food, clothing, equipment and horses and conducting operations under the harshest conditions. The regimental headquarters shifted back and forth between Fort Sill and Fort Gibson from June 1872 until April 1875. During this time, the regiment served both in Indian Territory and in Texas. It campaigned against the Kiowas and Comanches in 1874–1875.

Campaigns in Texas

Regimental headquarters moved to Fort Concho, Texas, in April 1875, with companies located at Fort Concho, Fort Griffin, Fort McKavett, Fort Davis, Fort Stockton and in the field near Buffalo Springs in Indian Territory. Over the next two years, the companies scattered all over western Texas and conducted a series of border operations characterized by pursuits of small bands of Apaches that raided into US territory before escaping across the Rio Grande to safety in Mexico. One of these bands, led by the Mescalero Apache Chief Victorio, became the target of a special operation by

the 10th in the summer of 1880.⁷

Victorio escaped from military authorities in New Mexico in the spring of 1880. His band attacked Grierson and a group of six soldiers near

Four companies of the 10th . . . defended Wichita Agency against attacks by as many as 500 Indians. Both sides used innovative tactics in this fight. The Indians tried to destroy the agency and rout the soldiers by setting fire to the prairie at different points. The soldiers fought the fires, and at one point, Carpenter's company conducted a mounted charge. . . . During the three years that the regiment headquartered at Fort Sill, its monthly desertion rate [was] among the lowest in the Army.

Quitman and Eagle Springs. The fight lasted about 4 hours before reinforcements from companies A and C arrived. Seven Indians were killed. One Buffalo Soldier died, and one officer was wounded. The soldiers pursued Victorio's group to the Rio Grande. A detachment under Corporal Asa Weaver kept up a running gun battle with the retreating Indians for 15 miles near the old Alamo battlefield. At one point, a soldier from Company C, Private Tockes, was killed when his horse bolted into the Indian position. That same day, another column captured Victorio's supply camp. Grierson personally led the soldiers who pursued Victorio's main body, pushing his men along a 65-mile flank march and catching the Apaches in the Carrizo Mountains. Victorio and his survivors withdrew into Mexico, where he was later killed by Mexican troops. The department commander, General E. O. C. Ord, commended the 10th Cavalry's campaign against Victorio and recommended that the 10th be allowed a respite from such hard campaigning.

"I trust that the services of the troops engaged will meet that recognition which such earnest and zealous efforts in the line of duty deserve.

The Medal of Honor was awarded to Lieutenant Powhatan Clarke of the 10th Cavalry for rescuing one of his men under heavy fire during the Geronimo Campaign.



A small group of scouts and selected troopers relentlessly tracked and pursued Geronimo while most soldiers guarded important mountain passes, water holes and isolated settlements. Finally, Geronimo and most of his followers surrendered to a detachment led by Captain John Lawton of the 4th Cavalry, accompanied by Lieutenant Leighton Finley, on the Bavispe River in Mexico. A remnant of Geronimo's band under Chief Colorado Mangus still held out until Troop H of the 10th under Captain Charles Cooper ran them down.

They are entitled to more than commendation. . . . In this connection I beg to invite attention to the long and severe service of the Tenth Cavalry, in the field and at remote frontier stations, in this department. Is it not time that it should have relief by a change to some more favored district of the country?"⁸

Unfortunately for the 10th, Ord's suggestion fell on deaf ears, and the regiment stayed in Tex-

as. Regimental headquarters moved to Fort Davis in July 1882 and remained there until the spring of 1885. At that time, the whole unit moved into the Department of Arizona. Grierson established his headquarters at Fort Apache in May 1885. From there, the 10th began its famous campaign against Geronimo and the other Chiricahua leaders and contributed greatly to bringing Arizona Territory under government control.

Campaigns in Arizona and New Mexico

The campaign against Geronimo took 16 months and held little glory and a lot of hard work for most of the soldiers. The 10th successfully used some of the same tactics learned in Texas against Victorio to capture Geronimo and his band. A small group of scouts and selected troopers relentlessly tracked and pursued Geronimo while most soldiers guarded important mountain passes, water holes and isolated settlements. Finally, Geronimo and most of his followers surrendered to a detachment led by Captain John Lawton of the 4th Cavalry, accompanied by Lieutenant Leighton Finley, on the Bavispe River in Mexico. A remnant of Geronimo's band under Chief Colorado Mangus still held out until Troop H of the 10th under Captain Charles Cooper ran them down. Lieutenant Powhatan Clarke greatly distinguished himself during the Geronimo Campaign and received the Congressional Medal of Honor for his actions in the Pineto Mountains of Mexico.⁹ The Army declared this campaign ended in October 1886.

Regimental headquarters moved to Fort Grant in July 1886 and then to Santa Fe in November of that same year. The regiment continued to garrison the lonely Arizona outposts for four more years. Congress selected Grierson for promotion to brigadier general and ordered him to replace General Nelson A. Miles in command of the Department of Arizona. In his farewell address in April 1890, Grierson spoke to the Buffalo Soldiers about their place in history.

"The officers and enlisted men have cheerfully endured many hardships and privations, and

in the midst of great dangers steadfastly maintained a most gallant and zealous devotion to duty, and they may well be proud of the records made, and rest assured that the hard work undergone in the accomplishment of such important and valuable service to their country is well understood and appreciated, and that it cannot fail, sooner or later to meet with due recognition and reward."¹⁰

Grierson's departure was a watershed for the 10th. He commanded the regiment for 22 years during which the unit evolved into one of the premier fighting outfits on the frontier. Colonel J. K. Mizner took command after Grierson and immediately lobbied for the unit to be moved farther north. Soon the 10th left the Southwest for Montana.

Modern Relevance

What value does this piece of history of the Buffalo Soldiers have for us today, more than 100 years later? Are there lessons in the experience of these regiments on the Southwest frontier that can help us solve our own problems?

The Army fought a low-intensity conflict in the Southwest during the last quarter of the 19th century. We might anticipate similar operations anywhere within our country's area of interest

"The officers and enlisted men have cheerfully endured many hardships and privations, and in the midst of great dangers steadfastly maintained a most gallant and zealous devotion to duty, and they may well be proud of the records made, and rest assured that the hard work undergone in the accomplishment of such important and valuable service to their country is well understood and appreciated."

From Colonel Grierson's farewell address, April 1990.

today. Such considerations might include cross-border operations, communications security, civil-military operations, small- and large-unit actions, long-range patrolling, and a host of other modern terms describing similar tasks performed by the Buffalo Soldiers.

Regardless of the existence of any analogy between operations in the 19th century and operations today, the legacy of the Buffalo Soldiers will always contain one irrefutable fact. Blacks contributed to the American dream, and they deserve a piece of it. The Buffalo Soldier Monument is a part of that piece. **MR**

NOTES

1. GEN William Hoffman graduated from West Point in 1829 and fought with distinction in the Mexican War. He served on the frontier and was taken prisoner by Confederates in Texas at the start of the Civil War. He was exchanged in 1862 and became commissary general of prisoners at Washington, D.C. He commanded Fort Leavenworth from April 1866 to March 1868.

2. George Walton, *Sentinel of the Plains: Fort Leavenworth and the American West* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1973), 141; and LT John Bigelow Jr., originally published in Theodore F. Rodenbough and William J. Haskin, *The Army of the United States* (New York, 1896), republished in *The Black Military Experience in The American West*, ed. John M. Carroll (Liveright, 1971), 79-80. The Buffalo Soldier Monument stands about 300 meters north of the original campsite which was along One-Mile Creek.

3. The Army changed the name of all cavalry companies to "troops" as of 1 January 1881.

4. LT Grote Hutcheson, first published by Rodenbough and Haskin in *The Army of the United States*, republished in *The Black Military Experience in The American West*.

5. COL George A. Forsyth went on to serve with the 4th Cavalry and commanded the field troops of the Arizona Southwest District during the Geronimo Campaign of 1885-1886.

6. LTC John W. Davidson was second in command to COL Benjamin H. Grierson and nicknamed "Black Jack" for his service with the 10th Cavalry. This custom was common to white officers—among them John J. Pershing—who served with black units. Davidson commanded the 10th Cavalry during the Kiowa-Comanche Campaign of 1874-1875 in Grierson's absence.

7. LT Henry O. Flipper, first black to graduate from West Point (Class of 1877), served in the 10th Cavalry until November 1880. He participated in skirmishes with Comanches and Kiowas, on whose land Fort Elliot and Fort Concho stood. He was the first black officer to serve as a Buffalo Soldier.

8. The 9th and 10th Cavalry campaigned nearly continuously in the Southwest from 1867 to 1890—longer than any other Regular Army unit in that theater.

9. After the 10th Cavalry transferred north, LT Powhatan Clarke drowned in the Little Big Horn River in July 1893. LT Leighton Finley died after his horse fell on him and crushed his leg, requiring amputation, in February 1894.

10. Quoted from the 10th Cavalry *Historical and Pictorial Review*, published and copyrighted in 1941 by the Army and Navy Publishing Company. The Buffalo Soldier Monument at Fort Leavenworth is part of that "due recognition and reward."

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Civil Affairs and Wartime Host Nation Support

Lieutenant Colonel Norman F. Hubler,
US Army Reserve

During operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, Civil Affairs (CA) soldiers played important roles in obtaining the needed host nation support. The author reviews the myriad of missions executed by CA units and soldiers from the initial deployment through the end of the ground war.



IT HAS been said that "amateurs practice tactics and professionals practice logistics." Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm presented logisticians with the opportunity to demonstrate the importance of their profession. Among those professionals were Civil Affairs (CA) soldiers who were prepared to support the logisticians.

CA soldiers deployed with the first Army units to arrive in the gulf. The theater army commander called upon the CA community to assist in coordination with Saudi Arabian government agencies and military units.

These soldiers are trained as technical specialists in such activities as labor relations, commercial supply, public and commercial transportation, public works and food production and storage. These civilian activities can be used by the military to augment logistic operations. Such augmentation is particularly critical when US forces in division and corps strength rapidly deploy overseas, as in the Gulf War.

CA soldiers were integrated directly into the logistic force structure to work with procurement and supply/services personnel to obtain support from Saudi civilian, government and military sources. They were immediately faced with a multitude of requests from units of the XVIII Airborne Corps for help in obtaining land for base camps, warehouses, buses, trucks, lumber to

The US military had not maintained a major presence in the Gulf Cooperation Council states. Thus, a logistics infrastructure was not available. The US military turned to the government of Saudi Arabia for host nation support. Agreements with the Saudi government for "assistance in kind" were made to offset the initial lack of a logistics base. . . generally at no cost to the United States.

build latrines and showers and, with temperatures reaching 120 degrees, water. With the rapid buildup of ground forces, there was no time to wait for equipment and supplies to arrive from the United States. Almost everything that XVIII Airborne Corps did not bring with them had to be obtained from within Saudi Arabia, the host nation.

Current Army doctrine in US Army Field Manual (FM) 100-16, *Support Operations, Echelons Above Corps*, states:

"Host nation support (HNS) to US Army forces can include almost every aspect of the support required to sustain military operations. It may be performed by civilian or military personnel. Further, HNS requirements and capabil-

ities vary, based on the phase of the war, the peacetime presence of US forces in the area prior to the war, and the capabilities of the HN itself. . . . The scope of HNS is limited only by the availability of HN resources and the ability to reach agreements concerning their use."

Historically, the US military had not maintained a major presence in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states. Thus, a logistics infrastructure was not available. The US military turned to the government of Saudi Arabia for host nation support. Agreements with the Saudi government for "assistance in kind" were made to offset the initial lack of a logistics base. The term "assistance in kind" described supplies, services and facilities provided by the government of Saudi Arabia and other nations, generally at no cost to the United States.

The theater commander needed a logistics organization to manage host nation support and to establish the logistics infrastructure that would be required to sustain the land battle. The Army reactivated the 22d Support Command (SUPCOM) after a long hiatus. The SUPCOM became the focal point of combat service support.

The SUPCOM's area of operation in Saudi Arabia covered an area equivalent to the states of Pennsylvania and New Jersey. When the land battle commenced, the area grew to include Kuwait and portions of southern Iraq. The SUPCOM area of operations was divided into two parts, the SUPCOM rear and the SUPCOM forward. The SUPCOM rear operated the eastern logistics operations center (ELOC) in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. The ELOC staff coordinated the reception, processing and transport forward of theater forces, equipment and supplies. The SUPCOM forward operated the northern logistics operations center (NLOC) near the corps' rear boundaries. The NLOC staff coordinated the establishment of logistic bases that provided immediate support to the VII and XVIII corps.

The SUPCOM staff included an assistant chief of staff for host nation activities (ACSHNA). The ACSHNA served as the principal point of contact for logistics between the government of Saudi Arabia and the US ground

forces. He established an operations section at the ELOC whose principal mission was locating civilian and government support. Typically, the ACSHNA found land for base camps and logistics bases, sources of water such as wells, bus and

[Personnel] came, initially, from the Army's only Active CA unit, the 96th CA Battalion. In late December 1990, approximately 44 percent of the Army Reserve CA units were mobilized, to include the 304th CA Group from Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The 304th CA Group was attached to the SUPCOM upon detachment of the 96th.

truck companies, lumber yards and suppliers of bottled water, tires, cots, photocopiers and administrative supplies. He also established a plans and policy section and tasked it with developing an overall host nation support plan, providing guidance to the SUPCOM staff on host nation support policies and coordinating civilian support for the SUPCOM contracting officer.

Once both corps deployed along the Kuwait and Iraq borders, the SUPCOM commander needed host nation support from within the northern province. He tasked the ACSHNA to provide a 15-man host nation support cell in the NLOC. They located sites for logistics bases near the corps boundaries. The NLOC host nation staff also served as the SUPCOM commander's liaison with the Saudi army province commander. The Saudi army provided the majority of host nation support, due to the scarcity of private businesses in a largely unpopulated province. Immediately prior to commencement of the ground campaign, the logistics operations in the northern province became so critical that the SUPCOM commander and the ACSHNA established their headquarters at King Khalid Military City in the northern province, less than 100 miles from the border with Iraq. During and after the land battle, the NLOC host nation support cell became the focal point of refugee

operations in southern Iraq and northern Saudi Arabia. Thousands of Iraqi refugees asked for and received permission from the government

Based on the lessons learned from BRIGHT STAR and the fact that there was, initially, no host nation support agreement with the government of Saudi Arabia, the SUPCOM commander decided to establish the ACSHNA as the single point of contact for host nation support.

of Saudi Arabia to move to a refugee camp established in northern Saudi Arabia. Fortunately, the ACSHNA staff included CA soldiers trained to supervise and coordinate refugee operations.

In fact, the 22d SUPCOM host nation staff consisted primarily of CA personnel. They came, initially, from the Army's only Active CA unit, the 96th CA Battalion.¹ In late December 1990, approximately 44 percent of the Army Reserve CA units were mobilized, to include the 304th CA Group from Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The 304th CA Group was attached to the SUPCOM upon detachment of the 96th.

The majority of the active duty CA personnel had primary military occupation specialties in the combat and special operations fields. Their familiarity with tactical units was a definite asset to the ACSHNA. They understood the needs of these units and quickly located sources. The officers of the 96th Battalion responded to the challenges of staff work in a major command, despite the fact that, as company grade officers, they had little or no prior experience as part of an EAC (echelons above corps) staff.

With the arrival of the 304th, the ACSHNA had the support of field grade officers and senior enlisted soldiers with prior staff experience. They also possessed a wide variety of civilian skills, to include contracting, engineering, finance, religion, public safety, commerce and law. They contributed a wealth of civilian experience

and knowledge to host nation support operations.

In addition to this wide range of civilian skills, the members of the 304th were well prepared to work with the Saudis. Prior to mobilization, the 304th Group had been assigned to a theater army area command (TAACOM) under war plans and had participated with the TAACOM in EAC exercises, to include every BRIGHT STAR.² Since 1985, the unit had been preparing for operations in Southwest Asia. They received cultural and language training during monthly Reserve training, and many unit members had been to Egypt during BRIGHT STAR. With this experience and training, the 304th was able to advise and assist the SUPCOM staff in its contacts with the Saudis. The majority of the SUPCOM staff personnel had not received extensive cultural and language training and found working with foreign nationals a unique experience.

Working with the government of Saudi Arabia was, initially, challenging. There was no status of forces agreement or host nation support agreement. The CA soldiers working for the ACSHNA were trained to develop such agreements. With their knowledge of the culture, customs and language, they played a key role in coordinating the assistance-in-kind agreements that became so crucial to the establishment of a logistics infrastructure.

Designating a Point of Contact

Prior to *Desert Shield*, the only overseas exercise in Southwest Asia large enough to involve a theater-level logistic command was BRIGHT STAR. This exercise was held every other year from 1985 through 1989. During this exercise, the theater-level logistic commander did not establish an ACSHNA. Instead, each logistic staff section was responsible for determining what support should be obtained from the host nation, locating a source and then coordinating with the theater contracting officer for the procurement of the needed support. For example, the assistant chief of staff for supplies would locate sources of bottled water and then assist in the procurement of the water. There were problems with this ap-

proach during the first BRIGHT STAR, due primarily to the fact that the logistic staff personnel were not familiar with the culture and language. On subsequent exercises, the logistic staff sections were augmented with CA personnel who assisted in locating and procuring host nation support.

Based on the lessons learned from BRIGHT STAR and the fact that there was, initially, no host nation support agreement with the government of Saudi Arabia, the SUPCOM commander decided to establish the ACSHNA as the single point of contact for host nation support. The ACSHNA assigned members of his staff to the logistics operations centers. Units submitted their support requests to the nearest LOC. The LOC director then coordinated with the ACSHNA's representative to determine which requests could be met using host nation support. The ACSHNA prioritized the host na-

tion support requests and made the necessary coordination with other staff agencies and the Saudi liaison officers. This system eliminated the need for other SUPCOM staff sections to dedicate personnel to time-consuming surveys and searches for resources.

This is not a unique approach to host nation support. In fact, the ACSHNA is an adaptation of the area support group (ASG) organization for host nation support. The typical ASG, of which there may be one or more in theater, includes a directorate of host nation support. Although an ASG does not have any organic CA staff, a CA company may be assigned or attached. It may augment the directorate, which serves as the single point of contact for host nation support for all units within, or passing through, the ASG's area of operations. The CA company performs the host nation support and other CA tasks for the ASG that were centralized

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East meets West as a US artillery unit deploys during BRIGHT STAR 85. BRIGHT STAR is the only exercise in Southwest Asia that is large enough to involve a theater-level logistic command.



Much of this support was in the form of contracts awarded by the Saudi government to Saudi-owned companies. By Saudi law, any business operating in Saudi Arabia must be at least partly owned by a Saudi citizen. The success of such assistance depended heavily upon the relationship between the US forces and the Saudi government.

under the SUPCOM ACSHNA for *Desert Shield* and *Desert Storm*.

Support to Area Support Groups

CA units were never assigned or attached to the four ASGs under the 22d SUPCOM. The ASG commanders relied on the ACSHNA to provide support. The majority of the missions given to the ACSHNA were in response to requests from the ASGs. By centralizing host nation support under the ACSHNA, the SUPCOM commander was able to effectively use the assistance provided by the government of Saudi Arabia and other nations. This avoided duplication of effort and the potential for the ASGs to compete for scarce resources. For example, due to the economic structure in Saudi Arabia, one contractor controlled most of the perishable food. The ACSHNA and the SUPCOM contracting officer coordinated with this contractor for all the ASGs. Similarly, only a few contractors controlled such vital assets as bottled water, buses and heavy equipment transporters. If each ASG had attempted to contact these contractors, the contracting officer could have been faced with the time-consuming and potentially costly task of modifying a contract for one ASG to include support for another ASG.

If necessary, the ACSHNA would dispatch a mobile team to obtain additional information from the requester or to survey possible sources of support. The mobile teams provided concise data that could be used by the other staff sections to focus support planning on the most viable sources.

The ACSHNA was able to field sufficient mobile teams to support ASG requests by tasking the 304th CA Group to provide dedicated personnel in both the ELOC and NLOC and to provide additional personnel on short notice. Mobile teams consisted of two or three CA personnel (generally a major or captain and a master sergeant or a staff sergeant). The use of mobile teams provided the ACSHNA with the flexibility to support a variety of missions simultaneously.

These missions ranged in complexity from routine searches for sources of supplies to complex real estate issues. In one case, a Saudi civilian gave verbal permission to the Army to use his land and a water well, with the understanding that the Army would drill another well on his property. An attempt was made to drill a water well; however, no water was discovered at a depth that could be reached by Army drilling equipment on hand. The owner appealed to the Army to finish the well. At the time, the land battle phase of *Desert Storm* was underway. The Army engineers were occupied supporting the VII and XVIII corps. A mobile team was sent to meet with the land owner. The team coordinated with the US Army Corps of Engineers Middle East/Africa Projects Office and the theater engineering command. A statement of work for a new water well was developed and a contract let to dig the well.

CA and Host Nation Support Contracting

The ACSHNA worked closely with the SUPCOM contracting officer, assisting with a variety of procurement actions. At the peak of combat operations, the United States had received over \$444 million in assistance from Saudi Arabia, Germany and Japan. Much of this support was in the form of contracts awarded by the Saudi government to Saudi-owned companies. By Saudi law, any business operating in Saudi Arabia must be at least partly owned by a Saudi citizen. The success of such assistance depended heavily upon the relationship between the US forces and the Saudi government. The



CA liaison officers also worked in the consulate in Dhahran. Besides working on civil-military problems, they helped locate host nation, as well as other nation, support. The consul general had already established relationships with many key business firms both in Saudi Arabia and in the United States.

ACSHNA served as the link in this relationship. He succeeded in obtaining support due primarily to the fact that the ACSHNA staff was formed as a logistics staff and manned by CA soldiers. By selecting only those CA soldiers who had a background in logistics or who demonstrated the propensity to quickly comprehend logistic operations based on related civilian occupations, the ACSHNA was able to assist the contracting officer in developing statements of work and in identifying the appropriate sources of support.

On one occasion, a CA officer prepared a statement of work for the contracting officer to procure urgently needed services. The CA officer had been working closely with the requester to locate a source, and the contracting officer could not spare anyone to take the time to familiarize himself with the requirement and still meet the desired contract award date. Recognizing that the CA officer working the issue was, in civilian life, a contracting officer for the US Navy,

the contracting officer wisely employed the CA officer's talents and accomplished the mission.

Host Nation Support Problems

By mid-January 1991, the tempo of logistics operations was at a peak in preparation for the land battle. The US Army had obtained from the Saudi government the use of the greater part of the eastern province seaports of Ad Dammam and Al Jubayl, on the gulf; a variety of living and administrative facilities to include a large complex of multistory apartment buildings in the eastern province; numerous warehouse complexes in the eastern and northern provinces; multimillion dollar contracts for rations and bottled water; and large expanses of land for bivouac sites, assembly areas, ammunition dumps and equipment storage.

Keeping all this support going proved to be exceptionally challenging after 17 January, when the air campaign began. Once the Iraqis began to retaliate by launching Scud missiles at cities

One of the Saudi Arabian military installations made available for US use during operations *Desert Shield* and *Desert Storm*.



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in Saudi Arabia, laborers, stevedores and truck drivers stopped working. (The majority of the Saudi work force is composed of third-country nationals under contract with Saudi companies.) The ACSHNA had to work closely with the SUPCOM contracting officer and the Saudi liaison officers to keep host nation support going. Some laborers were talked into returning once protective masks were issued, thus reducing their fear of attack by Saudis armed with chemical warheads.

There were also problems between Saudi civilians and US soldiers. The majority of the soldiers deployed had little or no knowledge of Islamic culture. They had to learn to live and work in a country with customs and laws very different from those in the United States. Commanders called upon CA soldiers to provide cultural

orientations and, when problems developed, to work with the local government agencies to solve them. With over 300,000 soldiers in the communications zone, incidents with the civilian populace were inevitable. Fortunately, there were few incidents of a serious nature due, to a great extent, to the initiative of the ACSHNA.

The ACSHNA served as the SUPCOM commander's liaison with the local government to handle problems between civilians and soldiers. He established a civil-military operations section to work with the local government. He assigned liaison officers to the eastern province police and civil defense headquarters to ensure responsive coordination. This arrangement proved to be very effective, as demonstrated by the support the police and civil defense provided on the night of 25 February 1991 when 28 sol-

diers were killed and 98 wounded when a Scud missile hit a barracks in Khobar, Saudi Arabia.

CA liaison officers also worked in the consulate in Dhahran. Besides working on civil-military problems, they helped locate host nation, as well as other nation, support. The consul general had already established relationships with many key business firms both in Saudi Arabia and in the United States. He worked closely with the liaison officers to meet the demand for host nation support. Without his help, the SUPCOM would have had a difficult time obtaining support. The consul general and the liaison officers also played a crucial role in assisting the government of Kuwait to locate US businesses interested in helping with restoration, to include cleanup of the gulf oil spill and extinguishing of the hundreds of oil well fires.

The SUPCOM commander stated that, without the efforts of CA soldiers, there would not have been the degree of cooperation that existed between his staff and the governments of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. The ACSHNA mobile teams and liaison officers anticipated problems and provided timely recommendations to the SUPCOM staff, thus ensuring good relations with the host nation governments.

CA Must Adapt

Although the possibility of another war on the scale of the Gulf War is unlikely, the US Army can expect to be involved in contingency operations anywhere in the world. It is probable that such operations will take place in and involve nations with which the United States has no

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host nation support agreements. Whether as attached units, as with CA companies attached to ASGs, or as members of a SUPCOM ACSHNA, CA soldiers with logistic or related civilian experience and training will be needed.

CA soldiers must be prepared to participate in establishing host nation support agreements. They may be called upon to monitor the implementation of such agreements and advise the EAC commander concerning appropriate forms of assistance in kind from the host nation and other countries. To succeed, the CA community must place greater emphasis on training for this mission. CA soldiers and commanders must be prepared to conduct host nation support. It is highly probable that in future contingency operations, CA reservists will be called upon to volunteer for such missions and be assigned to a host nation support staff. **MR**

NOTES

1. All Civil Affairs (CA) units, Active and Reserve, are assigned, in peacetime, to the US Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC), Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The USACAPOC is currently reorganizing the CA community under a new table of organization and equipment. There will no longer be CA groups or companies. There will continue to be CA commands and brigades. Three types of CA battalions will be formed: A general purpose battalion, a direct support battalion and a foreign internal defense unit.

conventional warfare battalion. Doctrine will be that a CA brigade has the capability to support a theater army area command and similarly a CA battalion has the capability to support an area support group.

2. Combined US/Egyptian exercise, conducted every other year, in which selected Active and Reserve forces deploy to Egypt. The exercise lasts for more than two months.

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MR World War II Almanac



Assault Gliders: A World War II Phenomenon

Major Ronald M. Buffkin, US Army

On 29 June 1942, a successful test flight of an ungainly, awkward and experimental aircraft called the XCG-4A signaled the start of the US Army's glider program. The CG-4A would become one of the most produced aircraft of World War II.

Gliders have long since disappeared from our airborne arsenal. Fifty years ago, however, CG-4A gliders rolled off assembly lines to become the fourth most produced combat aircraft of World War II. A total of 13,909 CG-4A gliders were made between 1941 and 1943; more than the number of B-17, B-25 and B-26 bombers; the P-38, P-39 and P-40 fighters; or even the C-47 transports.¹

Gliders were used in all the major US airborne assaults, and several other nations developed some glider capability. The British built 5,935 combat gliders; the Germans built 3,995; and even countries such as India, Turkey, Argentina and Japan developed gliders.² The Soviets fielded gliders before the war and maintained three glider regiments until as late as 1965.³ The largest user of combat gliders was the United States. But what became of the thousands of US gliders used during World War II?

Today, only four complete CG-4A gliders are known to exist.⁴ The CG-4A, designated as *Cargo Glider production model 4*, became the mainstay of the US glider force. Commonly called the Waco for the Waco Aircraft Company of Troy, Ohio, the CG-4A could carry 13 combat-equipped troops plus a pilot and co-pilot. It was made mostly of wood, steel tubing and canvas, comprising 70,000 parts.

The Waco Aircraft Company was the fourth largest of the 16 makers of the CG-4A, but since this company, as the chief contractor, had the responsibility for providing design data to the other manufacturers, the name "Waco" became universally applied to all CG-4As. Ford Motor Company actually produced the largest number of CG-4As, using its assembly line experience with automobiles.

Other CG-4A makers were not so productive. The glider program suffered from poor oversight and cost overruns. Not only was the CG-4A one of the most produced combat aircraft of World War II, it was also one of the most expensive. In the Army's

rush to put gliders with newly created airborne divisions for training requirements, the 16 manufacturers of the CG-4A were given the go-ahead for hurried production of the glider in 1941.

When the Army began receiving the bill for the CG-4As, a procurement scandal erupted. For example, one contractor charged the Army \$1.7 million for a single CG-4A.⁵ Typical cost for a CG-4A was about \$23,000, but the Army accepted many CG-4As with a higher price tag. The Babcock Aircraft Corporation in De Land, Florida, for example, charged the Army \$51,000 for each of the 54 CG-4As it delivered.⁶ By way of comparison, the Army was buying P-51 Mustang fighters for \$58,824 at the same time.⁷

Despite its high cost, the CG-4A was a remarkable aircraft. It had a wingspan of 83.6 feet and a length of 48 feet and could carry a load weighing more than its empty gross weight. The cargo capacity was a healthy 4,060 pounds, and the CG-4A could glide fully loaded 8 feet horizontally for every foot traveled vertically.

Gliders were assigned to troop carrier squadrons supporting the airborne divisions. Glider pilots were a part of these squadrons along with C-47 transport pilots. Glider pilots frequently trained in small-unit tactics with light weapons for the probable instance of ground combat following a glider assault. In practice, however, glider pilots were frequently used to escort prisoners, guard command posts and other secondary missions while awaiting transport to the rear. While most glider pilots eventually returned to the rear area, their gliders did not always make it back.

Gliders were rarely recovered for future use. Those gliders not damaged in landing or destroyed by enemy fire could also fall victim to friendly troops or the local populace. The locals routinely pilfered unguarded gliders for wheels, firewood and canvas. Friendly troops, without command guidance, damaged gliders with abandon in their haste to unload them. The surviving gliders received limited battle damage repair and limped back to staging areas after being snatched off landing zones by C-47s.



(Above) Waco gliders near Zon, Holland, 18 September 1944, and (below) in the French Riviera, 15 August 1944.



By the end of the war, gliders became a critical item of airborne equipment. The portion of the logistics estimate concerning aircraft status for the 1st Allied Airborne Army's assault across the Rhine River in 1945 deals exclusively with glider readiness. Crated gliders awaiting shipment overseas from ports of embarkation in the United States were tracked day-by-day to staging areas where they were immediately assembled for use.

In 1945, following the war, the government sold surplus, crated CG-4As for \$75 each. Most were purchased for the wood as a crated CG-4A contained over 10,000 feet of grade A lumber.⁷ A booming glider freight business, forecast during the

war, never materialized, although one veteran glider pilot tried shipping strawberries from Georgia to grocery stores in Pennsylvania via CG-4A. Other than this brief, failed venture and a few CG-4As used for wind tests in California, the venerable Waco faded from existence.

The Army retained the glider concept for airborne assault and developed more capable gliders than the CG-4A. The CG-20, a heavy transport glider capable of carrying 60 troops, was an all-metal glider fielded in 1946.⁸ This glider would later don reciprocating engines and become the C-123 assault transport of

Vietnam fame. In the postwar Army, however, the glider had few champions.

Lieutenant General Edward M. Flanagan Jr., author of *Before the Battle* and an Army magazine column of the same name, wrote an epitaph for the glider in a 1951 issue of *Infantry School Quarterly*. Flanagan, then a major, called the glider a "people and equipment killer" and favored the development of other means of airborne assault such as the heavy-cargo parachute to deliver equipment previously carried by gliders. The article proved timely because the successful combat parachute assault of troops and equipment by the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team in Korea that year prophesied the

fading of the glider from the airborne arsenal.

The Army, in conjunction with the Air Force, soon pronounced the glider obsolete and began developing assault transports and heavy-drop parachute techniques. The glider survives today in the memories of the men who flew them and the soldiers who assaulted on their silent wings. One organization dedicated to preserving glider history is the World War II Glider Pilots Association, which frequently holds conventions and continues the history of glider exploits through its newsletter.

The glider's contribution to airborne forces is symbolized today by a round airborne patch worn on the garrison cap of selected airborne organizations. The patch displays a white glider superimposed over a parachute on a field of blue. This simple patch is a fitting tribute to the courage and innovation of glider units and serves as a reminder of the glider's brief, but bold, service. **MR**

NOTES

1. Gerald M. Devlin, *Silent Wings*, with a foreword by General William C. Westmoreland, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985), 63.
2. *Ibid.*, 376.
3. *Ibid.*, 375.
4. *Ibid.* Locations of the four are the Ste. Mere-Eglise Airborne Museum in France; the Pratt Museum at Fort Campbell, Kentucky; the US Air Force Museum at Wright Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio; and the Silent Wings Museum in Terrell, Texas. Fuselage sections of various other gliders reside elsewhere such as a CG-15A section at the 82d Airborne Division Museum, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and a Horsa cockpit in the Imperial War Museum in London.
5. James E. Mrazek, *Fighting Gliders of World War II* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977), Appendix III.
6. Devlin, 66.
7. *Ibid.*
8. *Ibid.*, 375.
9. Mrazek, 145.

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July 1942

Major George J. Mordica II, US Army, Combat Studies Institute, USACGSC

Wednesday 1—German forces achieve their deepest penetration into Egypt, with the capture of Deir el-Shein.

Thursday 2—Winston Churchill wins a vote of confidence in the House of Commons over his handling of the war.

Sevastopol, Soviet Union, falls to the Germans in a costly campaign.

Saturday 4—US bombers fly their first mission in Europe, targeting German air bases in Holland.

Sunday 5—The PQ-17 convoy of 33 British and US ships bound for the Soviet Union comes under heavy German attack. In the next few days, 24 ships are sunk.

Tuesday 7—Lieutenant General Carl Spaatz is appointed commander of all US air forces in Europe.

Thursday 9—Germans divide Army Group South into two army groups to expedite the Caucasus offensive planned in the east.

Friday 10—General Sir Claude J. E. Auchinleck adopts a new British strategy in North Africa, attacking Field Marshal Erwin Rommel's weak Italian allies and forcing Rommel's use of precious resources and limited German forces in coming to their aid.

Wednesday 15—The first supplies flown "over the hump" from India reach Chiang Kai-shek's Chinese forces.

Friday 17—Churchill informs Joseph Stalin that, in light of the PQ-17 convoy disaster, the British will no longer sail the northern routes to Murmansk and Archangel in the Soviet Union. Stalin protests.

Wednesday 22—The British Eighth Army attacks Rommel's defense in North Africa. While unsuccessful, the attack continues to drain Rommel's resources and best forces.

The Japanese Eighteenth Army begins landing troops at Buna, New Guinea.

Thursday 23—Germans capture Rostov, Soviet Union, after a bitter fight.

German submarines mine the main approaches to the Mississippi River in the Gulf of Mexico.

Saturday 25—Combined chiefs of staff agree upon command setup for Operation *Torch*, previously named Operation *Gymnast*.

Tuesday 28—Japanese advance on the Kokoda trail, New Guinea, capturing it the following day.

Soviet forces begin massive withdrawals from the lower Don River area in the Soviet Union.

Scrapping the Napoleonic Staff Model

Brigadier General Anthony C. Zinni, US Marine Corps; Colonel Jack W. Ellertson, US Army; and Major Bob Allardice, US Air Force

A new staff organization that mirrors the way we do business with today's "realities" is needed. These realities deal with real-time information capabilities allowed by high-tech command, control and communications (C³) systems, decision cycles that must beat CNN and other news media to the punch and the quest for cost savings. The military currently uses the Napoleonic staff model, but it is inappropriate for today's situations and loses its relevance daily.¹ Why?

First, it is 189 years old, to be exact. Second, it is based on a functional organization featuring a bureaucratic, top-down and, then, a bottom-up flow of information.² Finally, it is designed to be slow because its primary function is to keep an organization from making that critical error that will cause certain disaster.

Our proposed new staff organization is radical; therefore, the name—"heretic option." The heretic option is based on time, not function. This is not a nuance but a key point. It allows today's revolutionized communications flow to be accessed by key decision makers from both the top via the Napoleonic staff, and from the bottom via an expanded crisis action team. It also puts more staff officers where they can, once again, be relevant to the staffing process.

Napoleon's Realities. We should remember that nearly all modern military organizations are modeled after the Napoleonic staff model (a testament to Napoleon and his brilliant chief of staff, Jean Baptiste Bessi res), and this staff model has not been substantially changed since 1812. Napoleon's personal headquarters (the Maison) was large, since he continued to govern France and direct all his armies, even when on campaign. He was assisted by a group of aides-de-camp general officers capable of all missions from the negotiation of a truce to the command of a special task force.

The general headquarters itself had four functional sections: troop movements and intelligence; records and personnel; headquarters' sanctioning and security; and prisoners, deserters and legal matters. In addition, there were special staff sections: a topographic bureau, artillery, engineers, military police

and a pool of unassigned officers. Its staff organizations varied somewhat from year to year, just as today, based on personnel strengths. Corps and division staffs followed the organization of the general staff, but on a reduced scale.

Since today's Napoleonic staff is big and, therefore, very expensive to operate, a key prerequisite justifying its establishment is a viable enemy threat—an opponent capable of strategically or operationally defeating you. The key benefit of this type of staff is that it provides the commander with a detailed product that is well thought-out and workable. Its key problem is that it does not lend itself to the "salami slice" solution.³ What makes the Napoleonic staff so good is its ability to functionally analyze a problem. These functions do not go away even if the staff is reduced.

Today's Realities. There are three new realities that make the Napoleonic staff outdated. The first reality deals with real-time information capabilities designed to aid high-level leaders and quickly provide them with information. In essence, key leaders have direct access to communications information via communications nodes located conveniently nearby that allow the ability to "see" events as they unfold and give orders to commanders on the scene, if they so desire. High-tech C³ systems make this possible. Portable nodes are also moved to the scene of action—much as CNN and other news media do. Many in the current Napoleonic staff are left out of the information flow since the communications nodes are not located with middle- and lower-level staff members. Thus, the input of over 80 percent of the Napoleonic staff is late and useless. The staff is simply not cost-effective in today's scenarios because it is not involved in the communications flow.

The second reality deals with the time required for multiple staffs to complete a decision cycle. Our chief competitor is CNN. Time's 1991 Man of the Year, Ted Turner, was awarded this honor because he changed the news from "This is what happened" to "This is happening now." Decision cycles must, therefore, beat CNN to the punch and be able to

respond intelligently to incoming questions that are based on real-time information. The ability of the world, via the media and high-tech systems, to focus on any event forces decision cycles to be quick and at the highest political levels. The old adage of centrally planned but decentrally executed takes on a new meaning in today's environment. Today, plans are made at the very high levels, then moved to the very lowest levels for execution. There is simply no need for actions to trickle through the Napoleonic staff. Who would have thought, as happened in the Gulf War, that a battalion-size force would have its operational plan developed by a four-star staff, get its directions from a four-star general and have its mission approved by the president of the United States?

Making matters worse for the military is that we usually get a late start. CNN can and does get to the event ahead of the military or corporate troubleshooters. The Kurdish problem and the Alaskan oil spill are examples of each. Thus, current structures must play catch up from the very beginning. Lightning speed is required if we are to appear in charge. Again, the Napoleonic staff does not move fast enough to be relevant.

Having said all this, CNN and the rest of the news media are not the enemy. They can distribute an interesting and moderately informative product to a wide audience. The military need not compete with, or resent, the media. Rather, the media can liberate us from the delays and slants our own bureaucracy imparts.

This is not to overstate the relationship of CNN and the Napoleonic staff. Even without quick and agile news media, the current staff organization cannot meet today's speed-of-action requirements—the real issue. In a crisis, the dusty wire diagram sitting atop most of our desks does not spring into action as one amorphous mass. Rather, it jolts a small portion of its members into action much like a paramedic jolts a heart attack victim. Most staffers do not know who was jolted or why.

The final reality is the quest for cost savings. Historically, societies have invested in big militaries and their staffs because of a perceived threat from an enemy; not just any enemy, but one who can defeat you completely. Thus, he represents a threat of intolerable risk; the consequence of failing to "deal" with him is the potential annihilation of your state and way of life. This is clearly the justification required for the society to bear the burden and costs. Today, our society perceives that this threat does not exist. This is not to say there is no threat, only that the threat is not big enough to crush our way of life. Therefore, as a society, we want to scale down, save

costs and generate a "peace dividend."

Yesterday's Example. Yesterday's communications flow and decision cycle went something like this: First, an event happened that set off a well-defined domino chain of actions. Second, an incident report was prepared, usually via government channels by people at the scene (with multiple verifications of the report for accuracy). Third, various staffs began to evaluate the situation and develop courses of action, with commanders' guidance. Fourth (perhaps concurrently with steps two and three), news of the event would be released to the people by various means. Finally, a well-developed plan was put into action. If the event dealt with a military threat, the ability to win was good; perfection was not required. The bottom line: *The requirement for action would move slow enough that the staff system could respond.*

Today's Example. Today, the scenario is more like this: First, an event happens. It is brought to the world's attention via CNN and other news media; leaders and staffs get their first reports from their televisions or from their superiors. Second, leaders and staffs are required to respond to questions from the very beginning; they must answer fast if they are going to be perceived as being "in charge." Third, the operational concept is concurrently evaluated by opinion polls in the United States and other world capitals, as citizens everywhere watch the event unfold. If the event requires military action, then it is evaluated against an ideal, flawless execution model. (As an example, in defending Israel from Scud missiles during the Gulf War, every Patriot miss had to be explained even though the Patriot's performance exceeded every design specification.) Last, to meet time constraints, centralized high-level planning is key. These plans are then moved with lightning speed to the lowest (usually tactical) level for execution, in the process, cutting out nearly all intermediate levels and, therefore, their staffs. The bottom line: *Current staff organizations are not designed to beat the lightning speed scenario and survive the first few days of the crisis.*

Generic Heretic Option. To begin with a generic example, the heretic option can best be described not as a pyramid but as a series of concentric circles (fig. 1). Each circle is functionally organized; however, time is the key element in the design. At the center (Ring A) is the senior decision cell where those responsible gather to discuss strategies, options and taskings. Members of this group are the commander, deputy commander, chief of staff, operations officer and logistics officer. They are supported by a group of carefully selected

and well-trained staff officers (Ring B). The officers in Ring B should be experienced, independent thinkers. Rank will vary from captain to colonel. Maturity and experience are more important than rank in officer selection for this lightning speed ring where suspenses can be 24 hours or less.




Figure 1. Generic Heretic Option

Outside Ring B is another group of officers that adds depth to the inner rings, provides backup, as necessary, and does quick, detailed research on tasks due in less than one month (Ring C). One of the major goals of Ring C is the training of staff officers for their eventual movement into Ring B. Rings B and C are supervised by the operations officer, and both are functionally organized. Roughly 50 percent of the current staff officers will be allocated to these rings. The last group (Ring D) provides the heretic option with its long-range planning. This ring is under the supervision of the plans officer. Thus, this ring is insulated from lightning speed requirements and allowed to plan. This option is a "skeletonized" Napoleonic staff, which saves 25 percent of the original staff assets.⁴

The rings are functionally organized. The pie shape represents those officers who are the particular functional experts (logisticians, personnel and others), allowing for a quick reconstitution of the Napoleonic staff if required by changing circumstances. The chief of staff is the integrator of the rings and controls the flow of assets between the rings. He does this based on the threat, time available, perceived workload and the commander's guidance. The heretic option:

- Increases our ability to focus on crises, with the right supervisory level.
- Increases early key leaders' participation.
- Increases staff officers' participation by placing

them nearer the relevant communications nodes.

- Maintains the flexibility to shift assets back to the Napoleonic staff model, if required.
- Reduces manning levels while maintaining a viable long-range planning capability.
- Eliminates the need to restructure the staff to solve a crisis.
- Eliminates the need to "salami slice" the current staff organization.

Specific Heretic Option. It is always difficult going from the general, usually theoretical, case to the specific case. The difficulty is that in an actual case, someone's ox gets gored. Consider the heretic option as applied in a unified command headquarters, realizing that the number and level of billets will vary depending on the particular command (fig. 2):

Both the commander and the deputy commander retain their billets.

The chief of staff also retains his billet. Plus, his current deputy position is upgraded to a brigadier general billet because the chief of staff's span of control will expand. This expansion centers around an increase in special staff positions. The heretic option increases the chief's special staff at the expense of the command chaplain, command surgeon, legal adviser and comptroller. These groups will lose their directorate-level status and become part of the chief's special staff. They will all be cut 15 percent; only the command surgeon will retain the flag status of brigadier general.

The operations and intelligence directorates will combine. The intelligence officer will become the second deputy of the operations officer. This will give the directorate three flag billets—one major general and two brigadier generals. The security (from the personnel directorate) and the public affairs functions will be taken over by the new operations and intelligence directorate.

The personnel and logistics directorates will combine. The logistics officer will retain his major general billet. The personnel officer billet becomes a colonel billet and is the deputy in this new directorate.

The C³ directorate has its assets spread throughout rings A to C. However, the current director, who retains his brigadier general billet and a small staff, will become a special staff officer working for the chief of staff.

The special operations directorate, if there is one, presents a problem because of its unique position. It can be both a headquarters directorate and a component. Our solution thus takes the part of its force structure that belongs to the headquarters directorate and divides it up within the rings. The component part of its force structure remains untouched.




Figure 2. Specific Heretic Option

The plans and policy directorate is reorganized to a functionally organized planning cell. It retains its current flag positions.

Rings A, B and C have 300 people, and Ring D has 150 people—a total of 450—which equates to approximately 150 people/billets saved. (Again, these numbers will vary depending on the specific command.) There has been a conversion of the two major general billets into two brigadier general billets, and one brigadier general billet is converted into a colonel billet. Numerous other billets will be downgraded as the exact details are worked out.

In short, our Napoleonic staffs are based on function, not time, and this is the problem. They are inefficient and slow and not used when we

have a crisis. Their communications nodes are not located with the majority of the people, thus many are not included in the staffing process. Today, with the threat so low and the cost of staffers so high, we cannot afford this waste.

It will, however, be difficult to overcome the organizational status quo to make a change. The heretic option will be perceived as forcing some functions to be given up, when this is really not true. The day is here when cuts must be made. We must be careful not to take a salami slice out of our current structure or bog down in bureaucratic fighting and stonewalling when facing this external suspense. As you are well aware, this has happened for 189 years, give or take six months. **MR**

NOTES

1. The term "Napoleonic staff" is chosen because it engenders a feeling of being very old and very outdated. The term "current staff organization" could have been used, however, this term would not have provided enough emphasis.

2. A "functional organization" emphasizes practical utility or functional relations, is important in this article. An example of this is the formation of a personnel directorate to handle all personnel actions. The people in this directorate are trained experts in the personnel field, and they work for a general officer who is also a personnel expert. He, in turn, works directly for the chief of staff. Functional organizations are self-contained.

3. The salami slice solution is a euphemism for proportional cuts on an organization. It implies an inability to prioritize because, instead of completely cutting lower-priority functions, all are retained with reduced manning. The danger is

that a needed functional entity is rendered inefficient due to lack of people. The salami slice solution is a key reason for the longevity of the Napoleonic staff model. It is most difficult to cut functions within an organization because they are needed. So, the staff fights any cuts in manning or functions with all its strength, usually via bureaucratic stonewalling.

4. Is there really a savings of 25 percent? To be honest, we are not sure it could be 20 percent or even 30 percent. We do not know the exact size, but there is a savings and it is big. The exact transition plan will need to be carefully crafted so that the staff does not break in the process. This will be very difficult because most will fight every step with all their skills. Accurate impacts of changes will be very difficult to determine due to both real and perceived problems.

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Letters

The LA Riots and LIC

We are witnesses to low-intensity conflict right here at home. The US Army and US Marine Corps were called out to help control the rioting in Los Angeles, which followed the acquittal of the policemen who beat Rodney King. Yet, California officials asked Washington to be prepared to send troops, if the situation continued. The police, fire departments and even the National Guard were overwhelmed and exhausted. It is not hard to imagine that the situation might have continued and spread to other cities across the country. There were, in fact, rallies and demonstrations in many places and even outbreaks of violence.

This is proof that low-intensity conflict is amorphous and ambiguous. We argue about terminology, but we do not need a name for the situation in Los Angeles. It was what it was. That is all we need to know. Do not ask me into which "operational category" it falls. I could give an answer, but having done so, I would have accomplished nothing. Likewise, our endless arguments about the "operational continuum" or the "continuum of military operations" become a cruel joke when juxtaposed with violence in the streets.

Military people do not like this kind of ambiguity. Tough. Nobody asked us. This is reality. We have to face it and deal with it, whether at home or abroad. Since we need to refer to the situation and generalize for future similar situations, we must call it something. Low-intensity conflict is good enough. Any other name would be as valid. We must not let ourselves become hung-up on terms. Instead, we need understanding, thoughtfulness and an attitude that will make our forces useful to the government in such a situation.

It is clear that the situation in Los Angeles was violent. It is equally clear that it was not a war. This puts it well within the definition of low-intensity conflict in Joint Pub 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*. If you rebel at that thought, I do not care. Names are not important. The doctrine in US Army Field Manual (FM) 100-20/Air Force Pamphlet 3-20, *Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict*, and Joint Pub 3-07, *Doctrine for Joint Operations in Low-Intensity Conflict*, offers insight into how to deal with such a situation. Doctrine does not provide "cookie cutter" solutions; Army forces involved would be required to think. Doctrine promises nothing more than that.

The Army was required to conduct operations with great restraint in Los Angeles. There was no room under such circumstances for the employment of "operational fires." We were not there to see how many "Angelinos" we could kill. The mission was to put an end to violence. In the process, we employed the absolute minimum of counterviolence adequate to the purpose. Preferably, we would have employed no violence at all.

It is equally clear that military or police operations to suppress the riots do not constitute a solution to the problem. They are ancillary to the more fundamental actions that doctrine calls "balanced development." The people in Los Angeles and other American cities need hope. They need opportunities for education, jobs, "empowerment" and dignity. To provide for these needs is an overwhelming job, but it is not a military one. Neither is it a police job. The security forces have an important role, but it is not the primary role in solving the major problems that plague our country and others.

Los Angeles provides all the ingredients of the classic low-intensity conflict theory. There is perceived, relative deprivation. The poor people of the inner city see prosperity all around them, but they are denied it. More important, they see themselves, perhaps, as a permanent underclass with no opportunity for advancement within "the system." They are unable to make the decisions that control their lives. They are subject to coercion and intimidation by criminals. Economic, social, political—all the ingredients are there.

The acquittal of the policemen was a precipitating event, the spark that set off the powder keg. There was even some evidence of organization to the violence. A Los Angeles disc jockey, interviewed on ABC's "Good Morning America," said he saw buildings burst into flame when no one was around. When the fire department answered a call in one part of town, a fire erupted in the opposite direction. He concluded that someone had placed time-delay incendiary bombs. There were also reports of people going to scenes of riots by the busload.

Los Angeles was not a classic insurgency. Neither was it a classic anything else. Los Angeles was Los Angeles. There is no possibility that the people involved could overthrow the government or secede from the Union. The perpetrators, who are also the victims, mostly black, are too few to take over the country. They are too dispersed to secede. There is no doctrinal name to put on this situation. We do not need one.

With or without a name, we know this is not the first time such a situation has developed. We can predict with reluctant confidence that it will not be

the last. Our Armed Forces must be prepared to act constructively, should they be needed under such conditions. Low-intensity conflict doctrine points the way.

The authors of low-intensity conflict doctrine did not have Los Angeles in mind when they wrote their publications. Doctrine is not a perfect fit. It is not intended to be. Nor will it be a perfect fit to any foreign situation of similar type. It does, however, point to a useful mind-set and positive attitude for military forces employed in a violent situation that is not a war. The doctrinal "LIC Imperatives" say it all—primacy of the political instrument; unity of action; adaptability; legitimacy; perseverance (patience); and the minimum use of violence. Think about it.

LTC John B. Hunt, USA, Retired, Leavenworth, Kansas

Global Policing Mission?

This letter is in response to Colonel Bruce B. G. Clarke's letter in the April 1992 *Military Review* on the subject of war-termination. In his letter, Clarke highlights two interesting points, one of which I will only briefly mention here: the first is war-termination as the fourth phase of conflict; the second is peacemaking. He refers to the recent Senior Leaders' Warfighter Conference discussion point that "it is very likely the military may have to conduct war-termination and post-conflict activities as a third party to a conflict."

First, the idea that we as a nation will "very likely" become willingly engaged in *peacemaking*—as opposed to *peacekeeping*—operations is disturbing, at best, and would seem to have undesirable implications. While I do not doubt the possibility, it is nonetheless disturbing to see a de facto acceptance of a role as the world's policeman. The statement is also unsettling in that it moves the very occurrence of conflict to the forefront of our concerns. No longer will we tie our involvement in conflict to our vital interests. Rather, we will willingly become embroiled in a conflict simply in order to end it—much as the hapless policeman called to end a domestic dispute—only to find ourselves on the receiving end of a healthy dose of ill will from both parties. This may lead to situations requiring a sustained presence in a fight that we do not really care about.

I also question the political and military sagacity of such a view, especially when so many today are questioning the basic need for military force. Representative Les Aspin (D-WI) has stated that the American people want "protection of their vital in-

terests against things they perceive as threatening to them." It would seem that global "police actions" do not meet this test and would be difficult to sustain. Can we realistically expect popular support for deploying military forces around the globe to stop conflicts wherever they may occur even when our interests are not at stake? Are we prepared today to shed American blood to end the conflict in Sri Lanka, for example, and expend limited national treasure to sustain that effort? Perhaps yes, perhaps no. In any event, the concept of peacemaking is worthy of further discussion, and I applaud the efforts of *Military Review* and military professionals such as Clarke to come to grips with it.

Second, I would offer the following comments for inclusion in the ongoing discussion of war-termination. In the introduction to *On The Endings of Wars*, the editors remark that "war remains something of an enigma. Perhaps the least understood, and certainly the least studied, aspect of wars is how they end. The very destructiveness of modern warfare has led many analysts to focus on how wars begin and how they might best be prevented. Yet, whether by plan or accident, wars continue to occur, rarely following a course anticipated by any of the participants."

Unless the total subjugation of an opposing state is envisioned, ending conflict requires a kind of "partnership" between all parties to the conflict, which is Clarke's point about modification of objectives. Essential to establishing this partnership is identifying and attacking an enemy's strategic center-of-gravity (and, obviously, protecting our own). Fundamental to effective war-termination is early planning by both military and political leaders for deescalation and cessation of conflict when stated goals are achieved or, as Carl von Clausewitz reminds us, when their attainment has become too costly. Toward this end, elucidation of war-termination in the revised US Army Field Manual 100-5, *Operations*, will be a welcome addition to our doctrinal foundation.

As professionals in the practice of conflict, military leaders and planners are peculiarly responsible for the efficacious use of force to achieve national objectives. Some key points for war-termination planning are: understand the desired end state; maintain focus on the strategic center-of-gravity and the actual situation; protect one's own strategic center-of-gravity; and design conditions of conflict to enhance the peace.

However, it is important to remember that ending wars, just as initiating them, is ultimately the responsibility of the civilian political leadership, and improved military doctrine is only a small part of an

efficacious solution. Adding to the complexity of the issue is that war-termination is both a process and a result.

As a process, war-termination can be aided by military operations conducted to help establish the conditions that will lead to the desired result. However, war-termination as an objective is not simply a military operation that can be planned and executed. Each confrontation is different and will require unique combinations of national means to obtain the desired ends. For example, as we now see from the outcome of Operation *Desert Storm*, success on the battlefield is not always sufficient to guarantee the attainment of desired postwar military, political or economic objectives. The destruction of civilian power plants may be desired for operational reasons, yet these same power plants will be required for internal stability and postcrisis development. The campaign plan must be focused on the desired end state to be effective and must not leave questions about postcombat operations unanswered.

The achievement of war-termination objectives—making conflict "pay"—requires a clear understanding of the objectives, limitations and the methods by which conflict will be terminated. This is important in that the qualification and definition of our desired war-termination result at the outset—a sort of bottom line—will preclude confusing it with any of various war-ending outcomes that will present themselves during the conflict. Historically, nations and alliances that enter into conflict without considering these points usually have not done very well (consider all parties to World War I, the British and French experience in the Suez and the United States in Vietnam).

How do nations lose sight of their ultimate goal in war? These goals may not be defined precisely before the war and are likely to shift during the course of the conflict. In *Every War Must End*, Fred C. Ikle writes:

"In part, this deficiency stems from the intellectual difficulty of connecting military plans with their ultimate purpose. . . . governments tend to lose sight of the ending of wars and the nation's interests that lie beyond it, precisely because fighting a war is an effort of such magnitude."

He continues that "through the elaborate preparation and conduct of battles and campaigns, both military and civilian leaders lost sight of the desired end-state, instead focusing on the details of the fight and the outcome of particular battles." In an interesting commentary on this problem he states, "If generals act like constables and senior statesmen act like adjutants, who will be left to guard the nation's interests?"

So, what is our national war-termination objective? The January 1992 National Military Strategy states that our objective is to "deter any aggression that could threaten the security of the United States and its allies and—should deterrence fail—repel or defeat military attack and end conflict on terms favorable to the United States, its interests and its allies" While this is all well and good, what constitutes "favorable" terms? Clausewitz warned us that no nation's leader should consider going to war "without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it." Unfortunately, wars have seldom, if ever, gone precisely according to plan, with the result that the cost and level of difficulty has often been greater than expected.

While the reverse appears to have been true in the Gulf War, President George Bush's decision to end the ground war after 100 hours without removing Saddam Hussein surprised many both within and outside the military. While the stated objectives of liberating Kuwait, restoring the Kuwaiti emir and reestablishing regional stability were clear, there were other "objectives" that brought pressure to bear on military and political leaders, especially if their attainment was perceived as reducing Hussein's continued legitimacy in the postwar environment. Should the president's decision to end the war have been a surprise? As we now see by the situation in Iraq, situations that once appeared acceptable may turn into less than desirable outcomes.

How do senior civilian and military leaders decide to "terminate" conflict? How do we deal with the uncomfortable paradox that to "win" the war may "lose" the peace? To win, we must win militarily, economically and politically; otherwise, the resultant peace will be transitory, and the cessation of hostilities will only be a lull in, rather than a termination of, the conflict. Clausewitz (once again) advises us that "war is no act of blind passion." He points out that it is "dominated by the political objective . . ." and that "as soon, therefore, as the required outlay becomes so great as that the political object is no longer equal in value, the object must be given up, and peace will be the result."

While Clausewitz was describing the relationship between friendly costs and objectives, in the Gulf War the decimation of the Iraqi military at the hands of the coalition, had it been allowed to continue, had the potential to cause an excessive "outlay" of Iraqi casualties (or at least the public/coalition perception of an excess). This, in turn, could have been perceived by the president as endangering the attainment of the political objective. Viewed in this light, the decision to end the ground war after

100 hours appears more reasonable.

In summary, the recent crisis in the Persian Gulf once again illuminates the difficulties associated with terminating conflict on terms favorable to the United States and its allies. Fighting a war costs more than almost any other undertaking a nation may pursue, yet despite elaborate preparations in the form of armaments and plans, many of the grand designs for peace are inadequate. Going to war is easy—battles and campaigns are more easily analyzed—but the diffuse objectives and political considerations associated with returning to peace make planning extremely difficult. The outcome depends on a much wider range of factors, some of which, such as public opinion, are highly elusive and may be beyond the purview of military planners. Yet, these problems notwithstanding, war-termination—making conflict "pay"—is an issue that must be addressed by civilian and military planners before undertaking combat operations, preferably before the outbreak of armed hostilities. Toward that end, continued discussion among military professionals is both necessary and desired.

MAJ Neville S. Vanderburg, USA, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Washington, D.C.

Who Has the HET?

In *Military Review's* January 1992 article, "Bring on the HETs! Operational and Tactical Relocation of Heavy Maneuver Forces," Joe A. Fortner and Captains Jules T. Doux and Mark A. Peterson raise valid concerns about the availability and use of heavy equipment transporters (HETs) and the lack of current US transportation capability to move large armored forces. Operation *Desert Shield* reemphasized the US Army's deficiencies in devoting money and resources to equipment that does not provide a high payoff (from the lack of sealift to move our equipment across the seas to the use of radios older than most of our soldiers). The time is now for the Army to apply the lessons learned from operations *Desert Shield* and *Desert Storm* and fix the problems identified. Once again, the creativity and resourcefulness of leaders at all levels solved problems that could have been disastrous.

As a tank company commander during *Desert Shield* and *Desert Storm*, I found out firsthand the importance of HETs. It took my battalion two weeks to move our tanks and other heavy equipment from the port of Ad Dammam to our assembly area near King Khalid Military City. The lack of HETs and changing unit priorities on the movement of equip-

ment to the desert caused our battalion to piecemeal our equipment to the assembly area. We were supplied with a mixture of US and Saudi HETs. The reliability of the equipment and the drivers was seriously tested.

The movement from the port to our desert encampment some 500 miles away stands out as one of the most difficult challenges I encountered during the deployment. I left Ad Dammam leading a convoy of 30 HETs. My first sergeant followed, pulling up the rear and trying to keep the HETs moving forward. The trucks immediately encountered breakdown after breakdown. Trucks carrying loads that outweighed their capacity experienced busted radiators and endless flat tires. The Saudi HET drivers' speed and concern for moving the equipment were different than mine. Even though I had sergeants riding shotgun in the cabs, the Saudi drivers stopped whenever they wished. It did not take too long before most of the 30 HETs had disappeared on their own itinerary.

I arrived first at the HET release point with a handful of the original HETs I started off with, some 24 hours after beginning the journey. It took the next three to six days before all the HETs arrived at the release point. Putting a \$2.5 million tank on a Saudi HET is something I do not want to do again. More priority and money should be spent in the future in procuring and outfitting heavy divisions with the transport capability needed to move our equipment.

The proposed heavy truck company organization discussed in the article is a well-thought-out concept. The organization of 96 HETs in the heavy division structure provides unprecedented capability for the division commander to quickly move his forces over great distances and have a ready-to-fight combat unit. However, in these times of defense budget cuts and the drawdown of personnel, I do not foresee the widespread implementation of this organization. In the interim, the force structure could slowly integrate this proposal and supplement Active divisions with Army Reserve truck units. Much like the roundout brigades associated with Active Army divisions, Reserve transportation companies could be specifically identified and assigned with Active Army divisions.

This concept could serve dual purposes. First, it would provide organic transportation assets to the heavy divisions activated during times of crisis such as *Desert Shield*. Additionally, these Reserve units could train annually with their Active counterparts. Second, it could provide a short-term solution until the funding is available to fully implement this proposal. Both the Active Army and Reserve units would benefit from this. Active Army divisions would have a designated unit capable of providing the

support necessary if called upon. And the Reserve Component would benefit by maintaining units in its force structure. Currently, hundreds of Reserve units, many truck units included, have been identified for deactivation. These units could be saved and used as a viable option to the Active Army.

The next conflict might not allow the Army the time necessary to gather the transports to move our equipment. The collapse of the Soviet threat to Europe and the regional conflicts that could erupt in the coming years may force another large-scale armor deployment.

CPT David R. Manning, USA, USACGSC

Unwritten Doctrine

Captain Richard D. Hooker Jr.'s "Redefining Maneuver Warfare" (February 1992 *Military Review*) provides an excellent overview of maneuver warfare theory. Hooker also inadvertently highlights the fundamental problems of maneuver warfare as a basis for US Army doctrine.

As presented in this article, Samuel P. Huntington probably goes too far in asserting that US military power is the product of our industrial and technological prowess. Typically American traits such as initiative, creativity and a genius for organization are at least as "military" as discipline, obedience and attention to detail. Huntington should not so easily dismiss the achievements of US arms as the inevitable results of mass and technology. From the American Civil War to Operation *Desert Storm*, the Army has shown remarkable tactical and operational skill at critical moments. Geoffrey Perret's outstanding *There's a War to Be Won: The United States Army in World War II* is but the most recent example chronicling this point.

Nonetheless, Huntington's basic point—that there is an "American Way of War"—remains valid. The great attribute of the Army has been its ability to bring logistic power to bear upon its operations. Two centuries ago, Frederick the Great wrote that he did not command his army—food and fodder did. It has been the American genius to realize this and to concentrate our abilities on commanding the logistics of modern battle. Any definition of maneuver warfare that fails to recognize the primacy of industrial, technological and logistic power is thus self-defeating. In the end, it is this logistic power that makes effective maneuver possible.

My second point is simply this: Enshrining maneuver warfare in US Army Field Manual 100-5, *Operations*, does little good if its principles are not

institutionalized throughout the Army. I should think it obvious that written doctrine is not worth the printer's ink if it does not correspond to the unwritten doctrine of daily routine. It is all well and good to talk of *Auftragstaktik*, but the current trend in the Army is away from mission-type orders and frontline decisions. It takes a full colonel to approve a change to a company training schedule inside the three-week window. Almost one-third of our soldiers require Department of the Army approval to reenlist in their military occupational specialties. Any young sergeant or second lieutenant could give you 50 more examples.

Broadly understood, maneuver warfare holds tremendous promise for the development of Army doctrine. Already it has brought us back to the human elements of war—leadership, morale and the will to win. If its advocates do not forget the importance of logistic power to the “American Way of War,” and if they do not shy away from the peacetime changes required to make this doctrine an institutional reality, maneuver warfare might yet lead us to a renaissance. That is one “maneuver” I think we would all like to see.

CPT Stephen C. Danckert, USA, 549th Maintenance Company, Kaiserslautern, Germany

Book Reviews

REPEALING THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION: Restoring the Rule of Law in U.S. Foreign Policy by Robert F. Turner. 206 pages. Brassey's (US), Inc., McLean, VA. 1991. \$25.00.

The War Powers Resolution is an attempt by the US Congress to limit the power of the president to introduce US forces into situations involving imminent or ongoing hostilities. The resolution imposes consultation and reporting requirements upon the president in the event of such a deployment and directs him to withdraw any forces in harm's way after a maximum of 92 days unless Congress has declared war or otherwise authorized the commitment of troops to hostilities. The resolution has been controversial since its passage in 1973 and has inspired much debate. Robert F. Turner has reentered the fray with his new work, *Repealing the War Powers Resolution*.

The thesis of this thought-provoking and cogent work is that the resolution is both unconstitutional and unnecessary. The author's primary constitutional argument against the resolution is that it unlawfully infringes upon the power of the president as commander in chief to use and deploy the Armed Forces as he sees fit, particularly in defense of American citizens or property. When the US Constitution states that “the executive power shall be vested in a President,” Turner relies upon sources such as the writings of John Locke and Baron de La Brède Montesquieu to establish that this broad grant of power includes the ability to deploy the Armed Forces and conduct foreign relations in accord with the national interest. The powers of Congress in this area are constitutionally limited to

declaring war and raising and supporting the Armed Forces. A statutory attempt to avoid these constitutional limitations is, in the author's assessment, a violation of the separation of powers envisioned by the framers of the Constitution. Turner's analysis in this area is well-documented and remarkably lucid.

The author further contends that the resolution is unnecessary. The political realities of domestic politics mandate cooperation between the executive branch and Congress. Furthermore, international law expressly prohibits offensive war. In a related vein, many deployments are now conducted under the provisions of defensive collective security treaties that, after ratification by the US Senate, require no further action by Congress. Turner concludes that, in light of these constitutional and practical infirmities, the resolution was “from the start a fraud committed by a timorous Congress in an effort to persuade the voters that its members were not responsible for the tragic conflict in Indochina.”

The book is not without its faults. While the author writes of the need for comity in government, he ultimately views the Congress as institutionally incompetent to deal with foreign affairs. This bias in favor of the executive branch sometimes interferes with the objectivity of Turner's analysis. He seems incapable of acknowledging that the president may act in a politically expedient manner, just as Congress sometimes does.

Turner also fails to consider that by ordering overseas troop deployments, the commander in chief may be making the functional equivalent of a declaration of offensive war, thereby invading the

constitutional province of the Congress. Finally, the author devotes far too little analysis to the Persian Gulf conflict, which is arguably a case study in support of the resolution.

Weighed in the balance, though, the book's analytic depth and superb readability far outweigh the policy bias of its author. *Repealing the War Powers Resolution* is a major work in its field and is worth noting by officers interested in practical study of the law of national defense.

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FORGING THE MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX: World War II's Battle of the Potomac

by Gregory Hooks. 303 pages. University of Illinois Press, Champaign, IL. 1991. \$39.95.

Beware of the military-industrial complex warned President Dwight D. Eisenhower some 30 years ago. The author, Gregory Hooks, takes Eisenhower's warning to heart and examines the military-industrial complex built to win World War II. Many, in and out of government and industry, will argue whether there is a military-industrial complex. Few will question the power and influence of the defense sector of the US economy.

This book traces the evolution of military-industrial power from the days of Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal through Ronald Reagan's defense buildup in the 1980s. The author believes the United States surrendered industrial planning competency to the Pentagon in conjunction with, and as a result of, World War II. Consequently, the United States is today unable to coherently define any sort of industrial policy. This leaves the United States a poor second in the world marketplace against competitors who exercise industrial planning at the national level.

In a somewhat scandalous tone, the author blames the Pentagon, generally, and the military, specifically, for this occurrence. Hooks stresses the "sharp divisions between the domestic-oriented reformers and the military professional." Further, he believes the military officer is a breed apart, somewhat contemptuous of civilian authority. He also claims military officers are able to insulate themselves from civilian authority. His evidence and examples are, however, some 20 years old. The extent to which military officers are masters of the defense acquisition process in the 1990s is questionable.

Throughout the book, Hooks notes that the Pentagon leads Congress by offering pork barrel

deals. Recent news reports of congressional foot-dragging on base closures and procurement decisions, however, suggest that the Congress has gained the upper hand. Perhaps the Pentagon no longer sets industrial policy. Instead, the Pentagon suggests and Congress decides and influences. Hooks believes the Pentagon must acquiesce to allow the rest of the government to take the country out of the present recession and look to Congress, the new policy maker, instead.

This book addresses a very real problem facing not only the military but the nation as well. Unfortunately, Hooks offers no new solutions for the problems he has uncovered. The historical links of the 1930s to today, however, are undeniable. Moreover, the defense industry and the mobilization capacity of the United States are also similar. As the military shrinks, the potential strength the United States is able to project also contracts. The nation's military-industrial capacity is what won most of the wars the United States has fought. The professional military ignores our nation's military-industrial complex at its own risk.

Whether you agree or disagree with the findings, this book deserves a look. In many ways, this could be the way national security is defined in the future.

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EBERSTADT AND FORRESTAL: A National Security Partnership, 1909-1949 by Jeffery M. Dorwart. 237 pages. Texas A&M University Press, College Station, TX. 1991. \$35.00.

Jeffery M. Dorwart, a historian at Rutgers the State University of New Jersey, has written an interesting, provocative study of the evolution of the national security organization in 20th century America. He traces the innovative institutional changes contributed by two brilliant friends, Ferdinand Eberstadt and James V. Forrestal, that culminated in the National Security Act of 1947, its amendments in 1949 and subsequent service reorganization measures. Forrestal became famous as secretary of the US Navy and secretary of defense, but Dorwart's focus is more on Eberstadt, a veteran of many national policy planning groups. Though the lesser known of the two, Eberstadt had an enormous impact on the building of the post-1945 national security establishment, as well as the Marshall Plan.

Both believed in a form of corporatism blending economic and military planning that would be entrusted basically to an elite of experts in management and organization who were the best and

brightest in business, industry, politics, academe and law and were committed to national security. This "Good Man" concept is a key thread woven throughout Dorwart's fascinating delineation of the growth of the United States' national security system. Dorwart includes Eberstadt's and Forrestal's important contributions to organizing economic mobilization in World War II, but emphasizes primarily their roles as the principal authors of the postwar national security reorganization. Dorwart contends that, though the structure they built was flawed, they did succeed in creating a realistic and permanent machinery for integrating war plans, economic mobilization and military operations that was suitable within the context of postwar domestic and international conditions. It has remained fundamentally unchanged to the present, with the National Security Council continuing to be "the heart of the system."

The national security administration has been hotly controversial since the legislation of 1947, and Dorwart's book undoubtedly will not lay to rest the criticisms of the discontented. But he has produced a solid case for the enlightened concepts of Eberstadt, Forrestal and the public-spirited leaders on their Good Man list. They strove earnestly to construct an effective organization of national defense that tapped the most gifted minds of the public and private sectors in mobilizing military and economic resources for national emergencies.

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THE LIFEBLOOD OF WAR: Logistics in Armed Conflict by Julian Thompson. 390 pages. Brassey's (US), Inc., McLean, VA. 1991. \$39.95.

Major General Julian Thompson's *No Picnic*, published in 1985, took us to combat with the Royal Marines in the Falklands War. Now, this retired commando general takes us behind the scenes to a less glamorous side of war as he analyzes the critical importance of logistics on modern battlefields. That such a study comes from a warrior such as Thompson may surprise some. Those familiar with the fragile shoestring of logistics that tied the British war effort together in the South Atlantic, however, will understand why the role of logistics in waging war made such a lasting impression on this soldier-scholar.

Thompson originally intended *Lifblood* to pick up where Martin van Creveld's *Supplying War* left off, but he found in his research that much remained unsaid about World War II, which he views as the

greatest test of military logistics in history. So, after a discussion of definitions and some observations about logistics over the centuries through World War I, he launches into three case studies from the world's first global war: North Africa, 1943-1944; Italy, 1943-1945; and Burma, 1942-1945. World War II was a watershed for the evolution of logistics despite the fact that industrial bases generally kept adversaries well supplied. The problem became one of getting supplies where they were needed and melding operational and logistic plans together in doing so. Thompson describes how sea flanks became important in collapsing lines of supply in the Mediterranean and how air resupply became indispensable not only to the survival of the Chindits (Indian Army 77th Brigade) but to Lieutenant General William J. Slim's overall flexibility in Burma.

Thompson provides chapters on the Korean War, the 1971 India-Pakistan War over Bangladesh and the 1973 Mid-East War, each of which contains new observations. But by far the best chapters, aside from his discussion of World War II, are those on the Vietnam wars (which he traces from French through US involvement) and the Falklands War. He implies that General Vo Nguyen Giap's better appreciation of logistics helped him weaken the French over the years and, ultimately, defeat them at Dien Bien Phu. Regarding US involvement, he vindicates the centralized logistic system in a war that blurred forward and rear areas for the first time; he provides numerous insights in the use of air power both to resupply and to interdict supplies; and he eventually finds the United States culpable for severe weaknesses in the Army of the Republic of Vietnam logistics and logistics training. For the Falklands War, with the benefit of his own unique vantage point, Thompson provides perspective on the challenges of amphibious logistics and explains instances where senior officers and staffs lost sight of the critical relationship of logistics and tactics.

A potentially controversial thread that binds his discussion of some of these wars is his agreement with the comment made by Air Marshall John Slessor during World War II that air power "cannot absolutely isolate the battlefield from enemy supply or reinforcement." The fact that Thompson reinforces this assertion in several chapters, despite including a postscript on the Gulf War, makes it even more provocative.

Thompson devotes an entire chapter to past problems and future considerations for NATO in the new world order, and he calls for greater cooperation and interoperability to keep NATO viable. He concludes with considerations for preparing for the next war. Although his is a British perspective regarding

the future, several of Thompson's recommendations to lessen logistic constraints warrant consideration by those developing US forces and equipment. These include, among others, increased use of smart weapons (to reduce tonnages and lift requirements) and development of advanced lift helicopters (to provide flexibility and decongest supply routes).

What emerges here is an account of logistics in 20th century conflict that is every bit as fascinating as it is carefully researched and documented. Yet, Thompson holds no false pretenses about studies like this hitting best seller lists even within military circles. As he states in his preface, "I have no reason to believe that logistics will ever have much military sex-appeal, except to serious soldiers, but this book is written in the hope that I am wrong." Serious soldiers, in fact, will find lots to look at in this new book.

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TRIUMPH WITHOUT VICTORY: The Unreported History of the Persian Gulf War by the staff of U.S. News and World Report. 477 pages. Random House, Inc., New York. 1992. \$25.00.

One year after the US military intervention in the Persian Gulf, few books concerning the conflict are on the book stands. This is not surprising. Authors need time to assemble a complete history that assesses the diplomatic maneuvers before and after Iraq invaded Kuwait, chronicles the Operation Desert Shield buildup and, then, describes the air and ground campaigns of Operation Desert Storm. The notable exception, Bob Woodward's *The Commanders*, came off the press quickly. However, Woodward limited his account to the actions of the senior US civilian and military leadership.

The staff of U.S. News and World Report gives us one of the first, comprehensive histories of the conflict. Written with journalistic drama and flair, *Triumph Without Victory* traces the events from Saddam Hussein's decision to invade Kuwait to action on the battlefield. It beats anything currently in the bookstores for both interesting diplomatic tidbits—roughly half the book is devoted to political intrigue and the early military buildup—and vivid descriptions of combat.

Through its formidable reputation and large staff, U.S. News and World Report gained access to the principals in *Desert Storm*, including President George Bush. Its reporters interviewed over 600 soldiers, sailors, Marines and airmen. This behind-the-scenes quality makes the narrative fun and

even exciting to read.

Combat action sells books, and to its credit, U.S. News and World Report provides powerful vignettes told by small-unit leaders and pilots. Some of the battles—73 Easting and the Highway of Death—made headlines. But the authors also detail fire fights and air combat that few have heard about. Despite the dubious title, *Triumph Without Victory* paints an unambiguous picture of the bravery and ingenuity of the US fighting force from star rank to private soldier.

Weekly news magazines are not, however, in the business of writing history. The publisher's heavy promotion of this book is aimed at the general public. Those in uniform, particularly those who were involved in the operation, will find the narrative unbalanced, erratic and inaccurate. Most of the errors are minor: improper unit designations, incorrect task organizations and misleading descriptions of military hardware (such as thermal night sights being referred to as infrared sights). Unfortunately, as years go by, errors in this publication may well be taken as truths.

Equally distracting is the uneven coverage of units and commanders. It appears that the units which receive the most attention in this book are those that U.S. News and World Report had direct access to during the fighting by virtue of press pooling procedures. That is understandable, but it hardly makes for a balanced view of how the campaign unfolded.

All that said, *Victory Without Triumph* will doubtless satisfy most readers who are eager to gain new insight into this recent conflict—until the next "untold story of the war" comes off the press.

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INADVERTENT ESCALATION: Conventional War and Nuclear Risks by Barry R. Posen. 280 pages. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY. 1991. \$36.50.

There is nothing like a child's innocent question to disarm a parent's knowing answers to life. Why is the sky blue? Why are eggs egg-shaped? Why do zebras have stripes? In a similarly unpretentious quest for reality, Barry R. Posen asks an equally unsettling question. Can nuclear powers fight conventional wars with each other and avoid the use of nuclear weapons?

The seemingly innocent question confronts not only the usual concern of war between superpowers but also future conflicts involving states where nuclear weapons have proliferated. In a clash between superpowers, there has always been the assumption that these states are unlikely to leave such effective

weapons unused in a struggle for vital political interests and that crossing the threshold was a relatively discernible escalation to the participants.

Posen's chilling answer to his question proposes a second way by which nuclear powers locked in conventional conflict might move to the use of nuclear weapons: "Large-scale conventional operations may come into direct contact with the nuclear forces of an adversary and substantially affect the victim's confidence in his future ability to operate these forces in ways that he had counted upon." He calls this "inadvertent nuclear escalation."

In daily briefings, news stories and cocktail banter, we talk about a "more dangerous world." Inadvertent escalation in a future world of multiple nuclear states defines and puts substance to the casual phrase. As conventional weapons gain in precision and destructiveness, conventional attacks will threaten major elements of a state's nuclear force, to include the command and control systems creating security dilemmas for decision makers. States with newly acquired nuclear arsenals will not have the redundancy in nuclear weapons for a second-strike capability nor the resiliency in intelligence collection and command and control to tolerate inadvertent conventional attacks that destroy their nuclear capabilities. Such dilemmas could push an unaware and confused leadership to use its remaining nuclear force. One can appreciate the magnitude of the problem if Saddam Hussein had nuclear warheads on his Scud missiles and fired in a vain attempt to survive within a larger conflagration.

To illustrate his sobering proposal, Posen reviews the US air, ground and naval war plans and probable Soviet military responses to a conventional war in Europe during the 1980s. While a reader may find alternative interpretations and probable courses of action and challenge an illusion of rigorous quantitative analysis, Posen's conservative estimates in the numbers and conclusions provide a convincing defense of his proposal.

Posen offers considerations for civilian defense leadership in an age of warfare that challenges its ability to maintain control of the conventional military actions. *Inadvertent Escalation* makes a truly unique, original contribution to security issues and should make defense planners grapple with conventional and nuclear linkages in future conflicts. Posen's answer gives wisdom to innocent defense planners as they venture forth into a post-Cold War world.

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CLAUSEWITZ AND ESCALATION: Classical Perspective on Nuclear Strategy by Stephen J. Cimbala. 218 pages. Frank Cass & Co., Ltd, London. Distributed by International Specialized Book Services, Inc., Portland, OR. 1991. \$37.50.

Carl von Clausewitz and nuclear escalation? Stephen J. Cimbala has surely stepped into the unknown and unknowable; compounded by extrapolating 19th century views of a 19th Century military philosopher into what is fast approaching the 21st century time warp of possible war or possible peace.

He invites equal wrath of the conventional wisdom bequeathed by mutual assured destruction (MAD). MAD holds similarly to the conventional wisdom before World War I, which held war could not occur because industry could not possibly support the production requirements for "modern" combat; or the various wisdoms, holding sway between the Great Wars such as Giulio Douhet's or B. H. Liddell Hart's or others, that (*inter alia*) masses of airplanes flying at unassailable heights could deliver such devastating destruction on the economic and morale facets of society as to make war by invading land armies obsolete.

Cimbala's enlightened exposition usefully challenges the conventional wisdom that nuclear war is a technological set piece of MAD; that the technological capacities of nuclear exchange to destroy civilization are the overriding consideration of its use. The author easily achieves his purpose of presenting a classical perspective on nuclear strategy. No strategist will challenge the intellectual primacy of Clausewitz in strategy, and the book serves as a good reminder that, whatever the technology or plan, war is an extension of politics by other, namely violent, means. Political leadership will decide when to start and when to stop war, conventional or nuclear, and escalation will play as much a role in the future as before.

It is well to read this book, fortuitously removed in time from the brink of Cold War, to consider what might have been; or, more important, as military and political leadership forget the devastation of 1945 and the opportunity for equal disaster threatened in the last few decades, what they might invite in the future if they fail to comprehend the philosophy of Clausewitz on the nature of war. Cimbala's well-written, well-researched and extensively footnoted book serves to remind and, in its way, warn.

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North Africa—Give and Take

In the spring of 1942, British fortunes in the seesaw war for North Africa reached their lowest ebb. General Erwin Rommel, at the head of a combined German-Italian army, drove the British Eighth Army out of Libya, inflicting sharp defeats at Al-Gazala, Tobruk and Mersa Matruh. Disorganized, disheartened and crippled by the loss of 50,000 men and most of its armor, Eighth Army streamed back into Egypt in a state of near collapse. It appeared that nothing could stop Rommel from seizing the Suez Canal and severing a vital artery of the British Empire.

At this juncture, General Sir Claude Auchinleck, the British theater commander, took personal command of Eighth Army in a last-ditch effort to save Egypt. He chose for his defensive position a natural choke point only 60 miles from Alexandria where the untrafficable Qattara Depression comes to within 40 miles of the Mediterranean coast. With only five depleted divisions at his disposal, Auchinleck established a fortified perimeter around the coastal town of El Alamein and posted the remainder of his forces on a series of ridges extending inland to the south and east.

The engagement that would come to be called the First Battle of El Alamein began on 1 July. Rommel's army (also depleted by the long campaign across Libya) attacked the British position in two groups. The Italian infantry divisions (organized into three weak corps) and the German 90th Light Division attacked the El Alamein perimeter itself while Rommel's mobile force, consisting of the 15th and 21st panzer divisions and the Italian *Ariete* Division, swung inland to crush the British flank.

The British, however, had learned from their earlier defeats, in which they had attempted to stop the enemy with a thin cordon of isolated strongpoints. Well-integrated British fortifications and powerful artillery fire handily repulsed the Italian infantry and the 90th Light Division along the El Alamein perimeter. Further inland, the 15th and 21st panzer divisions, which boasted a total of only 37 running tanks, ground to a halt when confronted by British forces in brigade and division strength fighting from high ground. A strong counterattack by New Zealand troops shattered the *Ariete* Division.

Sensing that Rommel's attack had stalled, Auchinleck ordered a counterattack. His most obvious course of action would have been to strike back at the panzer divisions that were endeavoring to turn his inland flank. Instead, he elected to attack the weakest of the Axis forces—the Italian infantry divisions along the coastal road running westward from the El Alamein perimeter. On 10 July, the newly arrived 9th Australian Division struck on this axis and drove the Italians back in a state of collapse. Rommel committed the last of his reserves to stabilize the situation along the coastal road, thus forfeiting the opportunity to renew his main effort further inland. Subsequent British attacks on 21 July further depleted his forces and left both sides too exhausted to fight. The First Battle of El Alamein ended in a tactical stalemate, but Eighth Army had saved Egypt and the Suez Canal.

Although this battle seems anticlimactic when compared to the campaigns that preceded and followed it, Rommel had in fact reached the high-water mark of his brilliant career in North Africa. He would attack again, but henceforth the British would enjoy a decisive advantage in numbers and materiel. Eighth Army would also soon receive a new commander—General Sir Bernard L. Montgomery.

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A German tank crew surrenders in the desert.